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PREFACE 
As the mythical k~ngdom of the Queen of Sheba 
and of Prester John, as the earliest African country 
to accept christianity, and lately as the only African 
country which escaped European rule in the nineteenth 
century, Ethiopia has attracted considerable attent~on 
to herself. From the beginning of the nineteenth 
century Britain became interested in Ethiopia, and in 
1. 
1848 established diplomatic relations with her. Besides 
commercial and strategical interests, the mid-Victorian 
spirit of civilizing the underdeveloped peoples had 
taken Britain to "the Horn of Africa." However, by 
1867 Britain's relations with Ethiopia had so much 
deteriorated that after conducting a successful military 
expedition she withdrew from that country without claiming 
for herself any advantages, either commercial or 
territorial. 
In the following pages an attempt has been made 
to narrate and analyse some aspects of the Anglo-Ethiopian 
relations; this is by no means a complete study of British 
policy in Ethiopia as it does not deal with all aspects 
of British relations with that country. The emphasis 
is political, and an effort has been made to show how, 
from the beginning, the incompatible attitudes and 
aspirations of the two countries constituted a 
stumbling block to the development of harmonious 
and mutually rewarding relations, and how the British 
government was compelled to send a military expedition 
to Ethiopia in 1867. 
This study is mostly based on the British 
Parliamentary papers for the period and the extant 
secondary sources; and since there has been no opportunity 
to consult primary sources no pretention is made to 
thoroughness or complete originality. 
I am much indebted to Dr. F. A. Hagar who gave 
me much guidance and encouragement during the initial 
stages of this research: much more I am indebted to 
Dr. L. Harris for having found time out of his busy 
schedule to go through this thesis to suggest corrections 
of syntax and style and to give me many invaluable 
suggestions about the organisation of my material. 
But for his unfailing support and encouragement it is 
difficult to see how I could ever have completed this 
work. I would also like to express my deep debt of 
gratitude to the staff of the Memorial University Library 
and to Dr. Mui and Professor Panting of the Dept. of 
History of the University for helping me in many ways. 
K.Venkat a r a m, 
Fe b r uar y ,1969 . 
ABSTRACT 
Though informal contacts between Britain and 
Ethiopia had existed from the eighteenth century, it 
was only in 1848 that Consular relations between the 
two powers were established. The need to counteract 
the growing French activity on the Red sea coast which 
seemed to threaten the sea route to India, the desire 
to extend British commerce in the region, and the 
mid-Victorian belief in civilizing underdeveloped 
people had prompted Britain to take the initiative. 
While Britain considered the 1848 treaty with 
Ethiopia a means to promote these aims, the Ethiopians, 
being uninterested in trade, tried to use it as a lever 
to obtain British support against the Turks from whom 
they hoped to recover some territories that had been 
a part of the historic Ethiopian empire. In this 
they were disappointed as Britain would not antagonize 
the Ottoman empire through which passed the traditional 
overland routes to India. This led to unfortunate 
misunderstandings since the Ethiopians considered as 
their enemies all those who were on friendly terms with 
Turkey. 
3. 
Since these positions were irreconcileable, 
Anglo-Ethiopian relations could hardly have been expected 
to fare better than they did. The actual rupture came 
as a consequence of Theodore's imprisonment of the 
British Consul and his subsequent intransigent attitude 
towards British proposals which in turn forced the 
British government to send a military expedition in 
1867 to free the captives and thus to restore the 
supposedly lost British prestige in the region. 
Having achieved these objectives, without 
claiming any concessions for herself, Britain withdrew 
from Ethiopia. This was no great sacrifice since to 
safe guard her interests on the Red Sea coast, which 
was under the control of friendly Turkey, Britain had 
no need to rule Ethiopia. Moreover, since 1848 France 
had ceased to be active in Ethiopia, and this had 
removed the chief motive for Britain's presence there. 
Above all the race for the partition of Africa had not 
yet begun. 
The two decades of British relations with 
Ethiopia seemed to be an exercise in futility. 
4. 
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CHAPTER I 
Though Britain did not establish official 
relations with Ethiopia till the mid-nineteenth 
century, her connections with that country go back to 
much earlier times. In 1769, three decades before 
Napoleon's expedition to Egypt, the great Scottish 
traveller James Bruce visited Ethiopia. 1 After 
Alvarez2 he was the first European who attained a 
position of some i mportance in that country and has 
contributed valuable information to our knowledge of 
Ethiopia and her people.3 Though George III graciously 
acceded to Bruce's request that the drawings made in 
Africa should be added to the royal collection4 the 
Bri-tish Government did not show interest in the African 
venture. At any rate Bruce's expedition did not lead 
to closer commercial or political relatbns with Ethiopia. 
However this attitude of unconcern passed away 
with the eighteenth century, and Napoleon's campaigns 
in Egypt attracted British attention to the Red Sea coast 
1. At the time of Bruce's visit Takla Haimanot was the 
nominal emperor of Ethiopia; but Ras Michael Sehul 
was the virtual ruler. 
2. Alvarez was the chaplain of the Portugese Embassy 
which visited Ethiopia in 1520, and he has left a 
valuable account of the country and its people. 
3. Edward Ullendorff, The Ethiopians, (London; Ox.U.P., 
1960), pp. 12. 
4. David Mathew, Ethiopia (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 
1947), pp. 82. 
Equally Britain's changing attitude towards slavery and 
commerce was at the root of her new interest in the 
'Horn o~ Africa•. In varying degrees the English 
travellers who came to Ethiopia in the first half of the 
nineteenth century were aware of these new interests.l 
The first of this new class of visitors showing 
imperial consciousness was George Annesley, the Viscount 
Valentia. He thought of exploring the new avenues of 
commerce and "the commercial advantages which might 
attend the opening of Abyssinia appeared worthy of 
attention.n2 In 1804 he set out on a voyage of explor-
ation, and on arriving at Massawa3 sent his secretary 
and draughtsman Henry Salt "to explore the country and 
to negotiate commercial contracts with the rulers."4 
Accompanied by Nathaniel Pearce5 Salt reached Antalo 
the capital of Ras Wolde Selassie, the ruler of Tigre, 
where after the initial suspicion of the Ras had been 
allayed they were treated well. Salt tried to impress 
upon the mind of the Ras the advantages of establishing 
commercial intercourse with the English who "are the 
uncontrolled masters of the sea.n6 But the idea of 
l. Ibid. pp. 104. 
2. Lord Valentia's travels, p. 4, Quoted, Mathew, op.cit. 
6. 
3. The Red Sea port of Ethiopia, at that time it was under 
the rule of the Turks. 
4. Ullendorff, op. cit., pp.15. 
5. Pearce, an Englishman, born in Middlesex, had an adven-
turous career. He met Salt in 1804, at Mocha, and 
accompanied him to Ethiopia. On Salt's departure he 
remained behind and took up service with Ras Wolde 
Selassie.i where he continued till 1818. He reaQh1ed Cairo in 81 and died there in 1820. For deta~ s 
7. 
peaceful commerce, at first, did not impress the Ras who 
also probably doubted the credentials of his visitors. 
"Even in the first conversation it was obvious while 
Salt was speaking of commerce the Viceroy was thinking of 
fire arms and war."1 Although the Ras permitted the 
party to proceed to Gondar to meet with the Emperor, 
because of the difficulties of communication Salt 
abandoned the plan and returned to Massawa to join his 
master. Valentia prided himself on the fact that he 
had reopened communication with Ethiopia and returned 
home determined to establish direct trade relations 
with that country. 
Though the Directors of the Ea st India Company 
turned down Valentia's proposals for tra ding with Ethiopia 
as "chimerical", a Mssrs. Jacob &, Co. agreed to give the 
plan a trial. Encouraged by this success Valentia 
approached Canning, the Foreign Secretary, to send an 
official mission to the Ethiopian emperor. He specially 
dwelt upon the political advantages of the contact to 
counterbalance the French intrigues among the Wahabis of 
Arabia. 2 Canning received the suggestion well, and on 
the recommendation of Valentia, commissioned Salt to carr¥ 
6. (contd. from previous page). Salt's Narrative, quoted 
by Mathew, op. cit.,p. 125. 
1. Mathew op. cit., pp. 120. 
2. Robbin Hallet, Penetration of Africa to 1815, (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965), pp. 390-91. 
certain gifts and a letter from George III to the 
emperor of Ethiopia, and instructed him to do his best 
a. 
to ascertain the state of Ethiopian commerce.1 However, 
it is significant, that Salt was not commissioned to 
negotiate either a commercial or political agreement 
with the ruler of Ethiopia. Probably the British 
Government's objective was limited to an exploration 
of new commercial avenues, and as yet they were not 
interested in establishing regular diplomatic or 
commercial relations. 
As on the previous occasion, Salt arrived at 
Antalo and was well received by Wolde Selassie. The 
political condition of the country had not changed 
since his earlier visit in 1804. Because of the 
internal difficulties and revolts Salt could not 
v.isit Gondar to meet with the Emperor and presented the 
gifts intended for him, which included some pieces of 
artillery, to Wolde Selassie. The immensely pleased 
Ras ordered "that a prayer should be offered up weekly 
for the health of His Majesty, the King of Great Britain," 
and also expressed his gratitude to him for regarding 
the welfare of his country. 2 Though he expressed his 
1. Ibid. 
2. Henry Salt, Voyages to Abyssinia, (London: 1814), 
pp. 209. 
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''utmost" wish to encourage intercourse with England, he 
did not fail to point out how the ignorance of his people, 
the unsettled state of the country and the Turkish control 
of the Ethiopian sea board constituted real hurdles to 
commerce, "could any plan, however, be arranged for 
obviating these difficulties ••• he would most readily 
concur in carrying it into ef'.fect."1 Wolde Selassie 
was not deaf to Salt's description of England as the 
unconquered mistress of the sea; nor was he wanting in 
an appreciation o.f English artillery. However, it was 
not in Salt's power to propose any plan of cooperation, 
and a little later, with plenty ·of good will behind him, 
he returned to England. 
Like Valentia, Salt was interested in promoting 
trade between the two countries. However, he considered 
the Turkish control of Massawa a hindrance to free 
commercial intercourse with Ethiopia, and thought that 
British occupation of any one point on the Ethiopian 
coast would remove this difficulty. This would not 
only create considerable demand for British Indian goods 
in Ethiopia, 2 but also ultimately lead to a diffusion 
of civilization in that quarter.3 But the British 
1. Ibid, pp. 297. 
2. Salt, op. cit, pp. 498. 
3. Hallet, op. cit, pp.394. 
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Government did not act on these suggestions. The mun 
reason for this appears to be the opposition of the 
East India Company which considered Ethiopia as its 
exclusive sphere of influence. For instance, in 1807 
when William Jacob applied for leave to open up trading 
relations with Ethiopia, the Directors of the Company 
opposed it on the ground that it would interfere with 
the Company's monopoly in East Africa.1 Finally, when 
the Bombay council, under the pressure of the British 
government agreed to Jacob's request, the Directors 
emphasized the fact that such an infringement of their 
monopoly was unknown in the annals of the Company. 2 
Apart from this, the expenses of Salt's mission which 
reached a disagreeable sum of £2900 had shown the British 
government how expensive it was to maintain direct 
relations with Ethiopia. Naturally they must have 
thought of leaving the matter in the hands of the Bombay 
Government, and they made no further efforts to follow 
up Salt's mission. 
Whatever the reasons for the disinterestedness 
of the Foreign Office, the Bombay government began to 
1. Jackson Haight, European Powers and South East Africa, 
1795-1856, {New York: A. Praeger, 1967), pp. 147. 
2. Quoted by Haight, op. cit., pp. 147. I.O.R. Hom. Mia. 
Series, Vol. 494, 509, 16, 515, Ramsay-Fawkner, I, 
East India House, 24, Dec, 1807. 
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evince greater interest in Ethiopia. The East India 
Company had established a factory at Mocha and had 
improved their trading prospects by concluding a treaty 
with Aden in 1802.1 Bombay ships regularly visited 
the East African coast and traded with Massawa, the 
Somali coast and Mocha. The Directors of the East India 
Company were anxious to explore new commercial avenues 
and were urging the Bombay government "to increase by 
every practical endeavour the vend of woollens and other 
staples" in that region. 2 P~litical agents were told 
to collect information about conditions in Arabia, the 
Red Sea Coast and Ethiopia.3 The Bombay government lost 
no time in implementing the policy of the Directors of 
the Company, for, Coffin4 tells us that on his arrival 
at Mocha, in 1809, Captain Rudland, the Agent of the 
Company "was obliging enough to disclose his orders from 
the Bombay government for opening commercial intercourse 
with Ethiopia. 5 As a matter of fact Rudland informed 
1. Cambridge History of The British Empire, Vol XII, pp.568. 
2. I.O.R. Bombay Secret Letters, Vo1.76, Bombay Council -
The Court of Directors, Quored by Haight, op.cit. pp.l54. 
3. Bombay P & S proceedings 383, Vola, 2731, Presidents 
Minutes, March 16, 1809, para 6, quoted by Haight, 
op. cit., pp.l54. 
4. An English traveller and adventurer who accompanied 
Henry Salt to Ethiopia. He served Sebargadis and 
Oobeay of Tigre respectively and on their behalf 
conducted political missions to England in 1828 and 
1841 respectively. 
5. Salt's Travels in Abyssinia, pp. 121, quoted, Mathews. 
op. cit., pp.l33. 
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Wolde Selassie of the desire of the Bombay Government 
to k eep up regular communication with Ethiopia1 , ·and 
sent him a hand organ as a present. 2 Following this, 
in June 1809, Pearce was a ppointed as the East India 
Company's commercial agent in Ethiopia.3 However Wolde 
Selassie was not enthusiastic about these approaches as 
he was convinced of the futility of these relations eo 
long as the Turks controlled the Red Sea ports. Moreover, 
his country had not much to offer in exchange for goods.4 
Though Pearce remained in Ethiopia till 1818 no 
commercial advantages accrued from his efforts. 
Despite this, intermittent political contacts 
were maintained between the two countries. In 1828 
Sabargadis, who had succeeded Wolde Selassie in Tigre, 
sent through Coffin some presents to George III, and 
requested the British Government to send some horsemen, 
doctors, painters and other craftsmen to teach his people 
new methods of civiliza tion. More importantly, he f 
sought arms and ammunition to fight his internal enemies. 5 I 
Lord Aberdeen, the Foreign Secretary, ignored these requestsf 
but this attitude could not remain unchang-ed for long. 
1. Ibid. 
2. Haight, op. cit., pp. 393. 
3. Haight, op. cit., pp. 155. 
4. Salt, op. cit., pp. 297. 
5. Thomas. E. Marston, Britain's Imperial Role in The Red 
Sea, 1800-76, (Hamden; 1961), pp. 115. 
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By 1830 religious and strategical considerations 
had begun to challenge the old British attitudes towards 
Ethiopia. In that year the Church Missionary Society 
o~ London sent Samuel Gobat to spread the protestant 
~aith in Ethiopia. But protestant teaching with its 
disregard for the traditional worship o~ the Virgin Mary 
antagonised the Ethiopians, and in 1832, Dezaj Oobeay of 
Tigre expelled Gobat ~rom his territories. Undaunted 
by this reverse, the Church Missionary Society persisted 
in their effort, and sent Lewis Krap~1to continue the work 
started by Gobat. On his arrival in Tigre Krapf ~ound 
two Roman Catholic missionaries, Arnold Abbadie and 
Thomas Abbadie, in the confidence of the Tigrean ruler. 
Finding the field favourable ~or the propagation of the 
Roman Catholic ~aith Thomas Abbadie went to Rome and with 
the support of Cardinal Franzini2 procured the appointment 
of a Catholic mission to Ethiopia of which Justin De Jacobis 
was made the head. Abbadie also sought the assistance 
of Palmerston for his mission on the pretext that it 
would ultimately pave the way for commercial intercourse 
with Ethiopia. The Foreign Secretary helped the mission 
by procuring for it safe passage through Egypt and 
Massawa. He also sent a letter to Dezaj Oobeay promising 
1. A German missionary who later distinguished himself 
as the first European to visit Mt. Kilmanjiro. 
2. The head of the Propaganda Department of the Vaticano 
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Britain's good offices in terminating the border diffi-
culties with Egypt. 1 Though the Catholic mission under 
Jacobis at first, fared well, in the end it suffered as 
much as Gobat•s protestant mission. Jacobis could not 
accomplish much because of his illconsidered interference 
in the local religious and political practice which 
brought upon him the hatred of the Ethiopian orthodox 
church. 2 
Furthermore, in the 1830's France's activity in 
Ethiopia and the Red Sea region caused great anxiety in 
Britain and led her to interfere actively in that region. 
In 1835 two Frenchmen, Combes and Tamasier, undertook a 
private expedition to Ethiopia and reached Shoa. As 
King Sahale Selassie of Shoa believed them to be capable 
of making weapons for him he reluctantly allowed them to 
leave his country. Their mission stirred the French 
government's interest in Ethiopia, and led them to send 
a scientific mission under Lt. Charlemagne Theophile 
Lefbvre to explore Ethiopia and the Red Sea coast. 
expedition appears to have been largely scientific in 
character although it was instructed to report on the 
"This 
possibilities of colonization in Abyssinia."3 However 
1. This was a reply to Oobeay 1 s letter which Abbadie had 
conveyed to the British Government. 
2. This account is based on Marston's Britain's Imperial 
Role in the Red Sea. pp. 117-118. 
3. Marston, op. cit., pp. 119. 
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it did not lead to any political results. A little 
later a young French man, Rochet De'Hericourt, set out 
on a private adventure and arrived in Shoa in 1839. He 
presented to Sahale Selassie a mill ~or making gun powder 
and in~luenced him in favour o~ France. Krapf who 
happened to be in Shoa on the invitation o~ the King 
kept the British Government in~ormed of the Frenchman's 
alleged intriguing disposition. In October 1839, the 
French Ministry of Marine sent Ferret1 and Galinier2(two 
French explorers) to explore Ethiopia. 
The East India Company was so much disturbed by 
the French activity that on July 2, l840, the Secret 
Committee of the India Board instructed Haines, their 
political Resident at Aden "to take such steps quietely 
as would secure for Great Britain a preference either in 
political or commercial points of view or both in that 
part of the African coast which is opposite Aden, as the 
settlement of any other European commercial agency or 
military station on the coast would be detrimental to 
British interests,n3 With a view to securing the control 
of the coast Haines purchased from a local chief, for 
11,000 crowns, the Musa 1slands4 at the head of the Bay 
of Tajura. 5 Since French military vessels continued to 
traverse the Red Sea region, the East India Company's 
1 and 2. Captains in the French Staff Corps. 
3, BSC, Secret Committee - Haines, 7/2.40. Quoted by 
Marston, op. cit, p. 121. 
4. Two tiny islands facing the Bay of Tajura in the Red Sea. 
5. Marston, op, cit, pp. 127. 
agents at Aden suspected that the French were aiming 
to establish a footing in Ethiopia. 1 
16. 
In March 1840, Rochet d'Hericourt departed for 
France and it was rumoured that he had grandiose plans 
to establish firmly French influence in Shoa. Krapf 
advised the British government to seize the opportunity 
of Rochet's absence to increase their influence in Shoa 
and spoke enthusiastically of the Shoan ruler's desire 
to civilize his people. 2 At the same time he induced 
Sahale Selassie to seek help from the British Indian 
government. Accordingly, Sahale Selassie requested 
the Indian government to supply him with guns, cannons, 
medicines and doctors.3 Meanwhile, in view of the 
increased French activity, the Foreign Office, through 
the Board of Control, had advised the government of India 
to establish good relations with the King of Shoa. The 
latter assigned this task to the Government of Bombay 
who appointed Cor.nwalis Harris of the Bombay Engineers 
corps to lead a mission to Shoa.4 Harris was instructed 
to enter into a convention with the King of Shoa, to make 
necessary scientific explorations, to obtain a geographical 
knowledge of the area, to search diligently for coal, to 
ascertain markets for British Indian manufactures, and to 
check slavery. The governor of Bombay emphasised the 
1. Marston, op. cit, pp. 112. 
2. Ibid, pp. 127. 
3. Marston, op. cit., pp. 128. 
4. Ibid. 
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fact that theestablishment of French influence in Ethiopia 
would prove prejudicial to British interests in the Red 
Sea region, and ins t ructed Harris to use all legitimate 
means to couteract the schemes of French aggrandisement. 1 
The expedition sailed from Bombay towards the 
end of April 1841 and reached Ankobar, the capital of 
Shoa, in July 1841. Harris presented gifts to Sahale 
Selassie which included Cashmere shawls, Delhi scarves, 
and ornamental chiming clocks. The musical boxes were 
brought in and set to play "God Save the Queen". Three 
hundred muskets with fixed bayonets were carried forward 
and piled immediately in front of the royal stool. "God 
will reward you for I cannot,"2 exclaimed the sovereign. 
Harris's mission impressed Sahale Selassie so much that, 
in November 1841, he signed a treaty of commerce and 
friendship with the British Indian government. Though 
friendship was established, and mutual good will had been 
expressed, because of the complex political situation in 
Shoa, no good came of the treaty. As to containing French 
influence Britain did not accomplish much. Even before 
Harris's departure from Shoa, Hericourt returned and 
influenced Sahale Selassie to sign a similar treaty with 
France. However, neither France nor Britain benefited 
from this, as the tribal wars within Shoa closed that 
1. lBSC, 1841, Bombay Government - Harris, Quoted Marston, 
op. cit., pp. 132. 
2. Cornwallis Harris, The Highlands of Ethiopia, VoL$II pp~O 
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province to all external trade, and in 1843 Sahale 
Selassie forbade all foreigners from entering his country. 
In northern Ethiopia also, Anglo French rivalry 
continued unabated, and the East India Company's navy kept 
a constant watch on the French activity around Massawa1 
the strategical importance of which had increased for 
Britain since her occupation of Aden in 1832. In 1841, 
while the French were still struggling to build their 
influence in Tigre, the British had suffered considerable 
reverses in that region because of the unwise policy of 
the Foreign Office. In 1841 Dezaj Oobeay of Tigre being 
anxious to cultivate friendly relations with Britain had 
sent through Coffin some presents to the Queen. Lord 
Aberdeen had ignored Oobeay by not even sending him a 
reply, and when Coffin returned to Tigre with empty hands 
the infuriated Ras had threatened to imprison him. Although 
he did not carry out this threat it is clear that he was 
greatly displeased with the British. 
Thus by 1842 British influence in northern Ethiopia 
was at a low ebb, and Sho~for all practical purposes, had 
remained closed to them. The French were active in the 
Red Sea region and Britain was not prepared to see them 
entrenched there. It seemed time ~or a reconsideration 
of British policy in Ethiopia and the Red Sea coast. 
This task would be undertaken by Palmerston. Meanwhile 
it would be well to take a look at the changes in British 
1. For details see Marston, op. cit., pp. 169-73. 
attitudes towards Africa in general, and the particular 
circumstances that led to the establishment of consular 
relations with Ethiopia. 
19. 
CHAPTER II. 
From the time of Bruce's visit to Gondar in 
1769 to that of Harris to Shoa in l84l vast changes had 
occured in British attitudes towards Africa. As the age 
of exploration proceeded the mystery surrounding Africa 
was being cleared up. The continent had become an object 
of study for geographical societies, missionaries, and 
the learned public. Several expeditions had been sent 
to West Africa with a view to discovering the sources of 
the Niger and the Congo. Mungo Park, Clapperton, Lander, 
MacGregor and Walter Oudney had contributed to Europe's 
knowledge, while many Britons had come ·to realize that the 
vast regions of Africa would provide an extensive field 
for their activities, be they re~ious or commercial. 
In the mid-nineteenth century Britain was fast 
becoming the workshop of the world and she needed new 
markets for her manufactures and cheap raw materials for 
her industries. Her prosperity seemed to depend on the 
opening up of new markets in Asia and Africa, particularly 
since many in Britain thought that British goods were being 
excluded from European markets because of the rivalry of 
other European manufacturers. 1 
1. 
"The English merchant was crying for markets 
and customers ••••• The Grahamstown Journal in 
the 1830's and 1840's excitedly extolled the 
benefits to the English manufacturer, the 
merchant, and the colonial trader, if the 
artificial wants of the Africans in the 
interior were stimulated by the taste for 
European goods. "l · 
21. 
The need for markets outside Europe, the U.S.A. and the 
British Empire, had been felt acutely during the Napoleonic 
and the Madison wars. 2 Palmerston who was convinced that 
the British should unremittingly endeavour to Xind in 
other parts of the world new vents for their produce was 
persistently working towards this end.3 In May 1839, the 
British Government had concluded a convention of commerce 
with Zanzibar, and in 1840 with the ruler of Mocha in 
the Arabian peninsula. Likewise, Palmerston had opened 
up the Muslim states of North Africa for British trade 
and these had become useful fields of British business. 
He, therefore felt that it would be worthwile to extend 
this experiment to the Horn of Africa as well. 
Besides trade, humanitarian considerations drew 
Britain's attention to the Horn of Africa. Since the 
beginning of the nineteenth century Britain had been 
fighting against the slave trade on the West A£rican coast, 
and she was anxious to put an end to this nefarious traffic 
1. M.V. Jackson, Haight, European Powers and South East 
Africa, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967) pp.248. 
2. Donald Southgate, "The Most English Minister" Policies 
& Politics of Palmerston, (London: Macmillan, 1966) pp.137 . 
3. Palmerston-Auckland, "n.d." quoted by Wbster, op. cit, 
pp. 751. 
on the East African coast also. As early as 1822 she 
had concluded a treaty with the Sultan of Zanzibar :for 
stopping the slave tra de in his dominions, and this 
treaty had been renewed in 1840, and in 1845 the Sultan 
was induced to "put an absolute ban on the export of 
slaves from his African dominions."1 However this did 
not stop the slave trade in the Horn of Africa and many 
helpless Sudanese and Ethiopians were being sold into 
slavery at Massawa, Jidda and Suakin. Palmers ton 
believed that Britain had a special responsibility to 
free the slave and civilize him; that is to say he 
believed that "besides the negative duty of stopping the 
enslavement of Africans, there was the positive duty of 
helping them towards civilization and commerce.n2 One 
might go even farther and say that Palmerston, like many 
of his contemporaries, believed that legitimate trade was 
the soveriegn remedy for the slave trade and that the 
underdeveloped peoples might be civilized by the general 
influence of commerce. Nor did he admit the right of any 
backward country to exclude European influence. 3 Thus God 
and mammon could be served simultaneously. 
Apart from humanitarian and commercial conside r ations, 
22. 
1. Robinson, Gallagher with Dennyt Africa and The Victorians 
(London: MacMillan & Co., 1965) pp. 16. 
2. Southgate, op. cit., pp. 147. 
3. Ibid. pp. 144-45. 
strategical motives had also begun to attract Palmerston's 
attention to the East African coast. "Africa remained 
peripheral to the Mediterranean and, the Indian Empire, 
and the routes; to the East."1 After the acquisition of 
Aden in 1837, the Red sea coast facing Aden had assumed 
a new importance to Britain. But in the 1830's French 
influence hadincxeased in Mohammed Ali's Egypt, and the 
French occupation of the islands of NosseLbe, and Mayolla 
between 1830 andl8 3suggested· that they aspired to ~oat­
holds on the Mainland at Moabaaa, and even ~rther north. 
Since 1840 France had been showing deep interest in Abyssinia, 
and if French in~luence there became a reality, and i~ 
Mohammed Ali co-operated with them, it would have certainly 
posed a challenge to British interests in the region. It 
was Palmerston 1 s resolution that the "mistress of India 
cannot permit France to be the mistress directly or indir-
ectly of the road to her Indian dominions." 3 Thus by the 
1840's the British Government had sufficient reasons to 
become interested in Abyssinia. Britain's needs and 
necessities as much as her humanitarianism, made it desirable 
for her to enter into the Horn of Africa. 
1. Robinson, Gallagher with Denny, op. cit., pp. 17. 
2. Ibid., pp. 43. 
3. H. L. Hoskins, British Routes to India, (New York: Frank 
Case & Co., Reprint, 1966.) pp. 268. 
However Palmerston's decision to establish 
consular relations with Ethiopia was largely influenced 
by Walter Plowden. 1 During the course of his Ethiopian 
travels between 1842 and 1846, Plowden had been impressed 
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by the natural wealth of the country, and saw great prospects 
for the extension of British trade in that region. The 
opportunity to convey his views to the British Government 
came in 1846 when Ras Ali, the defacto ruler of Ethiopia, 
asked him to be the bearer of certain presents to Queen 
Victoria. 
On 16 October, 1846, Plowden wrote to Palmerston 
about the wish of Ras Ali to send some presents to Queen 
Victoria as a token of his friendship towards Britain. 
Plowden pointed out that the Ras had no political ends in 
view, but that in any case it would serve Britain well to 
encourage his approaches, since any rejection would be 
bound to irritate him, and render difficult the access to 
his 11magnificent" country. 2 In this vein Plowden approached 
the Foreign Secretary, and Palmerston instructed him to 
proceed to England with the Ras's presents, and provided 
l. Plowden was the son of a Bengal civil servant. He was 
born in 1820. As a youth he joined the service of a 
Calcutta Anglo-Indian firm. As he did not like the 
sedentary life at Calcutta he decided to return to England. 
On his way to England, at Suez, he met John Bell, an 
Englishman who was in the service of Ras Ali. With the 
ambition of discovering the source of the White Nile, 
Plowden accompanied Bell to Ethiopia where he travelled 
extensively from 1842 to 1846. 
2. Great Britain, parliamentary papers; 1867-68, Vol. LXXII, 
Correspondence Respecting Abyssinia 1846-1868 (hereafter 
referred as "PP" - unless otherwise mentioned reference is 
to Vol. LXXII - p.2. Plowden-Falmerston, 15th October 1846 
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him with funds for the journey from Alexandria to London. 1 
Soon after his arrival in England, in August, 1847, 
Plowden submitted to the Foreign Office a memorandum on 
Abyssinia. 2 As his first report left many questions 
unanswered, Addington of the Foreign Office enquired of 
him whether British goods would find a ready market in 
Ethiopia, and whether the Red Sea route offered enough 
security to maintain permanent commercial contact with 
Ethiopia. 3 
In reply Plowden submitted another memorandum to 
the Foreign Office on 28 August, 1847 giving a fairly 
accurate picture of the Ethiopian economy. He explained 
that the export goods of Ethiopia - spices, musk and wax -
were produced by the Galla provinces of Enarea, Kaffa Dji a, 
Gooraguay, and Jingera,4 that much of the uncultivated land 
was favourable for the production of indigo and that the 
neighbourhood of Massawa in northern Ethiopia was particu-
larly suitable for cotton cultivation; that in the Highlands 
of Ethiopia cattle flourished well and offered good prospects 
for developing trade in them: that western Ethiopia supplied 
gold and ivory and that he thought Ethiopia to be rich in 
Saltpeter, sulphur, iron, copper and gold. Furthermore he 
1. Marston, op. cit., pp. 176. 
2. uP.P." LXXII p. 3-5, Plowden's Memorandum on Ethiopia, 
13 August, 1847. 
3. uP.P." p. 5, Addington-Plowden, 18 August, 1847. 
4. These districts are in Western Ethiopia. 
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he thought that in Ethiopia there existed a demand for 
manufactured goods which Britain could fill; since the 
Abyssinians used mostly cottonwear a potential market 
existed for plain and printed calicoes and other varieties 
of textiles which could be supplied from Bombay with which 
port trade already existed. Also there was a demand for 
red Morocco, frankincense, bottles, mirrors andmrpets. 
The Ethiopians liked English cutlery, and other British 
manufactures which Bombay merchants were already supplying 
to them. 
Much of the Ethiopian produce was transported 
from Western Ethiopia by mules to the port of Massawa which 
was the main centre of Ethiopian foreign trade. Plowden 
estimated the duties levied on export goods at Massawa at 
about 70,000 dollars per annum. Con sidering the variety 
of Ethiopian produce, this was not an impressive sum; 
rather it showed the adverse conditions under which the 
commerce of a potentially wealthy country struggled. 
Plowden recognised three major obstacles to 
Ethiopian trade; first of al~the Turks at Massawa created 
many bottlenecks which interfered with the smooth flow of 
commerce; secondly, the Ethiopians had only a vague and 
limited idea of the value of commerce and failed to 
adhere to their commercial contracts; thirdly,they lacked 
an organised system of imposts and duties which worked 
against the trader, as he had to pay heavy taxes on his 
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merchandise every time he passed through the territory of 
a different chief. Plowden was hopeful that if Britain 
helped remove these obstacles the Ethiopian trade would 
quadruple within a short time. 1 
Plowden also drew Palmerston's attention to the 
slave trade in Ethiopia whose christian subjects were 
being sold into slavery by the muslim merchants at Massawa. 
The Egyptian and the Turkish authorities also participated 
in this trade which was reluctantly permitted by the ruler 
of Tigre, for the sake of the revenues it brought him. 
But it was Plowden's contention that he could be induced 
to stop the slave trade if British influence were combined 
with evidence that other sources of revenue could be 
developed. 2 
But Plowden did not rely on the commercial argu-
menta alone. He also raised the spectre of the French 
menace. He reported rumours that the French had bought 
an island named Edd on the Abyssinian coast, and that they 
were persistently endeavouring to establish their influence 
in the court of Tigre.3 To substantiate the rumours he 
could point out that in 1846 the French Government had sent 
four different mis s ions to the court of Tigre.4 And he 
explained that because this would jeopardise the British 
l. 
2. 
"P.P", p. 5-8, The above account if based on Plowden's 
memoranda on Abyssinian trade dated 13 August, 1847 and 
18 August 1847. 
Ibid. 
3. Ibid. 
4. np.pn, p. 3-5, 6-8, Plowden's Memorandum. 
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position if left unchecked he had advised Rasoob.a~ through 
Coffin not to enter into an understanding with the French 
before knowing the mind of Britain on the matter. 1 
Plowden thought that the possession of Massawa 
or any other convenient point on the Red Sea coast of 
Ethiopia by Britain, and the appointment of a consul in 
that place would help improve the situation. The consul 
would not only keep an eye on French activities but would 
also establish a friendly intercourse with Ethiopia which, 
in the long run, would lead to a vast improvement in the 
social and political life of that country. 
However, the first step would be to establish 
closer and friendly ties with Ethiopia, and he advised the 
British Government to send a friendly reply to the Ras 
placing more emphasis on the superiority of Britain in 
arts and sciences and less on powers in war, as the councillor: 
of the Ras had an unidentified jealousy on this point. 2 
Plowden was optimistic that a friendly treaty with the 
Ras would ensure Britain access into all his dominions, 
while a resident at his court "might ensure with little 
tact his correspondence in all our views."3 He felt that 
should the British Government let go this occasion to 
cultivate friendly relations with Ras Ali, perhaps it would 
be a source of regret. 
1. Ibid. 
2."P.P", p. 2, Plowden-Palmerston, Oct. 1846. 
3. Plowden's Memorandum, ibid. 
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Plowden's report impressed Palmerston as it 
threw light on all three of the aspects of the situation 
in which he was interested. Ethiopia held out the 
prospects of an attractive market for British manufacturers, 
a market in which the East India Company was also interested, 
In any case the British Indian merchants at Massawa, who 
were trading with Ethiopia, needed constant protection, 
and Palmerston who believed it to be "the business of the 
Government to open and secure the roads to mercl:mnts 11 , saw 
such an opportunity to open such a road into Ethiopia, a 
possibility which had occurred to him as early as 1840.1 
But Harris's treaty with the King of Shoa had shown that 
the mere conclusion of a commercial treaty with the native 
rulers would not lead to positive results. A British 
consul on the spot, however, would not only promote trade, 
but would also be more effective in counteracting French 
influence and in stopping slavery. 
Other forces were also urging Palmerston to 
establish a consulate at Massawa. For instance, Murray, 
the British consul-General at Cairo wrote that: 
nit is not only the encroachment of Egypt, but 
also the intrigues of France that require to be 
closely watched, on that coast, for if the 
independence of Abyssinia and the free egress 
of its produce be duly secured, it will afford 
a gradually increasing field for the extension 
of British commerce.n.2 
1. Webster, op. cit., PP• 751. 
2. F.O. 78/708, Murray-Palmerston, 10.2.47. 
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At the same time Dr. Beke, a writer and a traveller, 
was urging Palmerston to open a consulate on the Red Sea 
coast of Abyssinia to promote trade and to watch the French 
activity. 1 Under these circumstances Palmerston decided 
to establish consu.lar relations with Ethiopia. Having 
been interviewed and recommended by Hammond of the Foreign 
Office, Walter Plowden was appointed as Br~tish Consul to 
Ethiopia, though the consulate itself was to be established 
at Massawa. 
1. Marston, op. cit., pp. 174. 
CHAPTER III 
In his letter of instructions to Plowden, 
Palmerston wrote that in establishing a consulate at 
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Massawa the British government had no intention of acquiring 
territories in that part of Africa, and wished only to 
extend British commerce in that region. He instructed 
Plowden to report from Massawa the condition of that port, 
the state of the Abyssinian trade, the stability of the 
governments and rulers of that region, and then to proceed 
to the court of Ras Ali, the de facto ruler of Ethiopia, 
and to assure him of the earnest desire of the British 
Government to maintain the most friendly relations with him 
and his country, and to impress upon him the fact that the 
surest way of maintaining and strengthening such relations 
would be to encourage commercial dealings. 1 Palmerston 
was anxious to sign a treaty of commerce with Ethiopia 
without losing time, and he gave a draft treaty to Plowden 
for the consideration of the Ras should he find him interested 
in such a proposition. Palmerston himself addressed a 
letter to Ras Ali expressing the hope that he would percieve 
the great advantages which his conntry would derive by 
intimate connections •with the sovereign of Britain whose 
dominions extend from the rising to the setting sun, 2 and 
l. ~P.P", p. 8b, Pa1merston-Plowden, 3 Jan. 1848. 
2. Palmerston-Ras Ali, Ibid, p. 9. 
whose fleet are to be met with in every part of the sea 
which encompasses the earth. 
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Plowden arrived at Massawa in August 1848, and 
soon established the consulate at Mancullo, a village on 
the mainland. In the following December he left for the 
interior of Ethiopia, and a little later established fairly 
anxious to cultivate good relations with Britain promised 
Plowden 'protection and convoy through his terri tories•. 1 
In February, 1849, Plowden arrived at Debra Tabor 
and delivered to Ras Ali Palmerston's letter and the presents 
from the Queen. The delighted Ras promised to do~erything 
in his power to retain the friendship of the English nation, 2 
and on 2 November, 1849, signed Palmerston's proposed treaty 
of friendship ahd commerce with Britain. 
The treaty consisted o:f nineteen articles, and 
it began by expressing the mid-victorian belief that commerce 
was a grea t source of wealth, and that its fruits could 
only be realized when trading partners were firmly united 
in friendship. Article IV :forbade the granting of a t~ading 
monopoly or exclusive privileges to any country. Articles 
XI and XII required the Ethiopian government to encourage 
the merchants of the interior of Africa to bring their 
produce to the Ethiopian markets, and to promote trade with 
other parts of the world. Article s IV, X and XI significantlJ 
1. "P.PU, pp. 25. Plowden-Palmerston, Jan 27, l849o 
2. np.p.n pp. 30. Plowden-Palmerston, March 3, 1849. 
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show Britain's belief in the Horn of Africa. However, 
t his did not prevent her from trying to control the trade 
routes of Ethiopia, for, article XIII, by entrusting 
responsibility to keep open and secure the avenues of 
approach between the sea coast and Ethiopia to both the 
governments, virtually entrusted control over the trade 
routes to Britain. Article V aimed at protecting trade 
from excessive taxation by fixing duties at 5% on all 
imports and exports. Article XVII offered extra-territorial 
jurisdiction to British subjects by placing them under the 
jurisdiction of the British consul in that country. 1 
It is significant that Ras Ali did not propose 
changes in the draft treaty, and did not even object to 
article XVII, which could only mean that either he was 
insincere or indifferent, and indifference based on pessimism 
seems most likely. Certainly he had only a lukewarm 
interest in the trade2 and his contributions to the nego-
tiations were limited to a request for dollars wherewith 
to pay his soldiers.3 Plowden reported to Palmerston that 
his remarks on reading the treaty were that the proposals 
were excellent, but probably in ten years on English 
merchant might trade to Gondar.4 This mood of pessimism 
did not augur well for a prosperous trade between the two 
countries. 
1. Parliamentary Papers, 1867-686 Vol. LXXII, pp. 39-41. The Treaty of Friendship and ommerce between Great 
Britain and Abyssinia, signed on 2 November, 1849. 
2. Swen Rubenson, Kin of Kin s Tewodros of Ethio ia, 
( airobi: Oxfor Universi y Press., 9 , pp. • 
3-"E.P." p. 45, Ras Ali-Victoria, "n.d.tt Plowden's despatch 
of 2 Jan, l8BO. - . 
4."P.P.", pp. 69 Plowden-Palmerston, Apr1l 2, 1850. 
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From the beginning the commercial treaty had 
only a limited significance as Ras Ali's writ did not 
run throughout Ethiopia, and even his territories could 
not be reached without the previous permission of Dezaj 
Oobeay whose dominions bordered the Red Sea. Ali practic-
ally had no say in the administration of these vast regions 
by which Oobeay controlled every avenue to the interior 
of the country available for trade or policy. Hence 
Plowden realized the necessity of cultivating good relations 
with the Tigrean chief. This was also necessary to stamp 
out whatever French influence survived in Tigre by making 
Oobeay amenable to British influence. Fortunately for 
Plowden an opportunity occured to accomplish this when 
Oobeay approached him for British help against the Turks. 
The Tigrean ruler being closer to the Turkish seats of 
power in the Red Sea region saw more clearly than Ras Ali 
the menace to Ethiopian independence , in the persistently 
unreasonable treatment of Ethiopian merchants at Massawa, 
and much more so in the latest efforts of the Turks to 
establish their sovereignty over the Red Sea regions of 
Ethiopia. Since Oobeay lacked the requisite strength to 
force the Turks to behave properly, he was anxious to have 
Britain's support for his plans. Plowden transmitted 
these details to the Foreign Office.l However before 
this despatch could reach the Foreign Office, the increasing 
1. "P~P." pp. 69, Plowden-Palmerston, October 29, 1849. 
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Turkish menace forced Oobeay to march against them. The 
Turks who had legal rights over the port of Massawa only, in 
an attempt to extend their authority to the mainland, had 
overthrown the Naib of Arkeeko, a vassal of the Tigrean 
ruler. As this was an open challenge to Ethiopian 
sovereignty Oobeay could not remain indifferent, and he 
sent a force of eight to twelve thousand soldiers to dis-
lodge the Turks and to re-establish his authority on the 
mainland of Massawa. His soldiers burnt and pillaged the 
region, and after collecting 13,000 German crowns from the 
Turks returned to Tigre. 1 In spite of this Oobeay did not 
insist that the Turks leave the island of Massawa, but only 
that they withdraw from the mainland, so that he could once 
again entrust its rule to his vassal. Transmitting these 
details to Palmerston, . Plowden recommended that should OoBeay 
seek British intervention to decide the dispute, they should 
uphold his rights by refusing to reco gnise the Turkish 
sovereignty over the mainland of Massawa. 2 As expected by 
Plowden Oobeay applied for British help, and his letter ~o 
the Queen expresses Ethiopian expectations. He wrote: 
"Formerly my ancestors were in possession of, and 
governed all the coast of the Red Sea and Massawa 
•••• oRecently the Turks took Massawa. You are a 
christian Queen and a friend of the christians. 
You are powerful and now I will request your 
friendship (and hope) that you will not permit 
the Mohammedans forces to ravage and occupy my 
territories, but insist on their remaining content 
with the island of Massawa (though that even they 
have no right) without setting their foot on the 
mainland, or interfering with the Naib that I 
l."P.P.", pp. 26 Plowden-Palmerston, Jan. 28, 1849. 
2. np.P.", pp.26. Plowden-Palmerston, Jan 28, 18499 
appoint at Arkeeko and the coast - I wish 
much for the friendship of the English and 
trust that now you will show the sincerity 
of goodwill towards Abyssinia. 1 
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Plowden urged Palmerston not to let down Oobeay 
as such an opportunity to increase British influence might 
not occur often. 2 But Palmerston took a different view 
of the situation and declined to interfere in the political 
affairs of Ethiopia. He did not like to offend Turkey 
whose co-operation was necessary to check the Russian 
expansion towards Constantinople and the main line of 
communication with India. Moreover an inimical Turkey 
could be as dangerous as Russia itself. In fact he had 
written to Sir William Temples at Naples that "Turkey is 
as good an occupier of roads as an active Arabian sovereign 
would be." 3 So he refused to interfere . in the Abyssinian 
dispute and informed Obeay that since the Sultan of Turkey 
was also a friend of the Queen it would be improper for the 
British Government to interfere in the matter without being 
asked to do so by both the dissentient parties. 4 This was 
a real damper on Oobeay who told Plowden that "you say you 
are friendly to us and to our religion, we dont see yet". 5 
l."P.P.", pp. 30 Ras Oobeay-Victoria, "n.d." incl~ 49. 
2. ttp. P." pp. 29, Plowden-Palmerston, March 3, 1849. 
3. Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, Vol 2, pp.l62. 
4. "P.P.n pp. 42,Palmerston-00bie, July 3, 1849. 
5. "P.P.", pp. 42, Plowden-Palmerston, April 2, 1850. 
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Like Ali and Oobeay the King ofShoa was also keen 
on maintaining good relations with Britain. Indeed, in the 
light of the earlier interest they had shown in Shoa, he 
expected much from the British Government. In 1849 he 
sent, through Krapf, a few presents to the Queen, and in 
return he requested the British Government to send him one 
thousand five hundred dollars in gold coins. 1 A little 
later he requested the British political Agent at Aden to 
supply himwith certain medicines and gun powder. 2 While 
Palmerston £orwarded a box of 300 sovereigns to the Shoan 
King, he ordered the political Agent not to provide him 
with gun powder. 3 Not only was he disappointed by this 
but from this time began to suspect British intentions in 
Ethiopia. He feared that the English would deprive him 
of his territories, and he was convinced that they had the 
power to do soo 4 Palmerston tried to allay his fears by 
informing him through Plowden "that the British Govern ent 
entertained no aggressive intentions whatsoever with respect 
to any portion of Abyssinia."5 
1. np. p. n, pp. 28, Letter of the Shoan King to the Queen. 
2. "P.P. 
" 
pp. 32, King of Shoa - Political Agent at Aden, , 
July 4, 1849. 
3. "P.P. 
" 
pp. 56, Pa1merston-Hobhouse, November 25, 1850. , 
4. 11P.P.", p. 46, Plowden-Palmerston, Jan. 3, 1850. 
5. "P.P." , pp. 51, Palmerston-Plowden, June 7, 1850. 
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Not only did Britain refuse to supply arms and 
ammunition to the Abyssinian chiefs and interfere in their 
disputes with the Turks, but also she withheld her official 
protection to Ethiopian pilgrims at Jerusalem. The 
Ethiopians to whom the church of Holy Sepulchre and the 
asoociated convent belonged were in intercommunion with 
Armenians and Copts. Each year a number of Ethiopians 
visited the Holy City. ~ter 1838 they had fallen on evil 
days and the Turks illtreated them. Plowden evinced 
interest in the matter and r.equested Fin, the British Consul 
at Jerusalem, to give all possible assistance to Ethiopians 
at that place.1 A little later the Ethiopian priests 
residing in the city applied to Consul Fin for help and 
protection and to restore to them the church w~th the 
Armenians had seized. Fin's effective intervention procured 
for them some of their rights2 but though Palmerston approved 
Fin's action, it was understood that the Consul was to use 
his personal influence in such matters and not to commit 
the British Government officially. 3 
Palmerston's policy towards Ethiopia was one of 
commercial co-operation and political non-involvement. 
From the beginning Plowden doubted the effectiveness of this 
1. Great Britain, Parliamenta Pa ers 1867-68 Vol. LXXII 
(Correspondence on Abyssinia at Jerusalem 
Fin-Palmerston, November, 30, 1850. 
2o Ibid, Fin-Palmerston. 
3. Ibid, Ealmerston-Plowden, 28, December, 1850. 
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policy as he believed that unless the British Government 
evinced more interest in Ethiopia, the Ethiopians would 
never appreciate the value of their associa tion with Britain. 
Plowden thought that it was unreasonable to expect co-opera-
tion for Palmerston's policies from the disgruntled chiefs 
of Ethiopia, whose needs and aspirations were hardly 
appreciated by the British Government. However, this was 
only a side of the problem with which the new consul was 
struggling; he was to face a much more critical situation 
in his dealings with the Turks. 
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CHAPTER IV 
After concluding the treaty with Ras Ali, Plowden 
returned to Massawa, his official headquarters. Palmerston 
had chosen this place as the seat of the British consulate 
for many reasons: first of all, being a port, it was a place 
at which communication with London might be easily established 
and maintained; secondly, the British Indian merchants trading 
with Ethiopia resided in that place and one of the duties of 
the consul was to offer them protection; thirdly, the slave 
trade was centred at Massawa, and it was right that a consul 
should be stationed there to suppress it. Most important of 
all it was the gateway to Northern Ethiopia. At the same 
time it was a convenient place to watch French activities in 
that part of the Red Sea. 
To discharge his manifold duties, the British consul 
would have required some local co-operation. However, from 
the beginning Plowden's position was not only anamalous but 
also critical, as he was not accredited to the porte, and 
this to a certain extent, impaired his effectiveness in 
discharging the duties entrusted to him. 
Ethiopian commerce flowed through the Red Sea ports 
of Suakin, Zeila and Massawa; of these Suakin was far away 
from the main centres of production and only a small volume 
of the trade passed through that port. The produce of south 
and south-eastern Ethiopa passed through Zeila, but the 
lawless tribes residing between the sea coast and the centres 
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of production had rendered peaceful commerce in that part 
very difficult, if not impossible, so much so that the 
British and French commercial treaties of 1841 with Shoa 
had remained dead letters. The port of Massawa, a natural 
harbour, was far more important than either of the others. 
The net profits of the port, which largely accured from 
the Ethiopian commerce, were about 40,000 dollars per annum, 1 
despite the fact that the trade brought them such good 
revenues, the Turks had been injuring it by their heavy 
duties, which were often as heavy as 30%. For instance, 
the Governor of Massawa levied what was ostensibly a 12% 
duty on mules which the Ethiopians exported to Mauritius. 
However, the system of collection2 was such that the actual 
duty worked out to be 25% of the actual price of the anima1.3 
Likewise the Turks collected a 25% duty on the butter which 
the Ethiopian merchants exported to Arabia. The persons 
weighing goods at the customs house charged the importing 
merchants 5% for performing this duty, while another 5% was 
collected by the Turkish officials towards their personal 
pro.fit.4 As though this dead weight was not enough, the 
Turks controlled the trade to suit their interests. For 
1. "P.P.", pp. 23, Plowden-Palmerston, Dec. 10, 1848. 
2. The practice was, that the French captains who transported 
the animals to Bourbon bought the animals from Tigre througb 
their agents. The Governor collected a 12% duty not on the 
actual price paid for the animal but the total expenses 
incurred by the Captain of the vessel. 
3. "P.P.", pp. 18, Plowden-Palmer ston, Sept, . 17, 1848. 
4e~ "P.P." pp.54, Plowden Palmerston, May 12, 1850. 
42. 
instance they banned arms trade with Ethiopia, and refused 
passage at Massawa for arms entering that country.1 Pl.owden 
feared that "at no distant date al.l the claims of Turkey to 
the sovereignty o:f Abyssinia would be revived so .far at 
,. 
least as the levying of duties upon all articles o:f commerce,•~ 
as i.f Ethiopia were a Turkish province. The behaviour of 
the Turkish governor at Massawa l.e.ft no doubt in Plowden's 
mind as to their ulti ate aims. 
Plowden realized that unless these bottle-necks 
to the Ethiopian trade were removed, the commercial treaty 
with Ras Ali would remain useless. The Ethiopian chiefs 
possessed neither the means nor the strength to :force the 
Turks to behave differently; since the commercial treaty 
had imposed equal obligation on Britain "to keep open and 
secure the avenues o:f trade", Plowden proceeded to find a 
solution to the problem. He saw three lines of action 
open to him: :first o:f all to exert influence on the Turks 
to adopt reasonable policies towards the Ethiopian trade 
at Massawa; secondly, :failing this, to endeavour to bring 
the E·thiopian merchants at I'1assawa under British protection 
which would :force the Turks to accord them equal treatment 
with other British subjects; thirdly, to secure an independ~ent 
1. Ibid, Plowden Palmerston, May 12, 1850. 
2.~.P." pp. 93, Plowden-Palmerston, August 16, 1848. 
3. "P .. P." pp. 18, Plowden-Palmerston, Sept" 17, 1848. 
port on the Ethiopian coast which would remove for ever 
the Turkish menace to Abyssinian commerce. 
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In pursuit of the first of these, Plowden, after 
informing him of the destructive policies of the Turks 
towards the Ethiopian merchants, urged Palmerston to prevail 
upon the Porte to instruct the governor of Massawa not to 
collect transit duties exceeding 5% on goods passing through 
his jurisdiction, and to stop all illegal exactions.1 
Palmerston, in turn, informed the Egyptian government that 
Ethiopia was an independent country and that the Turkish 
officials had no right to tax Ethiopian goods exorbitantly. 2 
He drew Cairo's attention to the Anglo-Turkish commercia1 
trea ty which prescribed duties at 5% on all imported goods.3 
This did not improve the situation and Plowden continued to 
complain of the injurious effects produced on trade by the 
Turks and urged Palmerston to take some other steps for 
throwing open "the commerce of this portion of Africa for 
our . colonies".4 On Pa1merston 1 s instructions, Sir Stratford 
Canning, the British ambassador at Constantinople, made 
several representations to the Porte to follow a more lenient 
policy towards Ethiopia. But the Turks, who kept their 
trade agDeements with Britain by taxing British goods at 5%, 
1. nP.P.", pp. 18, Plowden-Palmerston, Sept. 17, 1848. 
2. Temporarily, between 1846 and 1849, Massawa was under 
Egyptian administration. 
3. np.P.", pp. 21, Pa1merston-Murray, Feb. 17, 1849. 
4. "P.P.", pp. 53, P1owden-Pa1merston, May 12, 1850. 
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did not give up their exacting policy towards the Ethiopian 
merchants whose grievances Plowden could do little to 
alleviate because of the unfriendly and often hostile 
relations existing between himself and the Turkish officials 
at Massawa. 
The reasons for the Turkish animosity are nottar 
to seek; Palmerston most certainly was to blame for keeping 
the Turks in the dark about Plowden's appointment asoonsul 
to Ethiopia. 1 The British consulate at Massawa was 
established secretly, and Plowden had not been accredited 
to the Porte. This having given rise to a rumour that 
Britain had secretly occupied Massawa, in turn, had made 
it necessary for Stratford Canning to do some difficult 
explaining to the Porte when he admitted freely their right 
to Massawa and Suakin. 2 Nevertheless Turkish suspicion 
regarding British intentions communicated itself to Massawa, 
and made Plowden's position extremely critical. 
The Turkish authorities at Massawa treated 
Plowden with unconcealed hostility, by intercepting his 
correspondence and threatening his messengers. He requested 
Palmerston to send an "energetic message 0 to Massawa warning 
the Turks against such hostile attitude. 3 The Foreign 
Secretary, through the British ambassador at Constantinople, 
1. ttP.P., pp. 8, Palmerston-Cowley, Jan 3, 1848. 
2. Harston, op. cito, pp. 187. 
3. "P .. P.", pp. 26, Plowden-Palmerston, Jan 27, 1849. 
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procured and forwarded to Plowden the Vazirial instructions 
for the protection of his corresp ondence. 1 However, this 
did not alleviate the situation, and Plowden complained of 
the difficulty of protecting himself n:rrom the insults daily 
and studiously" offered him by the Turkish authorities. The 
Turks had made it impossible for him to live in a "manner 
becoming an officer of Her Majesty's Government". 2 
Analysing the reasons for the hostile behaviour of 
the Turks Plowden wrote that "this conduct is aimed at my 
connection with the Abyssinian chiefs and adopted to persuade 
them that the English nation is no longer of any weight and 
virtually declares that if possible that the English govern-
ment shall not appoint any officers in that country ••••• 
Abyssinians will be convinced that our tolerance arises from 
our weakness.n3 On PalmerstPn's instructions, Canning once 
again took the matter up with the Porte who instructed the 
Governor of Massawa to treat Plowden well.4 Though the 
matter was temporarily thus settled, the British consul had 
little faith in the Turks, as it was evident from the 
hostilities existing between the Turks and the Ethiopians 
that the former would always regard with jealous,yBritish 
friendship and influence with the latter. 5 The Governor o.f 
lo "P.P." pp. 27, Palmerston-Canning, April 23, 1849. 
ttP.P.", pp. 33, Canning-Palmerston, June 19, 1849. 
2. "P.P.", pp. 43, Plowden-Palmerston, April,l2, 1850. 
3. np. P. ", pp. 53, Plowden-Pal.merston, April 4, _1850. 
4. nP.P.", pp. 52, Palmerston-Plowden, June 7, 1850. 
5. "P.P.", pp. 56, Plowden-Pa1merston, Dec. 15, 1850. 
Massawa proved Plowden right by ignoring the Porte's 
instructions. 
46. 
This so much infuriated Palmerston that he instruc-
ted Canning to state to the Turkish Government that a 
British war ship would be sent to Massawa to chastise the 
Governor if he did not behave properly towards the British 
consu1.1 Neither threats nor persuasion seems to have had 
any effect on the obdurate Turkish officials who held the 
opinion that Ethiopia constituted a part of the Sultants 
empire, and the British presence there was a threat to 
Turkish interests. Nothing would force them to alter 
their hostile attitude towards Plowden and the latter 
realized how futile it was to seek their co-operation in 
promoting Ethiopian interests at Massawa. 
Simultaneously, Plowden, pursuing a second line of 
attack endeavoured to procure an independent sea port for 
Ethiopia. In his memorandum of August 1847 he had stated 
that British occupation of the island of Massawa would be 
the most effectual means of establishing a permanent and 
valuable intercourse with Ethiopia. 2 Obviously there were 
many difficulties in implimenting this proposal as it was 
unlikely that the Turks would have favoured it and any wrong 
move by Britain would have certainly strained Anglo-Turkish 
relations. Plowden being aware of these difficulties placed 
an alternative before Palmerston. The Turks exercised 
1. "P.P.", pp. 62, Palmerston-Canning, May 27, 1851. 
2. "P.P.", pp. 7, Plowden-Palmerston, August 20, 1847. 
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sovereignty over the mainland of Massawa only, and they 
had no legal rights to , the surrounding territories belonging 
to the Naib of Arkeeko, an independent ruler, whose relations 
with the Turks had suffered lately. Plowden was hopeful 
that the Naib might be induced to sell a portion of the 
territory around the Bay of Arkeeko to the British, and 
possibly the Turks might not object to such a plan. However 
his preference was for Massawa and he advised the British 
government not to lose sight of it. 1 
Palmerston was reluctant to offend Turkey in any 
way, and enquired -of Plowden whether any port besides Massawa 
was suited for commerce. 2 Plowden thought that Amphylla3 
could be developed into a port, and a year later informed 
Palmerston that a certain Italian had planned such a develop-
ment and enquired whether the British Government would support 
him.4 Pallllerston was anxious to have further information 
on this5, but as the Italian had vanished from the scene, 
Plowden urged the British government to take up the matter 
themselves. 
He expressed the hope that if the British Government 
develop-ed Amphy11a into a port, the ruler of Tigre would do 
his part in opening the road to the interior , and recommended 
' 1. "P.P.", pp. 18 P1owden-Palmerston, August 23, _1847. 
2. fiP.P.", pp. 5-8, Addington-P1owden, August 18, 1847. 
3. A Bay to the south of Massawa on the Red Sea coast. 
4. "P.P.", pp. 18, Plowden-Pa1merston, August 17, 1848. 
5. "P.P.", pp. 18, Palmerston-Plowden, Oct. 14, 1848. 
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that a detailed survey of the place be undertaken. 1 
Palmerston requested the Lord commissioners of the Admiralty 
to undertake a survey of the port2 , but the Board at the 
time had no surveyors in the East Indies and suggested 
that the East India Company might be approached for the task. 
Thereupon the Foreign Secr eta ry assigned the task to Hobhouse, 
the president of the Board of Contro1, 3 who forwarded to 
him a report on the matter which observed, "while it (Amphylla) 
was viewed as a most central place for the trade with Gallas, 
Tigre and Shoa it was represented to be one of the moat 
miserable pla ces on the coast."4 Palmerston concluded that 
Amphylla was no port and that no further survey was necessary, 
and so informed Plowden.5 Palmerston did not take further 
steps to acquire an independent sea port on the Red Sea coast, 
and the Earl of Malmesbury, his successor in the Foreign Office, 
did not evince interest in the matter; consequently the 
situation remained unaltered. 
Now Plowden turned to the third of the alternatives, 
that of protecting the Ethiopian merchants fromTurkish 
exactions by urging Palmerston to place them under British 
protection.6 Certainly the merchants were eager to have 
l.nP.P.", pp. 18, Plowden-Palmerston, Dec. 10, 1848. 
2."P.P.", pp. 24, Addington- The Board o:f The Admiralty, 
March, 10, 1848. 
3. "P.P.", pp. 24, Palmerston-Hobhouse, March 28, 1849. 
4. uP.P.u, pp. 38, The Secret Committee's report to Hobhouse, 
March 28, 1850. 
5. "P. P .u, pp. 38, Palmerston-Plowden, April 4, 1850. 
6. uP.P." pp. 23, Plowden-Palmerston, Dec. 10, 1848. 
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British protection, and it appears that Dezaj Oobeay and 
Ras Ali were in ~avour of this so1ution. 1 
-
Palmers ton, 
however, refused to accord official protection to the 
Ethiopian merchants at Massawa with a view to avoiding "many 
di~ficulties and embarrassing discussions with the Turks."2 
While the situation at Massawa was discouraging 
enough, conditions within Ethiopia were no better. Th~ugh 
three years had passed since the conclusion of the commercial 
treaty with Ali, nothing had happened in the meanwhile to 
show its e~fectiveness. Plowden got an opportunity to 
~ind out the causes for this during his visit to Ethiopia 
in 1851 to hand over the ratification of the treaty to Ras 
-
Ali. Plowden remained with the Ras till February, 1852, 
and although the former was friendly towards Plowden, and 
expressed his desire for good relations with Britain, he 
had only a lukewarm interest in trade and lacked power to 
ensure the operation of the commercial treaty of 1848. 
Indeed, Ethiopia at this time, suffered from the 
want of a st~ong central government. Ras Ali's power was 
on the decline, and civil war among the Ethiopian chiefs 
was continuing unabated. The differences between Ras Ali 
and Dezaj Oobeay had passed beyond any possibility of 
compromise and the latter who was fully committed to open 
rebellion had an army ready to launch an attack on the Ras. 
1. "P.P.", pp. 25, Plowden-Palmerston, Jan 27, 1849. 
2. "P.P.", pp. 25, Palmerston-Plowden, April 6, 1849. 
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Under these circumstances, Oobeay reluctantly allowed 
Plowden to pass through his territories to Ras Ali. After 
.his arrival at Biohana, the Ras's camp, Plowden was robbed 
of his papers including the ratification, apparently by 
Dezaj Oobeay's spies.1 Meanwhile a new element of complexity 
had been introduced into the political situation by the 
emergence of Kassa as a contender to the supreme power in 
the country. 
The political conditions of the country had their 
disastrous effects on economic life. Agriculture suffered 
because of the continual troop movements, and trade suffered 
because of the insatiable thirst of the warring chiefs for 
plunder. In many parts of the country there was no consti-
tuted authority for supervising the collection of imposts 
and duties, and no fixed rates to guide the collectors where 
such functionaries existed. Each local chief levied duties 
on merchandise passing through his territories, and the 
merchants had to pay duties on the same merchandise at 
several points. Frequent quarrels and deaths occurred at 
custom houses which were guarded by armed men. Only at 
important towns like Gondar and Adwa did an officer known 
as Negadesh Ras collect taxes. He paid a fixed sum to Ras 
Ali ·or Gf.obeay, and extracted as much as possible from the 
merchants for his own profit. 2 
1. Marston, op. cit., pp. 190. 
2. "P.P.n, pp. 68, Plowden's Memorandum on Abyssinia of 20 
July, 1852. 
The lack of communications was a great obstacle 
to the growth of trade. "Their most important districts 
o:f production " wrote Plowden nare so :far away :from the 
coast that no European merchant could risk so hazardous 
journey. nl As Plowden certainly knew, it was dangerous 
enough even for the Ethiopian merchants to travel to the 
coast, unless effectively armed. Added to this was the 
51. 
high cost of transportation. Richard Burton observed that 
when he visited Harar ttthe price per ~arcel of twenty seven 
pounds of (coffee) was a -quarter of dollar, and the hire of 
a camel carrying twelve parcels to Berbera was :five dollars; 
the profit did not repay labour and risk." 2 What Burton 
wrote of Harar was equally true of other parts of Ethiopia. 
These difficulties had existed for decades, and the commercial 
treaty of 1848 had not removed them in any way. The trade 
report which Plowden submitted to the Foreign Office, soon 
after his return to Massawa in 1852, supports this view. 
The total value of Ethiopian trade passing through 
Massawa, in 1852, was approximately £48,000. Plowden 
thought that this could have been taken as the average for 
any of the preceeding years since 1848. The important items 
of Ethiopian export were butter, gold, slaves, while some 
trade also existed in mules and coffee. Of these, ArabLa 
1. "P.P." pp. 98-130, Plowden's Memorandum on Abyssinia, 
9 July, 1854. 
2.Richard Burton, First Foot Steps in East Africa, 
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966) pp. 194. 
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provided a market for butter which consituted a third of 
the total export. The trade in coffee, an important produce 
of Ethiopia, amounted to a thousand pounds only, while that 
in hides and skins, contrary to Plowden's expectations had 
not grown at all. 
The volume and value of Ethiopian imports was 
equally negligible. The British Indian merchants at Massawa 
supplied Ethiopia with Indian goods valued at £28,000, of 
which textiles amounted to 80%. Tobacco, Zinc, canvas and 
nails constituted the remaining 20% of imports from India, 
Egypt and Arabia supplied cutlery, soap, paper, scents and 
1 oil valued at £14,400. The commercial treaty had not added 
to either the value or the volume of the Ethiopian trade. 
While the overall situation in Ethiopia was dis-
couraging, Plowden's abilities to do any good were limited. 
He needed some proof to convince - the disappointed Ethiopian 
chiefs that Britain was interested in them; but in this he 
was disappointed. British policy in Ethiopia lacked force 
and did not please any one. For instance, in 1852, when 
Oobeay and Ras Ali appealed to the British Government to 
grant official protection to Ethiopians at Jerusalem, 
Malmesbury refused to comply and ordered Fin, the British 
Consul-General at that place, to use only his personal 
influence to protect the Ethiopian pilgrims and not to commit 
1. ~P.P.", pp. 132, Plowden's trade report for 1852. encls. 
1, 2 and 3 in No. 132. 
the British government officially.1 Likewise, he advised 
Bishop Gobat2 to r~strict his interference on behalf of 
Ethiopians visiting Jerusalem "exclusively to spiritual 
matters.n3 Similarly the British Government did nothing to 
raise the Turkish embargo on arms bound for Ethiopia. The 
Turks so indiscreetly enforced this policy that it was im-
possible forPlowden to obtain through Massawa a piece of 
mounted cannon which he intended to present as a gift to 
Oobeay. Of course, there was no possibility of complying 
with the repeated requests of Oobeay for some muskets and 
rifles. 4 Plowden's innumerable letters to the Foreign Office 
urging them to take effective action to call a halt to the 
hostile Turkish policies had not borne fruit. Plowden 
knew that "it was not reasonable to expect anything for 
nothing from the Ethiopian chiefs" and wrote in despair to 
the Foreign O:ff'ice either to reciprocate the I'riendship which 
the British government had demanded of the Ethiopians, or 
'to abandon the idea as useless'. No reply was forthcoming: 
Malmesbury, at the Foreign Office, did not app_ear to be 
ihterested in Ethiopia at all. In fact,Plowden who had 
sent a series of despatches to the Foreign Secretary complained 
l. 
Jerusalem, Vol, L~~·~ 
2. First Protestant Bishop at Jerusalem. 
3. Malmesbury-Gobat, July l O, 1852, Ibid. 
4. "P.P." Correspondence Respecting Abyssinia 1846-1868, 
Vol. LXXII pp. 54. Plowden-Palmerston, May 12, 1850. 
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in March 1853 that he had received no reply to them, and 
requested the Foreign Secretary to instruct him on the 
policy. 1 Perhaps this delay can be explained by the £act 
that during the short span o:f two y ears, :from the exit o:f 
Palmerston to the coming of Clarendon, into the Foreign 
Office, Britain had three Foreign Secretaries: Grenville, 
Malmesbury and Russell. These quick changes were probably 
responsible :for the :failure o:f the British government to 
:formulate any effective policy towards Ethiopia. However, 
with the coming of Clarendon into the Foreign Office more 
interest came to be evinced towards Ethiopian a:ff'airs, and 
bold policies were formulated and implimented. 
1. "P.P.n,l861-68, Vol LXXII, pp. 71, Plowden-Malmesbury, 
23 March 1853. 
CHAPTER V 
Clarendon's entry into the Foreign Office led to 
a change in British policy in Ethiopia which became more 
purposive, dynamic and forceful. The Foreign Secretary 
evinced deep interest in Ethiopian affairs, and after an 
initial period of observation, began supporting Plowden 
in his plans and activities. 
The first thing that drew Clarendon's attention 
was the correspondence of Plowden which reflected a mood 
of disappointment. The consul's high expectations about 
the Ethiopian trade had been shattered, and the internal 
situation of that country coupled with Turkish animosity 
at Massawa had robbed him of much hope for the future. 
Plowden must have been very unhappy for he had reached the 
conclusion that there was no need for him to continue as 
consul in Ethiopia. 1 Clarendon did not concur with this 
conclusion and admonished Plowden by writing: 
"Her Majesty's government were led by the represen-
tations formerly made by you to expect that 
advantages would result to British interest from 
the conclusion of a treaty with the rulers of 
Abyssinia, and from the establishment of a British 
consulate. It appears, however, from your reports 
before me that there is little reason to expect such 
will be the case. Nevertheless Her Majesty's 
government having concluded a treaty and established 
the consulate are reluctant to renounce all hopes of 
benefit for these measures. 2 
1. "P.P.n, pp. 76. Plowden-Clarendon, I"lay 28, 1853. 
2. / "P.P.", pp. 76, Clarendon-Bowden, October 3, 1853. 
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Probably Clarendon thought more in terms of the 
:future than o:f the present. While Plowden's commercial 
report o:f 1852 was disappointing, the sources :from which 
goods flowed into Ethiopia were encouraging. India contri-
buted the largest share o£ Ethiopian imports, but Arabia also 
supplied goods, and the East India Company's trading factory 
at Mocha, in Arabia, had a chance to capture and develop 
this trade. This indicated~ least a possibility for 
development, and held out a hope :for the future. 
Secondly, there was a reasonable expectation that 
with the establishment of political stability in Ethiopia, 
prospects for trade would improve. Plowden had created 
this expectation in the Foreign Office by his glowing reports 
of the rising Ethiopian chief Kassa, the future Theodore. 
In July, 1853, Plowden wrote that Dezaj Kassa had shown a 
more generous disposition than was usually found in an 
Abyssinian, and appeared to encourage strangers. 1 In 
September, 1853, he wrote more hopefully that, "if Dezaj 
Kassa obtains complete mastery over the whole country, as 
he is a man of talent, th~re will be some prospects of 
increasing our intercourse." 2 
These reports holding out a hope for the future, 
1. "P.P." pp. 76, Plowden-Clarendon, July 25, 1853. 
2. nP.P." pp. 79, Plowden-Clarendon, September 28, 1853. 
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must have influenced Clarendon to continue to maintain 
consular relations with Ethiopia. But political stability 
within Ethiopia was a prerequisite for any rewarding commer-
cial activity, and this would only be e bablished if a strong 
chief like Kassa rose to power. However, Clarendonwould not 
interfere in the domestic affairs of Ethiopia to bring about 
the desired condition, and preferred to wait hoping that it 
would come to pass in the normal course of the events. In 
any case, he was reluctant to withdraw and thus lose whatever 
influence Britain had so far gained; moreover, the severing 
of British relations with Ethiopia would have crea ted a 
political as well as a commercial vacuum, and this was not 
desirable. Also Clarendon was willing to attempt to 
resolve some of the difficulties confronting Ethiopian 
commerce. He would not give up before he had tried. 
Once Clarendon's determination to maintain consular 
relations with Ethiopia became known, Plowden began look±ng 
at the brighter side of the situation. He set out to 
revive the British Government's interest in acquiring a 
sea port for Ethiopia, and with renewed enthusiasm prepared 
a new report on Ethiopia which he addressed to the Foreign 
Office in July 1854. 
Plo den wrote that the plains of Waggera and 
Gojjam1 were fitted for all the productions of the northern 
1. Districts in Western Ethiopia. 
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latitude. The temperate provinces of Ethiopia were suited 
for the cultivation of pepper, othe r spices and coffee, 
and the hot coastal regions for cultivating cotton, beans, 
p e a s, oats and other pulses. The palm, the orange, the 
lemon and the pear grew wild in the jungle. The country 
was rich in minerals, and he thought that a search for coal 
would succeed. Unfortunately the people had not realized 
how generously nature had endowed them. He concluded that 
in a country "which combines mineral resources, delightful 
climate, and tropical luxuriance with such general salubrity, 
no waste of European life can be apprehended by frequenting 
•t nl ~ . Plowden was unhappy that this wealth would remain 
unexploited unless something was done to remove the obstacles 
in the way of progress. 
Meanwhile Plowden's attention had been attracted 
by other problems. At Senahait, about 120 miles from 
Massawa, lived a tribe known as Bogos who owed allegiance 
to the ruler of Tigre. They were christians and had nothing 
to do with the Egyptian government. In 1854 the Bey of 
Taka2 ravaged Senahait and carried into slavery three hundred 
of its inhabitants. His intention was to convert them into 
Islam, failing which to sell them into slavery. These 
helpless people, being on friendly terms with Plowden, applied 
for British ' protection declaring that they would rather 
1. "P.P." pp. 98-140 Plowden's memorandum, July 9, 1854. 
2. Egyptian outpost on the Ethio-Sudanese border. 
abandon their country than accept Islam, and r e quested 
him to procure the relea se of their wives and children 
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f rom the Bey's captivity. They requested him to establish 
a consulate in their district and to place them under British 
protection. 1 Plowden requested the British Consul- General 
at Alexandria to procure orders f'rom the Pasha of Egypt; 
to prevent f'urther incidents on the border. 2 Meanwhile 
t h e Bey continued to send messages to the Bogos offering 
them the choice of the Koran or sword. Plowden saw a great 
menace in these insidious a pproaches or the Egyptian govern-
ment to the conquest of Tigr; ·, particularly so, as the Bey 
held the opinion that Ethiopia was 'the property of his 
master, the Pasha of Egypt". He had already succeeded in 
oonve~ng some adjoining provinces to Islam by vio1ence. 
Plowden undertook a tour of the affected areas, 
and asked the Bey to release the people whom he had carried 
into captivity. The latter not only remained obdurate and 
refused to release the captives without order s from Cairo, 
but also intercepted Plowden's correspondence and obstructed 
his communications. Plowden requested Clarendon to check 
the Egyptian aggr~ssion on Ethiopia, and to send e f fective 
orders to the Bey to behave properly.4 
. nppn, · pp. 83 
1. P~ople of Bogos-Plowden, incl. 161, 
2 •. np. p. n pp. 83, Plowden-Clarendon, March 15, 1854, 
3. "P.P." pp. 83, Plowden-Cla rendon, March 29, 1854. 
4. np.p.tt pp. 86, Plowden-Clarendon, April 18, 1854. 
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Clarendon instructed the British Consul-General 
at Cairo to inform the Viceroy of Egypt that the British 
governmeJ?,t would not remain indifferent to the fate o:f the 
christians of Senahait, and expected the Egyptian government 
to prevent the Bey from persecuting helpless Ethiopians 
and to set free the christian captives.1 Bruce promptly 
took tlie matter up with Abbas Pasha who appointed an officer 
to investigate the conduct of the Bey, and promised to send 
order s 'for the restitution of women and children taken 
prisoner. ' 2 Not being completely satisfied with the outcome, 
Clarendon advised Bruce to ask for the dismissal of the Bey, 
and to state to the Pasha that the British government would 
not acquiesce in the Egyptian or the Turkish assumption of 
sovereignty over Ethiopia, and that they would watch over 
' 
the interests of · the christian Ethiopians by protecting them 
from the ill treatment of their Mohammedan neighbours. 3 
On Bruce's representation the new viceroy, Syed Pasha, ordered 
the restitution of the captives and later acquiesced in the 
wish of· Clarendon by dismissing the Bey of Taka from the 
Egyptian service.4 However, there was no doubt that the 
dismissed Bey had been acting on the orders of the deceased 
Viceroy, Abbas Pasha;5 Clarendon's firm policy alone prevented 
the continuation of Egyptian aggression on Ethiopia. 
1. "P.P." pp. 89, Clarendon-Plowden, June 26, 1854. 
2. "P.P. tt pp. 89, Bruce-Clarendon, June 16, 1854. 
3. u::p .P. 11 pp. 89, Clarendon-Bruce, June 30, 1854. 
4. "P.P. n :pp. 159, Bruce-Clarendon, March 2, 1856. 
5. "P.P. tt pp. 90, Bruce-Clarendon, July 30, 1854. 
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At the same time the Turks were also increasing 
their pressure on Ethiopia. The Governor of Massawa never 
concealed his aggressive designs on Ethiopia, and now claimed 
from the ruler of Tigre the salt plains of Taltal1 (100 miles 
away from Massawa) on which the Ethiopian economy largely 
depended. A £ew months later he sent down a contingent of 
Turkish soldiers to ravage the Hamesyan province which was 
not only christian 'but more indisputably the property of 
the ruler of Tigre than Wallachia could be of the Porte• 2 
Dezaj Oobeay of Tigre who was anxious to strike back at the 
Turks, refrained from such measures in deference to the 
wishes of the British government. Plowden had reached the 
conclusion that this state of affairs could only be ended if 
the Porte was made to recognise Ethiopian independence dis-
tinctly, and if the borders of Ethiopia were demarcated 
properly. He considered it the duty of the British Governmeni 
to uphold the only christian state of Africa which had 
preserved its independence through the centuries. 3 
The Turkish officials at Massawa burned with rage 
at Plowden's intervention in what they considere& to be 
their affair. There is no reason to suppose that the Porte 
held a different opinion on the matter. While the Porte 
was unable to resist openly British activities at Massawa, 
they were unprepared to tolerate it, and their official 
1. "P.P.", pp. 92,Plowden-Clarendon, June 30, 1854. 
2. "P.P.", pp. 134 Plowden-Clarendon, November 28, 1854. 
3. 11P.P.", pp. 98, Plowden-Clarendon, July 1, 1854. 
62. 
instructions to the governor of Massawa, issued under the 
pressure of the British gover~ment, were in contradiction 
with thedrpolicies and practises aimed at making the British 
consul know that his presence at Mass awa was not to their 
lik ing. 1 Indeed the governor of Massawa made Plowden 
uncomfortable by flogging and imprisoning his servants, by 
preventing the repairs of his residence, and withholding 
his parcels. Plowden thought that the governor would never 
h ave pursued such a ho&tile policy had the orders to the 
contrary been given in good faith by the Porte. 2 Plowden 
thought that the governor should not have been allowed to 
offer such indignities to an officer of the Crown, and 
advised the Foreign Secretary to procure the dismissal of 
the governor.3 
On Clarendon's advice Sir Stratford Radcliffe 
strongly protested to the Porte against the bigoted and 
unenlightened policy of the Governor of Massawa and hoped 
that "the Porte had too much wisdom not to perceive the 
imprudence of placing its allies in contradiction with 
themselves». ' He warned that the British Government would 
not, for ever, look with indifference upon the groundless 
pretensions of the Porte to the sovereignty of Ethiopia 
1. uP. P .", pp. 83, Plowden-Clarendon, March 17, 1854. 
2. nJ?.P.n, pp. 98, Plowden-Clarendon, June 30, 1854. 
3. Ibid. 
which was injurious to the dignity and freedom of a friendly 
country, and also asked for immediate redress of the greivance~ 
of the British consu1. 1 Clarendon app roved the content and 
the tone of the letter2 which obviously had some effect for 
the Sultan ordered the Governor of Massawa to show the utmost 
con sideration to British and French consuls on pain of 
dismissal and imprisonment for any lapse in the implimentation 
of the orders. 3 Even the.n, Clarendon and Radcliffe thought 
that this was by no me ans a frank disavowal of the Porte's 
pretensions to the Ethiopian sovereignty, and concl uded 
tha t further steps wo u ld have to be taken to achieve the 
desired results.4 
Clarendon's fears were not unfounded; for in 
January, l855,at the instigation of the Turks, a brother 
of the Naib of Arkeeko raided M~nsa, an Ethiopian district, 
and the christian inhabitants after fleeing from their homes 
requested Plowden's intervention.5 Plowden visited the 
districts of Mensa and Bogos, and forced the Naib's brother 
to withdraw from that area. Though the inhabitants, once 
again expressed their desire to be placed under British 
protection~ the Foreign Office was not prepared to assume 
1.. "P. P .", pp. 137,Radcliffe-Clarendon, . March 9, 1855. 
2. "P.P."., pp. 139, 01arendon-Radcliffe, March 28, 1855. 
3. "P.P.".,pp. 142, Fortes instructions to the Governor of 
Massawa, indouser 209, 
4."EoP.", pp. 148, Radcliffe-Clarendon; April 12, 1855. 
Clarendon-Radcliffe, April 27, 1855, ibid. 
5. "P.P.", pp. 1867-68. Vol. LXXII, Ste11a-Plowden, Jan.2, 1855 
6). np. P. n, pp. 146, J?lowden-Clarendon, March 4, 185 5. 
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further responsibility for them. 
Meanwhile, the Turks continued their raids into 
the Ethiopian territory, which only indicated that they 
had no intention of relinquishing their supposed sovereignty 
over ~thiopia. They continued to harass Plowden who com-
plained to the Foreign Secretary of the continued and 
determined opposition of the Ottoman government to his 
mission in Ethiopia. 1 While the British government were 
aware of the basic ·opposition of the Ottoman and the Egyptian 
governments to British policy in Ethiopia, they were not 
prepared to change their policy at the cost of Ethiopian 
independence. At the same time they were equally unprepared 
to offend their friends - Egypt and Turkey - by supporting 
Ethiopian ambitions in the Dttoman territories. 
The Turkish threat was only one aspect of the 
Ethiopian difficulty; much more serious was her political 
instability. Ras Ali's power was on the decline·, and as 
Plowden explained, there was an absence of "sovereign 
authority". "It was difficult to build up lasting political 
influence in a country whose political system lacked true 
foundations. 
However, despite the lack of a strong political 
authority, the vivisection of the country into almost 
autonomous po1itical units, and the ephemeral character of 
the political power of their rulers, the Ethiopians were 
1. ttP.P.", pp. 146, Plowden-Clarendon, April 22, 1855. 
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held together by their church. Their ecclesiastical 
superior, Abuna Salama, was favourably disposed towards 
Britain and was anxious to seek British protection for hie 
emissaries and proper~y at Massawa and Jerusalem. In 
r e turn he was prepared to lend his powerful support to 
the British in Ethiopia. Plowden thought that irrespective 
o f political changes Abuna would be revered both by ~he 
people and their rulers, and his influence would be of 
paramount significance in a country so ignorant and super-
stitious as Ethiopia. He requested the Foreign Secretary 
to consider favourably the Abuna's proposals. 1 Clarendon 
authorised Plowden to offer the benefit of his advice and 
assistance to the Abuna without officially committing 
himself or the British Government. 2 
While working for long range objectives, Plowden 
was not neglectful of the pres ent. Within Ethiopia 
im}Jortant developments were taking place-; Dezaj Kassa, the 
future Theodore, had defeated Ras Ali's forces in many minor 
engagements and a final contest for power was in sight. 
Plowden expected that Ras Ali would seek British assistance, 
and in such an event Britain could not remain indifferent, 
for, if she did not respond favourably, and Ras Ali restored 
his power he would set little value on the British alliance. 
Thus Plowden requested Clarendon to authorise him to spend 
l.nP.P.", pp. 77, Plowden-Russell, July 28, 1853. 
2. 11P. P .n, pp. 78, Clarendon-Plowden, November 4, 1853. 
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£200 for the benefit of the Ras which met with the latter's 
approva1. 1 This shows a change in British policy since the 
British Government had till then shown avers ion to a:n.y 
interference in the internal affairs of Ethiopia. However, 
Ras Ali did not seek British assistance; in 1855, he fell 
from power and Kassa ascended the throne under the title 
o.f Theodore. 
At first Plowden was uncertain of the new ruler, 
and informed Clarendon that Theodore's fanatical zeal, 
vehement character, and pride engendered by his success 
made it difficult to foresee how he would receive European 
advances. He also foresaw that Britain's friendly relations 
with Turkey and Egypt would certainly add to the difficulties. -2 
This was one of the most cautious readings of Theodore's 
character which Plowden ever reported to the Foreign Office. 
Had he continued to be equally guarded in his observations, 
probably the Foreign Secretary could have been spared the 
result of over optimism about Theodore. However, being 
impressed by Theodore's early zeal for reform, and his 
burning ambition to ll'le;SUScitate Ethiopia, Plowden gave the 
impression to the Foreign Secreta ry that Britain could not 
have hoped for a better ruler to ascend the throne. In 
fact, he went to the length of stating that should Theodore 
fail to hold power there would be a small prospect for 
negotiating with success in Ethiopia. He reported that 
1. "P. P.", pp. 82, Clarendon-Plo\"fden, April 15, 1854. 
2. "P.P.", pp. 133, Plowden-Clarendon, November 6, 1854. 
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Theodore had a disposition to encourage foreigners, and 
wondered whether Clarendon would not want to assist him 
in his views and in establishing his government on a 
.firm basis. 1 
However this optimism was ill-founded, and 
Plowden realized this when he met with Theodore in 1855. 
During the course o.f the discussions the King disclaimed 
any knowledge o.f what Ras Ali had done, and refused to 
reccrgnise the commercial treaty with Britain. Theodore 
also refused to allow the establishment of a consulate in 
his country, which he thought to be alien to its spirit 
and institutions. However, he held _ out a hope for the 
future in that he promised to receive a consul whenever it 
suited him. 2 Plowden thought that Theodore's reluctance 
was the result of a suspicion caused by Roman Catholic 
missionaries in Tigre who obstinately persisted in usurping 
the functions of Abuna and the Ethiopian clergy. Theodore 
suspected that the British in like manner would usurp his 
rights, and his counsellors had persuaded him to this effect.3 
Moreover the commercial treaty by allowing extra-territorial 
jurisdiction to British subjects in Ethiopia had infringed 
upon Ethiopian sovereignty. This did not fit in with 
Theodore's conception of sovereignty and the constitution 
of his country. 4 Clarendon concurred with this view and 
1. 11Jll>]•, pp. 133, P1owden-C1arendon, November 6, 1854. 
2. "P.P.",pp. 164, P1owden-Clarendon, _June 25, 1855. 
3. "P.P. 11 , pp. 163, Plowden-Clarendon, June 25, 1855. 
4 • . up .P. n, pp. 164, Same to same, August 5, 1856. 
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wondered whether Theodore would not want to propose modifi-
cations in the treaty. Otherwise, he instructed Plowden 
to impress upon the King the need to honour the contracted 
obligations in good faith. 1 Plowden assured Clarendon 
that Theodore's refusal was hardly a refusal and, sooner 
or later, he would accede to all reasonable requests through 
"the pressure of reason and not of fear." As a matter of 
fact Theodore'himself had told Plowden that he had hoped to 
be able to offer protection to Englishmen who might visit 
his country once he was through the Galla wars. More 
importantly he had spoken of his friendship for Britain 
and had proposed an embassy to the Queen. 
vfuatever Theodore's professions of friendship 
towards Britain, Plowden could not have missed the point. 
The King considered the Turks as his implacable enemies and 
spoke of recovering from them the lost territories of Ethiopia. 
Plowden wrote, "he wishes to reclaim all the provinces lately 
conquered by Egypt along his northern frontier: even Khartoum, 
as by his right. Nor does his military order hesitate to 
dream of the conquest of Egypt and a triumphant march to the 
Holy Sepulchre." 2 Obviously Theodore had in his mind thoughts 
of war on Turkey and expected help from the christian powers 
of Europe in realizing his ambition. He spoke of sending 
embassies to great European powers to treat with them on 
these matters.3 
lo nP.P." p. 175, Clarendon-Plowden, March 3, 1857. 
2. "P.P.n pp. 148, Plowden-Clarendon, June 25, 1855. 
3. Sven Rubenson, op. cit, pp. 65. 
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In fact Plowden seems to have met the envoy 
selected to go to Russia, at Adwa, while travelling inland 
himself. 1 This was hardly welcome news to Plowden for 
England had decided in concert with France to enter the 
Crimean war on the side of Turkey against Russia. For 
Theodore, Russia and any other christian power prepared to 
,. 
fight the Turks and liberate Jerusalem were the obvious _ allies.~ 
Theodore's policies caused much anxiety to Plowden 
who sent a memorandum to the Foreign Office analysing the 
Ethiopian situation, and proposing three different courses 
of action: first of all to wait and see the outcome of 
Theodore's conflict with Egypt and Turkey when he would 
probably recognise the value of Britain's friendly proposals 
and seek to renew them; secondly, to withdraw altogether 
from Ethiopia and to cease all communications with that 
country; thirdly, to accept Theodore's proposals of sending 
ambassadors to England, who impressed by the greatness of 
Britain, on their return would induce the King to accord 
all that Britain might wish. Plowden himself was in favour 
of the last of these proposals3 and asked Clarendon to arrive 
at a decision on the matter. The Foreign Secretary replied 
that the British government were convinced of the need for 
friendly and intimate relations with Ethiopia, and that they 
would receive with due honours Theodore's ambassadors if he 
1. "P.P.n, pp. 143, Plowden-Clarendon, April 7, 1855. 
2. Rubenson, op. cit, pp. 65. 
3. "P.P.n, pp. 153, Plowden-Clarendon, June 25, 1855. 
renounced all ideas o£ conquest in Egypt and Turkey. This 
was neces s ary as the British government had strongly remon-
strated to the Turks against their ~ggressive intentions on 
Ethiopia, and they (the British government) would expose 
themselves to grave suspicion if they received his ambassadors 
while he nurtured aggressive plans on those powers. 1 
When Plowden communicated these proposals to 
Theodore, the King protested that he h a d given no provocation 
to Egypt, but while he reserved for himself the right to 
reclaim ~he lost territories from them, he promised to take 
no hosti-le action until he received a . reply from the 
British government. ~fuile Plowden considered this to be 
a fair reply, he warned the British government that unless 
they gave effective arms aid to him, Theodore might be 
convinced of the futility of British £riendship, and might 
not seek it. 2 \1hile refusing to aid Theodore with arms, 
Clarendon wished to know how Britain could prove her good 
will towards the King.3 As Theodore woul d not say how 
Britain could be of help, Plowden on his own, requested 
Clarendon to send the King some percussion muskets, powder, 
and percussion caps as an expression of good wi11. 4 The 
consul _still hoped to place Anglo-Ethiopian relations on 
a solid footing. 
1. r-tp .P • 
" 
pp. 154, Clarendon-Plowden, November 28, 1855. , 
2. "P.P. tt pp. 173, Plowden-Clarendon, November 12, 1856. 
' -
3. ttP.P. u pp. 175, Clarendon-P1owden, :r..farch 24, 1857. , 
4. "P.P. n pp. 177, P1owden-Clarendon, Nov. 25, 1857. 
' 
71o 
Simultaneously Plowden had been endeavouring 
to promote Ethiopian economic interests. He believed 
that protection o£ Ethiopian commerce on the coast would 
lead to an increase in their trade, and the resultant 
prosperity, by diverting their attention from fratricidal 
wars to the production of wealth, would bring about vast 
changes in their social and economic organisations as well. 
This meant that Ethiopia needed a sea port of her own. 
Plowden explained to Clarendon that the Ethiopian 
chiefs were not strong enough to acquire such a sea port, 
and unless the British Government helped them to overcome 
this difficulty, British relations with Ethiopia would not 
lead to profitable or lasting results. 1 Clarendon enquired 
of the consul what measures would have to be taken by the 
British Government to "supply a sea port to Abyssinia," 2 
to which Plowden replied that the Turk ish presence at Massawa 
was an obstacle to commerce and civilisation, and that they 
should be prevailed upon to transfer that port to Theodore, 
if he consented to have a British consul stationed in his 
country. 3 Bruce the British consul at Cairo, supported 
the plan as it would place the Ethiopians in contact with 
civilization, and also increase British influence with 
Theodore.4 This argument appeared convincing to Clarendon 
"P.P", pp. 94. 
1. Plowden-Clarendon, July 10, 1854. 
2. "P.P.", pp. 96, Clarendon-Plowden, Nov. 1, 1854. 
3. "P.P.", pp. 163, P1owden-Clarendon, Feb. 17, 1856. 
4. "P.P.", pp. 158, Bruce-Stratford Radcliffe, Feb. 16, 1856. 
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as it assured all the advantages to Britain, in that it 
would have not only increased British influence in Ethiopia, 
but also put Theodore under a moral obligation to recognise 
and endorse the commercial treaty which Ras Ali had signed. 
Moreover, it would have ensured a preponderance of British 
power on the Red Sea coast. 
Clarendon thought that the time was now ripe to 
take up the matter of the transfer with the Porte whose 
territorial integrity had been protected by Britain. He 
therefore instructed Stratford Radcliffe~ the British 
ambassador at Constantinople, to advise the Porte to enter 
into an agreement for the transfer of Massawa •. 1 It is 
significant that Clarendon issued these instructions while 
attending the Paris peace conference of 1856. (After the 
conclusion of the Crimean war). But nothing seems to have 
come from these moves, and during the next two years of 
Clarendon's tenure at the Foreign Office, this matter does 
not appear in his correspondence. Probably, Theodore's 
tactless dealings with the British were as much responsible 
for this sudden loss of interest as the reluctance of the 
Turks to part with Massawa. 
Within Ethiopia matters had not improved either. 
Theodore had remained as reluctant as ever on the question 
of reviving the commercial treaty. In spite of the irritation 
caused by his stubbornness, Plowden sympathised with his 
1. P. P .", pp. 160, Clarendon-Radcliffe, March 7, 1856. 
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internal difficulties and consoled himself with the fact 
tha t the King had almost overthrown the local fuedatories, 
established one government and was not unfavourably disposed 
towards Britain. Theodore had been ·planning to send an 
embassy to Britain which would provide an opp ortunity to 
the British government to examine the value of hmalliance, 
and to decide the status of the British consul in Ethiopia~ 
In fact, Theodore had written to the queen telling her that 
he had received Plowden in a ~pirit o f friendship, and that 
he would send an embassy to .her to discuss matters of mutual 
interest. However, he avoided calling Plowden a consul, 
and the latter commented that Theodore would not consent to 
the residence of a British consul in Ethiopia, or to the 
planting of a British flag in any part of his dominions. 2 
All the same, Plowden was determined to establish British 
influence in Ethiopia, by any means, fair or otherwise. 
As a ma tter of fact he wrote to the Foreign Secretary that 
it would be an excellent idea to have in that part of Africa 
a powerful christian sovereign friendly to Britain, and if 
Theodore tried to exclude Britain from his country, his 
resistance could be broken by allowing Egypt to attack him. 3 
As yet there was no need to act on these lines as there was 
some hope that matters could be settled amicably. 
Theodore promised to send the proposed embassy 
after the termination of the war with the Gallas. As he 
1. "P ... P ."p.l83, Plowden-Clarendon, May 20, 1857. 
2. "P.P." p. 183, Plowden-Clarendon, Nov. 25, 1857. 
3. "P.P.", p. l87, Plowden-Malmesbury, Nov. 20, 1858. 
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wished Plowden to accompany the embassy he was reluctant to 
allow him to leave Ethiopia earlier. Plowden acquiesced in 
the wish of the King hoping to see the consummation of his 
efforts. However, Theodore's enemies remained formidable, 
and the war with the Gallas continued unabated. Plowden's 
patience was coming to an end. In view of his long absence 
from the consulate at Massawa, Plowden sought Theodore's 
permission to take leave of him. He had concluded, that 
he could do no better than await in England the conclusion 
of the Ethiopian struggle for power, after which the negotia-
tions could be resume d with certainty. Meanwhile Russell, 
who had entered the Foreign Office, thinking that no advantage 
would accrue from Plowden's stay in Ethiopia had ordered him 
to return to Massawa at once. 1 On his way to ~lassawa, 
Plowden died of a severe wound inflicted by one of the 
followers of a rebel chief named Negoose, a rival of 
Theodore. 
So died Plowden in the hope · of placing Anglo-
Ethiopian relations on a solid .footing. The twelve year 
period of r elations, from 1848 to 1860, bears the stamp of 
his personality. Plowden had a deep attachment to Ethiopia, 
loved its picturesque scenery, and valued its' wealth. He 
wanted Ethiopia to become an appendage of Britain, With 
innate tact, good sense and understanding he was able to win 
the people, gain their confidence and largely influence 
developments the way he wished. He had a grasp of the 
1. "P.P.u, pp. 192, Russell-Plowden, Jan 8, 1860. 
Ethiopian situation, and the confidence of the Foreign 
Of fice. Through Palmerston's period of non-involvement 
and Malmesbury's era of disinterestedness to Clarendon's 
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time of genuine interest in Ethiopia, Plowden steadfastly 
worked to promote Anglo-Ethiopian relations. Lord Clarendon 
and Plowden formed a perfect team, and grea t consequences 
could have ensued from their efforts but for the complexities 
of the Ethiopian political situation, the implacable hatred 
of the Turks and the incomprehensible behaviour of Theodore. 
With the death of Plowden one chapter of Anglo-Ethiopian 
relations, a period of hope for better results and closer 
ties,ended. It was soon to be .followed by another chapter 
of misunderstandings, despair and disillusionment. It 
fell to the lot of consul Cameron, the successor of Plowden, 
to participate in this drama on the Ethiopian Highlands. 
76. 
CHAPTER VI 
The death of Walter Plowden set the sta~e 
for the next act in the drama of An~lo-Ethiopian relations. 
Theodore 's position had become extremely critical. Though 
he had nearly established his authority over Ethiopia, 
the Gallas in the south-west continued to defy him, and he 
could not rest in peace until they had been subjugated. 
Constant rumours of hostile Turkish activities on the 
coast reached him. Thou g;h Syed pasha of Egypt had sent an 
embassy with rich presents , it was by no means certain that 
Egypt had relenquished aggressive designs on Ethiopia . 
Egyptian troop movements were frequently reported · near 
Materr®a , on the Ethic-Sudanese frontier, and this made it 
impossible f'or Theodore not to be ready to meet the possible 
Egyptian invasion. But the Turks had placed an embargo 
upon all arms entering Ethipia, and Theodore could not have 
survived without some active aid from outside. He was not 
sure of France's reaction to his appeal for friendship, 
and he had not fogotten her dealings ·with his late rival, 
Negoose . For these reasons he hoped for assistance from 
Britain . He ~herefore decided to take the initiative in the 
matter of sending an embassy to Britain. In pursuance of 
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this aim he wrote to Barroni1 noting tha~ he had avenged 
Plowden ' s death by defeating anct kilJ_ing 1500 followers of' 
Negoose one of \vbose retaine rs had killed Plowden , and sum-
moning him to Adwa2 ' being anxious to despatch son: . o1' his 
servants to the queen ' to in£orm her of all that had 
hap ened . 3 Ba.rroni sent thir letter to the Foreign o.f.fice 
in February 1861 , but it was misplaced by one of the clerks 
and remained unans\rered for a lon r time . 
i ean·J'~i1e the British ~overnm2nt appointed 
Duncan Cameron4 a~ consul i~ Ethiopia with instructions 
not to become the partizan of either of the contending 
parties there , and to abstain from all intrigues to set up 
an exclusive. British influence in that country; rat!1.er he 
was asked to promote amicable relations among the rival 
candidates for power, as British interests could be promoted 
only if peace prevailed . Cameron v1as advised to ·Hatch 
closely any proceedings that mil"l.:ht a l ter "the state of 
possesPion either on the sea coast or in the interior of 
the country . n5 The Foreign secretary did not sup,ly him 
l . British Vice-Consul at Maseawa . 
2. A to"·ln in Tigre, - northern 'thiopia. 
3. "P . P . ", p . 200, Theordore ' s letter "to 3arroni , Jan 23, 
1861 . 
4 . He had served in India army, an served in Kaffir wars . 
5 . "P . P . ", p . 209 , Rusf'ell-Cameron, Feb 2. , l86l . 
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with instructions on the proposed embassy of _heodore , one 
point on vhich the king was so anxious . It appears that 
Russell , the nev Foreign secretary, was more interested in 
the maintenance of the status guo in the Red sea region 
than getting i1to further involvements in ~thiopia . He 
did not imagine the extent of disappointment this attitude 
would cause The odore . 
In spite of the cautious attitude of Russell 
circumstances seemed favourable for forging closer relations 
with Theodore . Plowden ' s death had provided an occasion 
for both parties to express their mutual feelings of friend-
ship. Theodore had·repa~d one thousand dollars to the 
merchants of gondar who had paid it to the reb els as a ransom 
for Plowden . Though the Bombay government had \·Tished t o 
reimburse Theodore , he had refused to ac c ept the reimbursement 
for something he had done because of his friendship for the 
late Plowden , and for Britain . The Bombay government , being 
impressed by Theodore ' s behaviour , 1ere planni ng to send some 
suitable presents "in acknowledgment of his libera and 
friendly c onduct . "1 The Governor-General of India in Council 
also had conveyed their acknowledgments to Theodore for his 
friendly conduct2 and the Queen also let Theodore know that 
1 . "P . P . u , p . 203 , the chief Secretary to the Gove rnment of 
Bombay to Brig . O. Coghlen , ~eb 12 , 1861 . 
2 . "P . P .", p . 205 , the Under Secretary , the Govt . of India -
The chief Sec , Govt . of Bombay , Feb 27 , 1861 . 
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she was appreciative of the kindnes""'- shovm by him to one 
o£ her officers. Lord Russell s~nt a pair of revolvers and 
a rifle to the king as an expression of the friendliness of 
the B:ri tish Government •1 ltll this indicated a fund of go od 
feeling in official circles towards Theodore which led 
Cameron to approach his tas}c '.vi th optimism. 
After inordinate delays , on 9 February , 1862, 
C2.llleron arrived in Hassawa and took chare;e of the consulate 
from Barroni . Soon he informed Theodore of his arrival and 
of the various presents ·vrhich the British Government had 
sent for him . However, before proceeding to the interior, 
CLmeron noted \.Vi th concern the latest Turkish moves on the 
Red sea coast. They had occupied the island of ])esse and 
were planning to control the entire Red sea coast up to the 
Bab-El- Mandeb . They had appointed governors at Edd 2 and 
Adulis 3 , and the governor of :r.1assawa was pla:n..ning to establish 
Tur .. :is~: colonies on the Et11.iopian frontier, to furnish the 
I'·!ohammedan residents v.Ji th fire arms, and thus to advance 
the T~rrkish cause at the expense of the Ethiopians . The Turks 
were also planning to cri:?pJ_e the Ethiopian economy by taking 
over the salt mines at Taltal , and the sulphur mines in its 
l., "P . P .", p .205 , Russell- Cameron , November 13, 1861. 
2 ()) 
& ) Ports on the Western coast of the Red Sea . 
3.) 
80. 
nei~hbourhood . The Ethiopians depended on these mines to 
manufacture gun powder . Theodore ' s officers watched these 
Turlcish movements with jealousy and reported to hi@; nor 
could he be expected to remain quite . A clash between the 
Turks and the Ethiopians seemed unavoidable . 
Cameron advised the Foreign Secretary to check 
the pretensions of Turkey and to hold her in proper bounds 
with the avowed object of preventing a collision with 
Ethiopia . 1 In a subsequent des~patch he 'Harned the British 
government that their silence ~:vould be misunderstood by the 
Turks \·J"ho "calculated on a certain a --,proval of their pro-
ceedint; s by the British Government , " and aSked Russell to 
vTarn them against encroaching on the salt and sulphur mines 
near Taltal . 2 Acting upon the instructions of Lord Russell , 
Lytton, the British ambassador to the Porte , cautioned the 
latter again~t aggressive actions in the Red sea region . 
T~e Por-te assured t '1e British g overnment that they had no 
intention of raising any question that might lead to a 
collision with Theodore . 3 
1 . "P . P .", p . 209 , Cameron-Russell , Ivlarch 20, 1862 . 
2 . np . P . 11 , p . 211 , Cameron-Ha..mmond, :f'/Iay 27 , 1862 . 
3 . "P . P . " , p . 2ll , Bulwar Lytton-Rus Eell , Sept . 7 , 62 . 
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Having thus temporarily arranged the affairs on 
the coast , Cameron proceeded to Ethiopia to establish personal 
conta cts \·Ti th Theodore and to deliver him the presents from 
the British government . He could not immediately meet with 
him as he was a\'Tay campaigning in the Galla country . However , 
Theodore had ordered his officers to receive and treat 
Cameron with all the courtesy due to a foreign envoy , and 
the reception went so well that Cameron 1v..cote Russell that , 
"I can have no doubt from the mam:er that I have been treated 
that he (Theodore) is both anxious for our friendship and 
feels that he may stand in need of our future support . "1 
Reporting on the Ethiopian attitude to·v1ards the Turkish 
encroachment Cameron informed Russell that Theodore had 
ordered the governor of Hamasyen2 to collect tribute from 
all those tribes who were once under Ethiopian sovereignty , 
but ·who had lately passed under the control o£ the Turks, and 
to keep a watch on the movements of the Turks; he had further 
instructed him not to offer any provocation to the Turks but 
to retaliate in the event of aggression . Cameron was con-
vinced that Theodore would not regard 1.;i tn indif:ference the 
Turkish aggression on the Red sea coast and probably would 
strike at them the moment he was free from the galla cam-
paigns . 3 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 . nP . P . " , p . 210 , Cameron-Russell, April 26,63 . 
2 . Northern most province of Ethiopia . 
3 . nP . P . ", p . 210, Cameron- Russell, April 26, 1863 . 
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After a long and indecisive campaign against the 
Gallas ~heodore retu::cned to Go j jam1 where he received Cameron 
\vith a salute of· twelve guns ancl an escor-t; of six thousand 
infantry, cavalry and match- lock men, one o:f the best rece~p-
tions which he ever accorded to a forei~n envoy . Cameron 
reci:n.·ocated as best as :i;. could by p::-:'eBentinr; the gifts 
.from the British Gover11n1ent , and Lord Russell 's letter . 
Theodore was ibroensely pleased with this attention , 
ana. told Cameron hm.: he had avenged Plo',•Jden ' s death for :bhe 
sal~e of his friendship for Eri tain . He ex:pressed his desire 
to buy arms and a~nunition from Britain . Theodore renewed 
his invectives against the Turks and talked of what he could 
do if he was assured of British sup0ort on the coast . He 
made it quite cl( ar that he expected great thing·s from 
B . t . 2 - th t th ld b d b !- th !- , • d . rl aln, ana _a ere cou e no ou -LJ a·LJ nls Oitffi ls-
position tov..rards her \iould larr;ely denend 0!'1 the assistance 
that would be forthcomine from her . 
Cameron ' s task was a very delicate one . Theodore 
Has eager to secure Briti,..,h aid .for his projects , and his 
anxiety vias understal1dable . But the British ~over~~ent had 
not given any spe ci J~ic instructions on this matter to Cameron, 
and he was not in a position to make any promises to Theodore . 
But, at the sa."'!e time , he •:Fo.s expected not to encourage 
1. A province in western Ethio~ia . 
2. "P.P .", p .218 , Cameron- Russell , October 3l, l863 . 
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Theodore in his erandiose projects of conques~s a inst t e 
Turks and the Egy tians. In fact , durinr Plouden 's time, 
the British 6 overnment had emphatically told Thea-ore that 
the rece ~ion of his proposed embassy to the Queen \auld 
depend on the relenquishrnent of his a~ -ressive intentions 
ag· inst TurKey and E ·y-pt. In the absence of new instructions 
to the contrary it ·was Cameron's duty to emphasize this point , 
and in doing so he created an un leasant image of himself in 
the min~ of Theodore -·lhich was to have many unhappy rec:ul ts at 
a later-date . 
Theodore use everr conceivable argu ent to impress 
upon Cameron t-1e fact that peace \auld not be possible with 
the Turl-"'s . He complained that they were slowly encircling 
his kin;;dom , an that his empire and religion were in danger 
of bein;l cruf'hed, and t1at he .rould fight to the death in 
their defence; he said that he would despatch envoys to various 
chric. tian powers in the \vest to justify his conduct and solicit 
their aid in his impendin crusade against the Tur s. The 
most he could promise the British Has not to stri ··e the Turks 
until he had received replies to his pro~osals from the 
British government . He 'dis- ed to knoH ·for certain \lhere the 
British Government stood on the matter . 1 Cameron thanked 
Theodore for his assurance not to wage a war on the Turks 
until the -·eply had arrived, and he romised to refer the 
issue to the ~orei n Secretary . 2 
l. Ibid . 
2. Ibid. 
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Theodore did not receive ·well Cameron ' s state-
ments; he at once concluded that the British Government did 
not care for his interests , and that the new consul had been 
sent to safequard ·whatever British interests existed in that 
quarter ; nor did he hesitate to ex2ress his displeasure . Fe 
neglected Cameron al tgoether for a while i.'lhich caused the 
ne;,·r consul not a little anxiety . He ;,·rrote Russell "I waited 
for several days in the expectation of a private audience . 
I•1y food became scant and bad . ,l Ho'\·Tever under the pressure 
of circlLrnstances Theodore ordered him to proceed to Hassawa 
'"'i th a view to communicate with his Government, and to send 
him a reply whether his embassy v,rould be :!?ecei ved in London 
or not . 
As Lord Russell observed later it would .have been 
better had Oe.meron acquiesced in the wish of Theodore and 
l eft for the coast immediately . At least he could have 
communicated to the Foreign Secretary about the mood and 
expectation of Theodore and awaited fur t her instructions . But 
Cameron acted li£e a prosaic Foreign off'ice officia.l and 
though it was his duty to p~ess Theodore to take a decision 
on the question of revising the defunct treaty ·vri th his 
country , and of establishin;: a British consulate . Ca:31eron 
thought that these · questions were interrelated and it would 
I 
--·---
l . Ibid . 
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be di=:'ficu~ t for the :British ·-·~overn .. rnent to formulate any 
effective policy towards Ethigpia without having Theodore 's 
ans·wers for tnem . VJh ile there may have been some justifi-
cation for his thinking on those lines, he failed -t;o under-
stand the complexities oi' the Ethiopian si"Guation . Thus, 
instead o:f leaving for nassawa at once, Cameron l·v.L"ote a 
detailed letter to Theodore settin 7 forth his views . After 
reiterating the British position on the proposed embassy, 
he E'Uggested that the British government sho-u.ld be briefed 
in advance about the size, the objectives and the composition 
of the mission. He desired the embassy to be headed by a 
person "who \Jould e;ive a favourable impres 2 ion of the 
intelligence and civilization of 1i~ people, and of Theodore ' s 
character, both of' which had been greatly misrepresented by 
h . . nl lS enem1es . He suggested that a draft treaty between 
Theodore and En,r:lan., should be dra~::n in advance and be sent 
v.ri th his ambassadors .for the approval o.f the Brit ish Government . 
At the same time he pointed out t-v:: necessity of' Theodore 
acceptine; a British conf,ul in his country , as such an 
arrangement would be necessary if he wished to maintain 
frienuly relations with Britain. Cameron concluded sharply, 
\vri ting, nit '~vould be well if your .r1aj esty ei ves a frank 
decision on the subject as Your !·!ajesty had many years to 
l. "P.P.", p .222, Cameron- Theodore, October 22, 1862. 
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think it over . u1 
In viev1 o.f Theodore's stubborrmess it is not 
unlikely that Cameron ' s reply ~.:auld have led to fatal 
results . Ho\·Jever, this vras .:.~revented by the timely communi-
cation of the British consul-general at Cairo assuring 
Theodore of the steus the British Government \>.lOuld take to 
prevent the Porte's aggression on .:<;thiopia . At the same 
time the 3ritish consul-General at Jerusalem had let Theodore 
know that he was offering protection to the Ethio0ian 
nationals at Jerusalem . This news had a mollifying effect 
on Theodore who had lately been much agitated by the rumours 
of diplomatic activ:.ty between Turkey , France and Russia . 
In this context he sent a message to Cameron entreating him 
to observe the peril he was in from two powerful enemies 
ana begging him to act sincerely by him . 2 
Thereupon Cameron requested the British Consul-
General at Alexandria·to do his utmost to preserve the peace , 
but above all to reJ.?Ort signs of aggression age.inst Ethiopia, 
and suggested to Theodore that he should be allowed to visit 
l'llatemma, a to'.'.ITI on t-.1e Ethic- Sudanese bor6.er, to v;atch the 
Egyptian activity against Ethiopia . But Theodore ouposed the 
idea . 
1 . Ibid . 
2 . Great Britain , parliamenta.ry patJers , 1868 , vol . LVIII , 
pp . l025 Cameron- Russell , October 31 , 1862 . 
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Nevertheless as a si:;n that Cameron was now back 
in his good grace , he presented him with a silk shirt which 
was a sign of Qnusual distinction in Ethiopia, and a purse 
of a thousand dollars for his expense . He also informed 
him that he had well considered the subject of a treaty about 
which ther e would be no difficulty although he left the ~ctual 
drafting for future consideration . He also gave assurance 
that if matters went well he would be glad to receive a 
British consul in his country . 1 Finally he as~ed Cameron 
to proceed to l•1assa-vra at once to despatch his letter to the 
Queen and to await her reply . 
Theodore ' s letter to the Queen was very polite . 
After thanking her f"'or the presents , he spoke of his friendship 
for Britain, and explained how the Tur~s on the coast pre-
vented him from sending envoys to England . He requested 
her to arrange .for the sa.:fe conduct of his ambassadors and 
concluded by v.rritin.= 0 I ,,rish to :-nave an answer to this letter 
by consul Cameron and that he may conduct my embassy to 
Enr~land. See how Islam .oppre-sses the Christian . " 2 
For"'\·farding this letter to the Foreign Office, 
Cameron urged Russell to acce~t Theodore ' s promises in good 
faith, and to receive his embassy . He aovised him that 
an in'T,,ri tat ion for the embass:l written by the Queen herself 
l . Ibid . 
2 . 11 P . P . n, vol . LXXII p . 225 , Theodore-Queen, incl . in 343 . 
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would have a ~ood effect . Cameron sylll1Jathetica11~ analysed 
Theodore ' s position and eave the opinion that a resident 
envoy would suit Theodore better than a consul, for if 
he alloued a consul to En ':land he mi :l't :.·ind it difficult 
to refuse one to France, and such a situation were better 
avoided . Further more, he ~ressed for the conclusion of 
a new treaty ·vvi th Theodore • 1 It v..ras a tragedy that Russell 
did not act on these suggestions promptl:7 , and thus placed 
c onsul Cameron in a very difficult position . 
After despatching Theodore ' s letter , Cameron 
decided to leave for the border areas instead of· 1'-""assawa , 
2 f·or he had learnt that the people of Bogos-- who had enjoyed 
British protection during Plowden ' s time were in troubl e . 
Roman Catholic missionaries at Bocos hau abandoned that 
:place in apprehension of an invasion from Egypt, and now 
that fresh inroads were threatened Cameron hoped to keep 
the Arab tr i bes in chec:: , and thus to help the cl1ristians 
'-3 of Bogos . , He "\•.rrote to Theodore acv isin< him to establish 
a regular government there . His interfere~ce vras an act 
of doubtful wisdom since the terri~ory claimed its indepen-
dence and was in fact a no man ' s land between Egyptian 
l . "P . P .", pp . 222- 23 , Ca..meron- 11ussell , November l , 62 . 
2 . A province in the extreme north east of Ethiopia v;hos e 
people were christians and o1:1ed allegianc e to the rule r 
of' Tigre. 
3 . "P . P ., p . 240 , Cameron- Russell , Jan . 8 , 1863. 
territory , the Pashalic of Jidda and Ethiopia, all three 
powers collecting some tribute from it . Cameron ' s desire 
to reinf'orce ·whatever British influence there ·was in that 
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quarter, did not receive the sympathetic consideration of 
Colq_uhoun1 wbo wrote to Russell that if British protection 
were officially off ered to the Bo~o= , it might justify pre-
tensions on the part of other powers ·who were eager to secure 
a footing in or nqar Ethiopia . 2 It vias :felt that Cameron , 
guided by a mistaken notion of res-ponsib±li ty , \vas committing 
the British government unnecessarily . 
From Bogos CP~eron went to Kascala , the capital 
of the Egyptian pasahalic of the Sudan , as he had heard that 
the Turkish trooJ}s on their v.ray to Ethiopia , had attacked 
the neighbouring Shangallas . 3 Cameron feared that such 
irregular attacks would give a pretext for more formal hos-
tili ties between the Turks and the Ethiopians, and vii shed to 
prevent them as they would have come in the way of the proposed 
Ethiopian embassy to England . He asked the Pasha of Kassala 
to abstain from attac·· ing Et' _io-oian territories and made a 
similar appeal to Theodore to abstain from attack ing the Turks . 4 
He met with many frontier chiefs and remonstrated against their 
1 . The British consul general at Alexandria . 
2 . "P . P . n , :p . 243 , Colq_uhoun-Russell , Aue:ust 17 , 63 . 
3 . The Negro tribes on the western border of Ethiopia . 
4 . "P . P . ", p . 229, Cameron- Russell , April 22 , 1863 . 
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lawlessness . He urged the British government to appoint a 
commissioner at Bogos to prevent the border clashes , and 
to protect the inhabitants from molestation by the Turks . 1 
After visitinJ' i'-1at e ::.mna , with a view to acquaint himself -v1i th 
the situation on the Et::io-Egyptian border , Cameron returne d 
to Gondar i n October, 1863 . 
Cameron ' s activities had caused much concern to 
the Foreign of~ice who thou~ht that he had exceeded their 
instructions , and were afraid that he would -plac e the British 
sovernment in an embarrassinE situation . Russell disapproved 
of' his action by wTitin-q; that ttit wac not desirable for Her 
hajesty ' s agent to meddle in the affairs of Abyssinia . n2 
But this 1,:arning dated April , 1863 , did not reach Cc-1111eron 
until after he had returned from his tour to Gondar . As a 
matter o.f fact Cameron ' s act i ons .. 1.ad raised Turkish oppo si:t i on 
to the supposed intentions of the consul \:·lith regard to the 
Turkish possessions on the Ethiopian border3 , and the British 
government had to do some dif:ficul t explaininc ~Go alTay their 
suspicions . 4 They also strongl y re~rimanded Cameron for his 
activities anc-:. ordered him to remain at his post in r•1assawa . 5 
l . np . P . n , p . 240, Cameron-Colq11.houn, I·Tay 20 , 1863 . 
2 . 11 .t? . P . " , p . 229, Russell - Cameron , April 22, 1863 . 
3 . tr? . Jl . 11 , p . 243 , Bulvlar-Lytton , -Rus8ell, Sept . l9 , 63 . 
4 . Ibid . 
5 . 11 J? . P . " , p . 243 , Russell - Cameron , September 8 , 63 . 
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During Ca.meron 1 s absence certain unfortunate 
events had taken place in Ethiopia \iliich had hardened Theodore's 
attitude towards Europeans in general . Early in 1863, Theodore 
with the hope of cultivating closer relations \·;ith France, 
and soliciting her support for his plans against the Turks, 
had sent a letter to Napolean III . But lTapolean 's response 
wc:.s not only disap_?ointing but also offending. The bearer of 
the letter had not been well received in the French court, 
and he had been sen-t back with a letter which had no royal 
seal or sie;nature, and which merely advi:sed Theodore to grant 
toleration to the Roman catholics in Ethiopia . Theodore 
felt slighted and he \'las extremely furious •1 However , before 
the return of Theodore's envoy from France , the Frenc~ consul 
at IVfassawa had arrived in Ethiopia and presented Theodore 
with gifts from the French government and a letter from the 
French ?oreign minister . As Theodore refused him permission 
to leave the country before the return of· his envoy from Paris, 
the French consul accompained the king in his expedition 
against Gojjarn . Bein~ weary of the Ethiopian way of life, 
Le Jean, the consul, decided to demand permission to leave 
the country . \lhen Theodore refused to see him, Le Jean 
decided to i'orce his 1:1ay into Theodore's camp, whereupon 
he v1as put in chains. He was , ho·wever, later released and 
l . Henry Blank, Narrative of' Captivity in Abyssi~, London: 
Smith & Elders Co ., 1868, p . 34 . 
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sent to Gaffat . 1 After the return of Bardel , the bRarer 
of his letter to Hapolean III , Theodore ordered Le Jean to 
t .+.h . . ., . t l 2 , -h h l . d t• t qui 0 e country ~mraeu~a e y , ana vL en · e rep 1e .{la 
had instructions from his government to discuss certain 
matters v1i th the king and wished to meet him, Theodore de-
clared that he had not applied as a mendicant to Napolean III; 
he had wanted christian friendship as from one king to 
another . It had been refused and Le J 0an mi~ht return to 
his master . 3 
Theodore ' s bitterness had been intensified by 
another occurrence . At about this time , Count De ' Bisson , 
a self styled French adventurer , arrived \'Ii th sixty well 
armed soldiers in Egypt :planning to establish a military 
colony in Ethiop i a . He told the viceroy of Egypt that this 
was in retaliat i on for the conduct of Theodore towards 
Le Jean , and boasted that he was acting with the knowledge 
of the French government . The Egyptian ambascador at Paris , 
however , informed l1.is government that the French Government 
denied any knowledge of Bisson ' s activity4 . As a matter of 
fact they had no idea of obtaining any satisfaction from 
Theodore for imprisoning the French consul as they had c ome 
l . A to ... ,Tn in Ethiopia where Theodore had established a 1·rork 
shop . 
2 . Holland & Hoizier, A Rec ord of the Expedition to Ab;y:ssinia, 
2 vols , London , 1870 , p . l2 . 
3 . 11 P . P . " , p . 250 , Cam.er:·on-Russell , October 2, 63 . 
4 . I I I . p . fl' p . 246, Colquhou_n- :Bulvrar Lytton , Fov 8, 63 . 
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to the conclusion that nothing effective could be done in 
. ' l thlS res ec""G . 
In the meantime the Viceroy had given certain 
facilities to Bisson and ordered the Governor of the Sudan 
to treat the par~y civill. and to assist them so lonB as 
the y were in gyptian territory . Colq _oun protested to 
the Viceroy for givin a·d to Bisson 2n advised ussell 
to warn the Egyptian overnment a ·ainst harassinr cheir 
nei~hbour (Ethiopia) by allo\~ing forei ·ners to create troubles 
on the frontier . 2 Co ..... quhoun v1as afraid that these incidents , 
unless cheered in time , vould give rise to many troubles 
bet,.leen - g pt and Ethiopia . 3 · :ean ·rhile Bisson ' s party , had 
reached the Sudan, and it was re orted to be heading tov1ards 
Ethiopia . 4 here \las no doub~ that oosa Pasna the governor 
of the Province 1;1a activeJ.y support in- Bisson . 5 Colquhoun 
could not view the situa~ ion vrith equanimity and he, at 
once, a~ned the Viceroy of Egypt tha~ the British Government 
uould no~ tolerate any action that would give "just offence 
to ~heodore . " 6 The British government also took the matter 
1 . "P .P . " , p . 247 , Co'\TleJi - Russell, November 14, 63 . 
2 . "P . P . ", p . 248, Colquhoun- ussell , November 63 . 
3 . "P . P . ", p . 246, Colquhoun-Ruscel1, ovember 11 , 1863 . 
4 . "P .P . ", p . 249 , Colquho m-Russell , Jan ll , 64 . 
5 . Ibid . 
6 . Ibid . 
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up with the :B'rench , \'/hereupon, Droyun JJe Lhy 's, the French 
Forei·:;n minister asEured them that nci ther the empeCor nor 
the _rench Foreign oflice had any knowledge of Bisson and 
. t 1 his proJec . Indeed Bis on's plan, vvhich seems to have 
been a purely private one by a ~oldier o~ fortune, ended 
i gnominously . 
However, .Disc on's activities had unfortunate effects 
on the 3uspic ious mina of Theodore . As Cameron's visit to 
the ·thio-Egyptian border preceded Bisson ' s arrival there, 
it is li-ely that Theodore suspected some kind of intrigue 
between England, France and Turkey . The growin~ TurAish 
menace on the sea coast, the reported Egyptian activity on 
his western borders, the offending French "behaviour , and the 
lack of response f~om the British ~overnment to h is letters 
must have strengthened such suspicion, and increased his 
dislike of all foreigners. It is a pity that Cameron was 
made to pay for all this . 
Though he could not be exactly described as a 
prisoner, s ince his return to ~thi9pia in September 1863, 
Theodore h~d placed restrictions on Cameron ' s movements and 
he was no lon~er in the good grace of Theodore . After 
learning of Cameron ' s position Colquhom1 advised him to leave 
Ethiopia for lJ!:assavva immediately . 2 But cameron had lost the 
l . " P . P .", p .254, Cov1ley- Russell , Feb . 23, 1864. 
2. np _p _n, p .2 54, Colquhoun-RusE;ell, Jan 23, 1864. 
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freedom to do so . 
Within EthiQpia itself affairs had taken a crucial 
turn . Theodore had become intolerant, despotic and reckless . 
The death of his beloved \rife and his adviser , Bell1 , had 
removed all the restrainin~ influences on him, and the con-
tinuing Galla wars had "~Heakened his position . All his 
endee.vovrs to win British anc1 French assistance .for his plans 
appeared to have failed dismally, and this had increased his 
hatred of' them . For instance , in October 1863, he flogged 
and imprisoned Rev . Stern of the Lone on Jev.,rish society on the 
charge of publishing some articles in Europe supposed to be 
derogatory to him . In this connection Cameron sought an 
audience with Theodore with a view to effect a reconciliation, 
and unable to get one , appealed to Theodore in the name of 
friendship between England and Ethiopia . Theodore questioned 
"vlhere are the si ns of friendship?n , meaning that the British 
goverThllent had no-c replier] to his letter . 
On November 12 , La\·Jrence Kerans , a young Br i tish 
officer arrived at Gondar to joining Capt&in Cameron as 
private Secretary . He brought a pack of letters to C~1eron 
but they contai ned no reply to Theodore . On the contrary, 
they contained Russell ' s instructions orderinc Cameron to 
ret11rn to I"·Iassawa at once . This strengthened Theodore ' s 
1 . Bell, an Englishman, 'IHas in the service of Theodore . He 
died in 1860 .hi'e tryin_ to save the life of Theodore in 
one o£ the latter ' s campai3ns against the rebel chief 
l'Yegoose . 
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suspicion of Britain ' s complicity --ith the ~u~ks , his enemies . 
He placed Cc~meron in a state of semi- imprisonment .. At last 
cameron requested Theodore to permit him to proceed to 
~Iassawa in deference to the vvish of· his government . A day 
later Theodo!:'e summoned Cameron, his retinue, and other 
Europeans to his presence and asked him to explain why the 
British Government had not replied to his letter , why he had 
gone to his enemies , the Tur,_s , and ·wheth'"?r he was a real 
consul or not . Cameron ' s explanations did not alter Theodore ' s 
views . He shouted ov-'c , "I will keep you a prisoner until I 
get an answer and see if. you. a r e a consul or not ". On that 
he was badly handled and imprisoned . 1 
It is indeed very difficult to explain rhat led 
Theoaore to impri~on Con~ul Cameron . Clement ~:a::'kham in his 
History oi' the Abysinian Expedition observes that , "it does 
not ap~ear that the conduct of consul Cameron in the course 
of these transactions is open to censure •.•• The discourteous 
omission to answer the letter was perfectly a just reason for 
Theodore ' s anger; an& ther~ can be no doubt, if he had 
received a civil reply T.-.:hich ldould have had the effect of 
explaining Cameron 1 s vi Ji t to the Turks t 1ere -v·ould never 
have been any rearJon i'or spending several millions on an 
Ab . . d. . . ., 2 ysslnlan expe l~lon . · 
l . Blanck, op . cit ., p . 45 . 
2 . Clement 
(London : 
On the other hand Rassa.rn , the envoy 
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\AJho was sent to procure the release of Cameron observed, "I 
believe that extra- ordinary expedition (Bisson ' s) stirred 
up the wrath of' the kina against all Euroueans and made him 
feel jealous of their movements . It also proved most probably 
the main cause o:f the apprehension , and the i"'.1prisonment of 
..;._ · C d th · · · ul capva~n ameron an e mJ.ssJ.onarles . v~atever the contra-
dietary opini ons , there can be no doubt that Cameron ' s 
indiscretion , the Briti sh Forei~n Office ' s ineptitude , Russell ' s 
policy o.= gradual withdrawal from Ethiopia, the irresponsible 
behavi our of certain Europeans in Ethiopia , and Theodore' s 
impetuo sity and sus<Jicion c oalesced to bring about an explosive 
situation . In imprisoning Cameron Theodore had violated 
international lav;r , an' this ill- considered act set in motion 
certa i n forces which led to the Napier expedition in 
1867- 68 . 
l . np . P . n , p . 297, Rassam-I~erewether , De ce'Ilber 2 , 64 . 
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CHAPTER VII 
The news of Cameron ' s imprisonment reacbed Patheric, 
the British consul at Khartoum, through lev . Hausmann1 who 
claimed that the failure of the Foreign Office to reply to 
Theodore ' letter had led to this unfortunate consequence, 
and nothing but a letter from the Queen would mollify him . 
He warned aeainst the use of i'orce to procure the release of 
~ -
the prisoners as it was likely to endanger their lives . 2 
Colquhoun comnunicating this news to Lord Russell 
advised him to instruct the Political Agent at Aden to send 
a person in his confidence to obtain immediate release of 
Cameron . 3 In his initial anger Russell asked the political 
Agent at Aden to 1:1arn Theo(ore that if he £ailed to release 
the Ca~tives he would incur the very serious displeasure of 
the British Government . 4 MeanwhiJ_e Cameron himself had sent 
a message affirming Hausma:1:1n ' s opinion that i:;here \iould b e no 
r:;: 
release until a civil repl- to the King ' r letter had arrived . ? 
J)es-)i te his initial outburst , Hussell soon settled into a more 
l . A German missionary . 
2 . nP . P . " , p . 257, Hausmann- Patheric, Feb . 24 , 1864 . 
3 . np . P . " , p . 257, Russell - CoJ_quhoun , JYiarch 9, 64 . 
4 . Ibid . 
5 . 11 P . P . " , p . 263 , Cameron- Speedy , Feb . l4 , 1864 . 
peaceful mood, and direct ed his energies towards obtaining 
the release of the cap tives through peaceful means which 
included senJing a mission to Theodore . 
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An explosive situation had now developed; a situa-
tion \•rhose difficulties had been compounded by the inefficiency 
of a ]'ore ign Of'fice clerk vrho had mislaid Theodore ' s letter, 
and by the failure of' the :B'oreign Secretary to understand the 
aspiration and character of Theodore . Theodore was sensitive 
to any development that infringed upon his power, prestige 
or sovereignty . He was unpredictable , autocratic, and quixotic . 
Having §,rovm up in a world o.f intrigue and ; __ uspicion he fre -
quently made his decisions on the rumours reaching him from 
~-'ias ~ awa or Iv.Ia te11l!Ila . Lac~ing an understandinG of the intricate 
world of European diplomacy , either he could not or would not 
appreciate the diplomatic code of conduct so familiar to the 
Uestern ·world . 
It was not easy to deal ,.-i th such an unpredictable 
ruler, and the success of the proposed mission would depend 
upon the -cact and abilities of the -person heading it; despite 
the challenge, or because of it , many vrere anxious f'or the 
leadership the most persistent and conspicuous among them 
being a Tir . Beke who considered himself an authority on 
Ethiopian affairs . However , on the advise of Layard, 1 Russell 
of:fer .. ~d the post to Harmuzd Rassam2 , the Ascistant political 
l . Then parliamentary under-secretary for foreign affairs . 
2 . Rassam had sho·,vn great tact in dealing with the Arab 
.A.mirates . 
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Resident at Aden . J?erhaps it was thought thE.;t a •:rily oriental 
would be the best man to handle J:lheouore , perhaps it 1vas only 
because Rassam "~:laS on the spot and l\'Ierewether (British Political 
Resident at Aden) supported him . 1 Dr . Blanc of the Bombay 
Ke C: ical Corps and Lt . Prideaux of the Bombay Ar;..1y were attached 
to the mission . 
Phe Forei~"n Office drafted a letter to Theodore 
expressing the Queen 's pleasure for the early -oo6 treatment 
of Cameron , and her surprise at the turn of events of late . 
It declared ·that no better proof of· Theodore ' s friendship for 
England could be shown than the release of the ca)tives, and 
once this was done , promised a good reception to his proposed 
embassy . Further it asked Theodore to receive Rassam \·lell 
and give cred i·t to what he woulc.. say . 2 This lett ex· was 
reinforced by two letters from the Patriarch of Alexandria, 
one to Theodore and the other to the Abuna3 both of· which 
pleaded for the release of the prisoners in the name of 
christianity . \'lhile cautioning Rassam against placing himself 
in a posi ti·=>n whic.l mil:;ht cause further embarrassment to the 
British government , Russell placed full reliance in him and 
looked .forward to the success of the mission . 4 
1 . Moorhead, o~ . cit ., p . 2l2 
2 . 11 P . P .", p . 273 , Queen Victoria-Theodo:GB, May 26, 1861 . 
3 . The Head of the Ethiopian Church . 
4 . "P . P . u, p . 284, Russe11- Eerewether , 24 July, 1864 . 
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In July 1864 , on arriving at Iassawa assam dis-
covered that the \ihole population of that place including 
the Turkish o£ficial~ dicliked 3ritain ' s peace£ul arleys 
vith heodore . ~he .i..:Juro)ean residents particularly wished 
to ser the overthro oi Theoaore so that they mi bt continue 
their activities in Ethiopia unhindered . :..r.:hou.,h the Governor 
of ~assawa advised Rassam to reflect before placin~ himself 
in the po~er of T eodore , t1.e .overnor ' s deputy volunteered 
hi services in obtainin the necessary in£ormation about 
1 Ethiopia . -
On July 24 , _assam sent a VP.r~ polite letter to 
~ eodore expressin · hi wish to meet him an to hand over 
the Queen ' s letter . t ~he same time he repeated the British 
Jovernment ' s of£er to receive an ~thiopian e 1bassy and pro-
mise to send them to En ·land in safety . fter aking the 
objective of h:s o-m mission clear ~o ~hrodore, assan pro-
~ o ed th t in t e event of hi~· unprnpared ess to receive the 
mission, he ohotld nevertheless release the ca tives and 
sen some one to r.ceive t e ueen ' s le-ter £rom him . 2 In 
~4e nor al course Ras~am ' s es~enrers could not have returned 
~rom Theorore ' s cotrt in less than six ifeeks, an in the 
meantime he could only wait in a state o hopeful expectat:on . 
1 . up . P . ", p . 284, Rassam-.. ere e-i:;her , 19 Au ·ust , 1864 . 
2 .. It")) 1f 
.J.,. • ...L. • p . 284 , assam-Theo-ore, July 24, 1864 . 
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But fvlassav1a w2 s not a pleasant place to wait , 
infested as it was with tropical diseases and exposed to 
very high temperatures . 'While weeks passed into months his 
messengers aid not re--cuTn, and this caused him much anxiety . 
Undei::' -::ne circumstances Rassam sent a second letter to 
Theodore requesting him to state his intentions regarding 
the reception of his mission . 
l 
This too failed to produce 
results . 
\~ile many explanatioLs are possible, it is d ifficult 
to pinpoint t;he exact cause of Theodore's delay in ackno'\v-
ledging Rassam t s letters . rvrasf-.awa was a hot bed of rDmours 
and speculations regarding European activities, and Theodore ' s 
agents from that place sent hi~ report'" about the supposed 
evil designs o£ the British governments towards him, and it 
is li~ely that he misunderstooa British intent ions and needed 
time to make up his mind about ~{assam 's mission . It \•ras 
widel~ believed that thousands of British soldiers were ready 
to proceed to Etbicpia2 and. Rassam suspected nthat some evily 
disposed persons had been deceiving Theodore" abo~t the 
object o£ his mission . 3 This uas corroborated later by one 
of Rassam ' s messengers who reported that kinE! Theodore 
enquired of him Vlhe ther Rassam had any troops 'l.·li th him . 4 The 
l . 11 P . P . ", p . 293, Rassam-I'J.Ierev.re-cher, 12 Oct . l864 . 
2 . 11 P . P . ", p . 293 , · Rassam-_lerewether, Oct . 12, 64., 
3.. Ibid . , p . 296 . 
4 . nP . P . ", p . 389, Statement of !.•_oharnrned Syed, incl . 8/529. 
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king had hear d from t·_,_assavla that the British (i-overnment 
intended to fi2ht him , and Franks had planned to occupy 
-T 1 
.H.ammaseyn . ]lac , the German missionary , reported that 
Theodore had told his Euro )ean v1orkmen that he v1ould first 
see uhat the British at Eassawa and. the French at Bogos 
would do , and 7ossibly enter into fr i endship with them later . 2 
At the same time the cord=:..al treatment which the Turks had 
given Rassam , and the prevailing rumoui" about the \ii thdrawal 
of the Brit ish protection -co -tLe Ethippians at Jerusalem 
would have strengthened Theodore ' s suspicions about Brit~in ' s 
complicity v,-i th the 2.1urks . do it is pos~ible th~t Theodore 
suspected British intention::, and 1Hished to satisfy himself 
concerning those intentions before receiving Ras~am ' s mission . 
Secondly , :britain ' s relia:::.:cc u >on the influence 
of the clerics on Theodore seeDs to have been mis~laced . 
Theo' ore suspected the r;>atriarch of Alexandria to be a spy 
o.t' the -..:ur:~s , and considered the Abuna -to be his arch enemy . 
Indeed a t the time of Rassam. ' s visit to lVIasbawa the Abuna 
was a virtual prisoner at the hands of Theodore . Ignorant 
of these .facts , :.. as am had for1varded the Patriarch ' s letter 
to the Abuna , ana this hac -turned out to be a grave mistake . 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
l . A northern ~rovince of Ethiopia . 
2 . "P . P . " , -p . 299 , Rassam ' s despatch, October l l, 64 . 
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Rassam \r..cote later tha.t on recei)t of his letter the king 
remarked Hith reference to him, 11 so he has already made 
friends with my enemies, the priests 11 • 1 Possibly Theodore 
suspected some kind of Bri ~ish intrigue .vi th the Abuna, and 
his ima3inative minG. would not have failed -co see some 
trian~ular relationship between the clericals in Ethiopia , 
the Turks , and the British , however unreasonable this may 
look to us at this distance of time . 
Iloreover , the king had a bad opinion of the foreign 
visitors who came to his cotmtry , ana :'ne tas critical of their 
behaviour . Very much la-ce~ , du~ins Rassam ' ~ stay in Ethipia , 
'rheoJo:.:-e told him that since Plowden ' s death the ~ _ _ropeans 
who visited his country nproved insincere , ill mannered and 
. \ 
i ll tempered ." '·Prob&bly Theodore did not expect anything 
different from the Brj_tish mission . There is no doubt that 
these ersonal impress:_ons and considerations interfered with 
his conduct , and Rassam ·.-1rote later that , 11 it has been proved 
to me beyond doubt that the kin·, had not the slightest inten-
tion of g iv ing me the leave to enter his country until an 
Abyssini&n merchant \lalde Seal ass i e •••• gave him a good 
account o f me and convinced him that I was eoing up f'or the 
sole purpose of cultivating his friendship ••.. otherwise , I 
should have been t old to retu:cn v.ri th Her llaj esty ' s letter 
l. Ras ->am , Narrative on The Brit~sh J-liss i on t o Theodore 
2 Vols . [ Iondon : John Murray , 18 9 Vol . 2 , p .?. 
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to Aden . nl 
Probably the more important rearon for Theodore 's 
O.elay in respond in::; to :<.assam was his inability to ensure 
safe passa e to the British mission throu~h Tigre in which 
lay the most direct route from the coast to his capital. 
Tigre province was , at that time, in revolt, a fact ·which 
pride alone made him conceal . This was endorsed by an 
Ethio}Jian , ne.med Ibrahim, who visited Rassam to\Iards the end 
of April 1 865 . 2 The fact that Theodore later asked Rae-sam's 
party to travel to his capital through IVfatemma , in Sudan, 
lends support to this view. 
It may also be that Theodore deliberately delayed 
in retaliation for the behaviour of the Foreign Office towards 
Any one, or all of these i'actors together, mi.,_-ht have 
influence, his conduct which in any case strained the patience 
o.f Rassam who \<Jas still waiting at lVlassawa . 
Meanw'lile the British Government 1:ras continuing 
its efforts to settle the iseues Vli th Theodore peacefully, 
and seized whatever o~oortunities came its way to do so . Thus , 
when a servant of Abuna Salama arrived at Cairo with a pro-
posal that his master would intercede and procure the release 
of' the captives if tl•e British government promised not to 
l. Great Britain , narliamontary paPe~s, 1868, vol . LVIII , 
Papers on imprisonment of British subjects , Rassam 's 
Report , p . 667 . 
2 . "P . P .", Vol . LXXII , ? - 332 , Rassam-Zere,vether, .April 10, 65 . 
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demand reparations from Theodore1 , Russell not only accepted 
the offer but on Colquhoun ' s recomn1endation instructed him 
to in.form the Abuna of this and also pledged to maintain 
friendly Telat ions with Theodore . 2 Colquhoun while communi-
eating these vievs to Abuna. sent him many costly gifts , and 
hoped that his intercession -rould le~d to successful results . 3 
3ut this h6pe uas in vain since the Abuna' s por:i-tion ·v_ras 
not bet~er than that of the captives . ~evertheless Russell 
continued to ho~)e that a peaceful solution could be found, and 
\'leeS willi"l'l~ if it ·v1ould produce results, to go so far as to 
send a g ift of 500 muskets to Theouore . But he left it to 
Rassam 1 s discretion -·lheth~r he would make the concession knovn1. 
to the king . 4 
Ilean\lhile the captives at i~agdala continued to 
secretly report their pitiable situat ion, and in one of these 
messages Cameron declared that the only \•Jay to settle the 
matter \.ras to \lri te strongly to Theodore , and t o act if' further 
wri tin~ \J~s of' no use . 5 Nor vlas Cameron alone in his impatience . 
In Britain public o~inion \Jas g rowing in favour o~ stronger 
measures against ~heodore . Letters of the captives to their 
l . nP . P . 
" 
p . 313, Colqill1oun-2uscell, Feb . l4, 65 . 
' 
2 . tr P . P.n, p . 3l5, Russell-Colq_uhoun, 'e b . 27, 65 . 
3. "L- .P . ", p . 325, ColqulJ.oun- Abuna, r1arch 1 865 . 
4 . "P . P . ·' , Vol . LXXII, p . 308, Layard-Rassam , ...teb . l7 , 1865 . 
5 . aP . P . fJ p . 35u, Ras sam- r_ere,,:et-J.er , Viay 12 , 65 . 
' 
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friends and relat i '.res frequently :found their way to the press, 
and their misfortune and difficulty elicited much public 
sympathy for them . Theodore ' s oi~ending attitude and 
Rassam. ' s frui t less and prolonge::_ stay at 1'-'Iassai.·.ra were fre -
quently cited to prove the ineffectiveness o£ the Government mea-
sures . Many adventureres , and some of those who considered 
themselves abler than Rassain, volunteered ~heir services to 
the Fore i~n Of£ice to go on a mission to ThPodore to settle 
the issues successfully : of all these Dr . Beke deserves 
notice . Believing himself to be "v.Ti thout presu-.nption the 
person best q_uali:fieC. to undertake the missionu he asked the 
Foreign Office to send him on an official mission to Theodore , 
which they politely declined. But the irrepressible Beke 
supported by many of' his admirers and the friends and rela-
tives of the captives decided to go on an independent mission 
to Ethiopia as he found no o-'cher v1ay of relieving the govern-
ment from their difficulty . 1 Layard warned him that the 
~ri tish .;overnment \•rou.ld not underta~e any responsibility for 
his safety or authorise him to negotiate on their behalf . 2 
The British press also condemned the peaceful policy of the 
government , and- the Pall Hall Gazette after publishing a 
letter £rom Rev . Stern went on -to comment , "this letter 
l . n.:: . P . " , p . 365 , Beke-Russell , July 7 , 65 . 
2 . Ibid ., Layard- Beke , July 13, 65 . 
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IVIr . Layard may as well extract and lay in dar~<Cness with other 
l documents . " ·The public pressure for stron~er measures was 
becoming irresistible . 
Rassam ' s patience '\·Jas wearing dovr.a ana. in a mood 
of dejection he corduded that "the madcap (Theodore) does not 
intend to release the prisoners , an~ his desire of receiving 
a reply from the queen i:3 almost :forgotten . 2 · Hovvever on 
l\1erwether ' s advice he in£·ormed Theo~,ore that vrhilc the British 
~avernment "\vould deplore any unfriendly feeli1~g between the 
two countries , he v1ould retu::cn to Aden if he did not receive 
~ . l . tl . bl . d .L' ...:... • 3 nls rep y Wl 11n a reasona e per1o o~ ~lme . .. lhen no reply 
arrived from Theodore , Rassam told Merwether that he had lost 
all hopes o£ aainin? the release o~ the captives through 
conciliatory means . 
Under thes\::'; c ircu.ms-t;ances Ii.ussell decided t o r e Jlace 
Rassam by Gilford Pal6 rave4 , and instructed ·the latter to 
seek the liberation a:_· the captives by assuring Theoc"'ore of 
the most frienclly intentions of' the British Government towards 
him . On Russell ' s advice Pal~rave proceeded to E~ypt to 
receive further instruct~ons from t.~~ British consul General . 5 
1 . 11 P . P . ", vol . LXXII , incl . 47l, p . 327 . 
2 . !tP . P . 11 , vol . LX.XII , Ra.ssam-Lerwet:her, Hay, 12, 1865, 
3 . "P . P . 11 , p . 366 , Has·_ arn- 1·1er\'le·ther , June 2 3, 6 5 . 
4 . A traveller of Arabic-.w.1. fame . 
5 . "1: . ::. . " , p . 367 , Hussell-Sta.n-ton , July 2l, 65 . 
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As yet there we.s confusion in the government as to uhether 
Rassam should be recalJ_ed . 
Even as PaJ_crave arJ::'j_ved in ngypt, The or ore ' s 
invitation reached ~assam askin? him to arrive at his court 
through the Sudan, as the alternate route throu~h Ticre had 
been blocked by the rebels . i'hough the invitation ,,vas 
neither courteous nor becominrr, Rassam could. not but communi-
cate his willin~ness to travel to Theodore's capital the 
momc;nt it became possible . 1 
Soon after\vards T·Ti th a vie'ltl to seekine :further 
instructions .from the -;oveL'n2ent, and to buy l?resents .for 
r:cheodore, Ras ~am arrived in Cairo iHhere he learnt of J?al-?;rave 's 
mission , and learnt as well that certain official3, including 
the Acting Consul General at Alexandria, were strongly in the 
favour of Palgrave . ~his was most disappointing since after 
vlai tin:: so lon·· he had finally eot Theodo"re ' s permission to 
visit him . lere he to be replaced by Palgrave -'che chance of 
negotiation with Theodore having to be reinitiated were great . 
2 A little wire pulling by Morwether strai~htened out the matter , 
and R: ssam ·was ordered to go at once to 1l'heodore with the Queen's 
letter . 3 
Russell \vi shed to resolve the problem peacefully4; 
l . "P . P . " , p . 39l, RasGam- Theodore , Aucust 25 , l865 . 
2 . Uoorhead , op . cit . p . 2l4 . 
3 . "P . P . " , p .. 382, Russell- Stanton , Sept . l, 65 . 
4 . Russell-Que' n Victoria, 5 Feb . 1865, BuckJ_e , Letters of 
Queen Victoria-t._]._862- l869 , second. series, 2 vols . (Londn n; 
John 1-'Iurray, 1826) l vol , p . 250 . 
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at this juncture, it seems he hoped that he could extric·te 
himself from the thiopian difficulty without further compli -
cations , and without further loss of prestige . Thus he was 
prepared to rro to come lengths to meet Theodore ' s demands . 
It is ill uminating to follow the trend of' his thought in his 
o\~ words . He wrote Col . btanton : 
Rassam should set off as soon as pos ible ; he should 
ask kin ~heo ore only as a favo~r to release the mission-
aries, but cannot insist upon their release; t at he 
should inform the kin that if His I~ajr sty wishes to send 
an embassy , Her la~esty ' s 0 0Vernment will endeavour Cto 
ob ·ain s fe passage ~ assam to inform Theodore that Her 
l\Tajesty ' - consul in J erusalem Hill be instructed to give 
Abyssinian subjects the same good o.ffices as were o.ffered 
to them by his predecessors . "! On September 22 h~ 
wrote , 
trRassam may explain to the king Theodore that no orders 
have been given to consul Cameron to interfere in the 
internal affairs of Abyssinia or in any· question that 
mi ·_ht arise bet ·1een him and the Viceroy of Egypt . n2 
This meant that Lord Russell was pr pared to concede 
on two important points ·which the British Government; had 
r fused till then: that £heodore ' s embassy 11ould be recAived 
~vithout the conditions attached to it by Clarendon , and that 
official protection rould be granted to the Jthiopian nationals 
at Jerusalem a responsibility which Great Britain had declined 
to accept ~ill.then . 
l . "P . P . " , p . 382 , Russell-Stanton , Sept . l, 65 . 
2 . np . P . II ' p . 393' Russe]_l- Stanton' Sept . 22' 65 . 
lll . 
But unfortunately these conc essions had come a 
little too late . They were concessions made under duress , 
and desir-ned to ,-Jxtricate the Bri tis!1 Government :from a 
dif.ficul t situation in which ~ri tish prestige was i:rr"Tolved . 
Theodore, having accidentally achieved a very s~rong bargaining 
position ·vras in a mood to play :Lor high sta~·:es . Inc )ired by 
the vision of his prophetic rol , and elated h~ his first 
diplomatic victory ovel'"' a Bi~~hty po\.-er, ~heodore •1as -pre:pared 
to cain as much advanta~e as h~ could from the situation . It 
vras at this June-cure that lassam \'J').s ca1_led upon to play the 
role ox· a consummate diplomat . 
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II - 2 
On the eve of as am's de arture for •thiopia 
Theodore had \VTi tten to t e Naib of __ rkeeko that, "Go d willing 
\hen he corr.es all his reque ..... ts 'ill be ranted . 111 This sub-
stan iated the evidence of messen eis returnin from Theodore's 
court that he had of late become ~tter disposed to Jards the 
B ... h 2 rl"tlS • The accoE&odatin attitude o the Forei ·n Secretary, 
and the apparently softened at·itude o£ Theodore .ave ~as am 
so e houe for the succesc of his mis ion . 
After - eceivin ussel 's in~tr ctions, assam 
accompanied by ..Jr . lane-~ an Lt . Prideaux ar_ i ved at _as sa\ a 
in Oc vober 1865, and a li t·t;le later left for atemma on the 
Sudan bord r . he ur 1~ and t- e E yptian autho ~ities at 
Lassawa and Kassala3 gave rnuc'l assistance to hi , and the 
~ yptian governor of T a received the mission \:ith a guard 
of onour consistinn of a reriment o~ Sudan infantry and 
150 Bash i Bazaik cavalr • 4 Rassam continued to ,..:et go od news 
from :.rthiopia . For instance Epperle, one of the lay mission-
aries, ret·urnina from Theodore ' s can1J, and ~lad , a friendly 
l . n 
" . ' 
~ . 387, Theoaore- Paib , incl . 529 . 
2 . Ibid . 
3 . An ....:.rgyptian _:ron· ier town . 
4 . "- • p . fl ' p • 42 7 ' assam-IerHet er, Yove ber 27, 1865 . 
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Ger an mipcionary advised- im of a genera~ feelin_ in Ethigpia 
that Th adore would come to term~ tnen he had the Queen ' s 
letter . 1 
Having received these reports Rassam informed 
Theodore of his arrival at the appointed place, and requested 
permission to roceea to his presence . 2 ~-leo~ore informed 
as·am that he had ordered all the chiefs enroute to provide 
for the needs of the mission , and an escort was on the way to 
fetch them to the La e Dembea \There the royal audience would 
b . 3 e glven . This friendly reply prompted Rassam to write his 
g overnment that 11 Theodore ' s let·ter co ld not have been more 
friendly and civil . " 4 All this tended to raise the hopes of 
the British ofiicials ·rho concluded that the progress of the 
misc:oion ·vas most promising . 5 
Indeed Theodore received Rassam and his party with 
all the reopect due to a forei~n embassy , and accepted the 
gifts from the queen as a token fro. a friendly power \•Those 
6 
rene'ied friendship he was happy to acknowledge . Thou:h he 
l . "? . p . 428 , R ssam- _Jer vether, ov . 27 , 65 . 
2 . Blanc_ , o • cit . p . 107 . 
3 . ".t . P . " , p . 440 , Theo ore- assam , incl . 2 , in 524 . 
4 . 11 P . P . " , p . 439 , Rassam- I-:erwether , Dec . 27 , 65 . 
5 . "P . P . " , :p . 445 , le:c-t-re-cher-Clarendon , !\.~.arch 17 , 1866 . 
6 . Blanck , on . cit ., p . l30 , ~arkham, o . cit . p . 99 . 
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gave vent to his rage at -che sup. osed misdeeds of' Cameron and 
the European ~nisEionaries , he ass11red Rassam that for the sake 
o£ his friendshin for the Queen he would release the captives . 1 
As an <:~xpression of gratitude Theodore planned to send a letter 
to the Queen in "\lhich he de _.c:r ibed himself' as an i !!norant 
~thiopian and iflplored her to pardon his offences . 2 After 
presenting Hassam wit 1 5000 dollars and promising to allov1 
the mission to leave the country il~ honour and safety3 Theodore 
ordered them to p:r:oceed to ~orata4 to a\·Jai t ~he arrival of the 
captives whose release had been ordered al~eady . 5 All rejoiced 
at -che happy t rn o:f eve:11.ts, and Dr . Blanck VJrote later, "all 
smiled upon us, and we rejoiced beyonG. expresc:,ion by the 
com-plete success of our misf"ion . 11 6 
On 12 ~larch , 1865, Consul Cameron , Kerens , the 
missionaries Stern and -losenthal joined the British mission 
\•Jhose relations '.fi th 1Jlheoc ore vvere extremely cordial . Theodore 
was embarrassingly poJ_i te and raa,:rnaEimous toviards RasLam , 
.r:ivin_r: him abunuant su_:>nlies an~l money, ·hTiting co-c.rteous 
letters thankin-~ him :for restorin~ hao 'Y relations between 
tne two countries and re~uestin~ hi~ to convey his sincere 
---·-·------
l . Blanck , on . cit ., p . l30 . 
2 . "P . P . n, p . 459 , Theodore-Qu.een, incl . l/593 . 
3 . Blanck , op.cit., p . l30 . 
4 . A villa~e on the Sor .. th east of -che Lake Tana . 
5 . Blanck, oo.cit., p . l30 . 
6 . Ibid . 
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friendship :for the queen . 1 The mission had completely succeded 
in its underta.kin~ and ancici?atin[; no f'urt:her -t;roubJ_es \vas 
hopinP~ to leave for EnEland any moment . 
However this was not to be: to every one ' s great 
surnrise Theocore novt demanded a justLfication of his former 
conduct, 2~d uith characteristic cunning asked Rassam to 
conduct a public trial of the captives ~o decide who had been 
in the vrrong - v;hether he or the captives? Rassam kn.ev1 that 
the sensible thing to do was to let the king have what he 
wished, and on his advice, after a sham trial the captives 
confes: ea. to their supposed :::aul ts a::.1d begged Theodore ' s 
pardon . 2 
After this , in antici~ation o£ getting a final 
clearance, Ras -am ruet \•ii th Theodore and it \va;::; agreed that 
Came on and the other captives wo-u.ld leave the country at 
once , v1hile the members of the British mission would join the:o 
after meeting Theociore at Zagwe to exchan~re farev;ell . Accord-
ing ly on April 13 , 1866 Came~on and the oth er ex-captives . 
!;1roceeded to Gondar, while Rassam , "Dlanck and Prideaux went 
to Zagwe to take leave of T~eodore . As usual, hiGh- ranking 
Ethbuian officers conducted them to the roval tent . But to 
- u 
their dismay Theodore was absent and the Ethio~ian grandees 
l . "P . P . 11 , p . 457 , Rassam-T.terwether , Feb . 3 , 1866 . 
2 . Blanck, ou . cit . , p . l46 . 
ll6. 
stood in terrifyine silence on either side of his empty t~rone . 
Even before Rassam and his friends had a moment to realize the 
meaning of this drama , Ethiopian soldiers seized and. ch8.ined 
them . They had been imprisoned, and it did n o t take them 
lone to learn that the advancing party of Cameron had been 
reimprisoned , and \·Jere being brought to Zage . 
The next day Theodore conducted a sham trial charging 
Rassam with takin~ away Cameron and others \vi thout effecting 
a reconci)_iat ion . No rational explanation satisfied the 
monarcr_ \·,rho had en ~ ineered the '.<Jhole affair . "After some 
blashphemous parleying the king bowed his head and begged 
forgiveness from all v.rhom he had wronged . n 1 Dr . Blank 1 s and 
Rassam ' s ac co~~t of Theodore leads one to the conclusion that 
either he was demented or else was being clever . 
seems to be the case . 
The latter 
Thou~b it was rumoured at that time that Theodore 
did not allow the captives to leave his country because he 
feared possible reprisals .from the British Government once 
the Captives were safe , this do~s not appear to be the case . 
Theodore was a soldier of great daring and courage , and it is 
unlikely that he was afraid of Britain . Cameron wrote of him 
that he cared nothing for Euro~ean alliances and believed 
himself to be a match to Britain . 2 Plowden ' s description of 
l . Bl anck , op . cit . , 
2 . " P . P .", p . 404 , Cameron- Hertslet , July 14 , 65 . 
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his character, and his later beheaviour support this view . 
Theodore had certain objectives and he was determined to 
reach them whatever the crudene ss of the methods he mi_zht 
have £elt obliged to employ . 
Theodore was a great moderniser and wanted to 
strengthen his country, both militarily and otherwise . He 
kne·"., that many f'issiparous tendencies were weakening his 
government , and the local chiefs beine anxious to be inde-
pendent were disdaining the central authority . In his first 
meeting Theodore had told Rassalli. that his country men were 
'.lic\:ed, al1:1ays re dy to reject a _;ood eovernrill~nt and al,trays 
in revolt . I1oreover , the aspirations of both the Turks and 
the Egyptians had increased his di~ficulties . ~e needed 
superior arms in large quantity to put dovm internal revolts 
and checkmate external aggres _ion . Vli th the Turl;::;3 in control 
oi' the Red sea ports the import o:f munition was difficult, 
and the British who might have helped him in this respect 
were loath to jeopardise theLr :rela:tions with Turkey . Thus 
Theodore sou::-ht a devise by which he could compel 3ritain to 
acco~~odate him . I 
As earlv as l855 Theodore had be~un the task of 
v -
acquirinl; modern armar'1ents .for his army . In thc:t year a group 
of protestani: m:L3·~ionaries Tvlho had been trained in the technical 
arts at Basle ~lad arrived in Ethiopia for propo~;atinc~ relic- ion. 
Theodore told them that he did not need reli~ious instructors 
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in h is country but uorkmen who could malte munitions of' \var. 
Having i:Ion them ovc to his wishes, '[lheodore not only sho\vered 
many benefits on them, but also encouraged them to marry 
Ethiopian girls and settle down in his country . He found a 
work shop i'or them at Gaffat and asked them to cast cannons, 
and build mortars and shells . In all they cast at least 
t"ll;el ve bronze cannons, including the famous 5 00 ton Cannon 
us ebastapool n • 1 The manufacture of such weapons was of' consid-
erable psycholo.;ical iiD.p o.rtance, the more so as Theoc.ore ' s 
atte~pt at unifying the country made necessary a series of 
military operations in the principal provinces . 
But though Theo~ore had learnt that he could manu-
facture arms in his o\:n country he was not satisfieu 1.•ri th the 
production of the missionaries alone , anJ revived the idea of 
obtaining craftsman from Britain . Cameron, before his impri-
so~ment, had supported this policy; but as vle have seen the 
Foreign Office preferred to avoid entanglements with Ethiopia 
and did not even reply politely to his letters . Beanwh:i.le 
the epi_s ode of' Cameron ' s imprisomnent had revealed to Theodore 
his strength and had put in his hands a new weapon to .force 
Britain ' s acquiescence to his wishes . j'ortified in his 
mo~ntainous country he could pursuade Britain to yield to him 
t h is 
on point . . Cameron ' s imprisonment had prouuced immediate 
1 . The above acco unt is based on Richard Pankhurst ' s article , 
rtEm:peror Theodore o:f Ethiopian, Tarik , Vol . l, no . 4 , 1967 
pp . l5- 25 . 
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results; a British mission had waited on hi=, and British 
intransigence ·vti th regard to -the rece!)tion of his ambassadors 
had been broken . W1ly not go a step .furtLer to realize a 
dream th~t had been so close to his heart? \ihy not use Rassam? 
As a matter of fact Theodore had expected Rassam 
to raise the question o~t' helping him with arms and artisans, 
and in this expectation he had treated the British mission 
very generously . But there VJas no in.dicatie>n this was paying 
of.f in any \'lay as Rassau had maintaine d complete silence on 
the matter . Dr . Blanck thought that "the Emperor was put out 
for Rassam had not mentioned the object he had so dear to his 
heart , the artisans and instruments ."1 At this juncture his 
European workmen su~gested to Theodore that he ought to take 
advantage of Rassam ' s presence to obtain whatever he liked 
.from Britain , 2 and he lost no :time in implementin,s the 
suggest ions , an echo of his O\•m feelings and t 1oughts . 
Theodore was not act inc on vihims and fancies . He 
set the stage by expl..oitine: the anxiet;, of the caotives to 
leave the cou.ntr:r , and had obtained from them a confession 
of t ... :eir w-..cong deeds . The offended monarch needed to be 
compensated . But he did not demand tb.is at once , since he 
had g iven his \ford of' honour to Rassam to send him and the 
l . Blanck , on.cit., p . l92 . 
2 . Ibid. o . l48 . 
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ca~tives on their way without delay . -re did not lqish to 
violate his remise openly as he did not wish to appear as 
an offender before his people . At the same time he could 
not thLnk o£ sen;i~g Rassam ana his party from his country , 
for , though the ~ritish ~overnment had promised to receive 
his embassy and to act in ood faith hH was not certain that 
thGy "\lOUld do SO . :""oreover by detE.ininr~ Ras' am he could 
force the British government to stlpply him with rne.chinery, 
artisans an workmen . 
Hovvever Theodore was not insensible to the magni -
tude of disappointment he had caused to Rassam and the others . 
1 i th a viev1 to soften the · he effected an e:notional reconcil-
iation with them . But Theodore never lost si ht of his 
objectives for a moment . rte told ~assam that in spite of 
aJ_l that had happened he 1.·;ould treat -them generously and send 
them home provided they got him satisfac:fion . He did not 
need gold or silver , but people 1..rho vo-:1ld "open his eyes . 111 
Rassa~ and his party fould remain in ~thiopia until the British 
Government had sent hir.. uor1-.men . On his req_uest, ... ~as2am, \Tho 
felt that he had no altern&tive, appealed to Clarendon to 
supply '.:heoc ore -,i th a :fevr ar-tisans an technicians for 
instructin his people in ~he art of castinE cannon, muskets 
and shots . J_hesc '~Jrere to arrive \vith their instruments and 
1 . uP . P . ", p . 467, Rassam-Clarendon, April 18, 1866 . 
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after they had instructed treEthiopians might return to 
En:;land . Jtur t her he reg_uested the Fore j_gn Secretary to 
send a gif't of 10 , 000 percuss ion ca:?s, rifles anCi .n.:un po1.vder 
to Theoc1ore . 1 
Simul taneou_sly Theodore sen-e a letter to the 
Queen making a similar request . He \\Tote: 
We the people of Ethiopia are blind and beg of 
your Ha.jes t.y that you should c;ive li .ht to our eyes 
and so you may receive light in the kinedom of 
=~eaven n . 2 
Flad, the German misLionary wa~ chosen by the kin~ to carry 
those letters to London . 
1 . Ibid . 
2 . Ibid ., Theodore-Queen , April 17 , 66 . 
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CHAPTER VII - 3 
Before the arrival of Fla< at Aden, the British 
officialB there v1ho had come to believe that the Ethiopian 
difficulty was at an end were daily expect in:- the arrival 
of Rassam . Col . ~erwether had even drafted a letter to 
Theodore invi tin~ him to send an embass:y to -~nr:la.nd along 
with some of his younz men who ·would remain in England to 
be e'"l uca ted . Col . Stanton at Alexandria had forwarded this 
draft for the approval of the ~oreign Secretary . 1 In fact 
j;he British oi'ficials were i.n an expansive and ·enerous mood 
and were prepared , once the captives were out of Ethiopia, 
to make up for their past indifference to the king . But 
Flad ' s tidings on Rasse~'2 detention upset their calculation 
and introduced new com~lexitiss into the situation . 
A little later Flad arrived in London and Gave to 
the Foreign Office a detailed account of affairs in Ethiopia 
until the tirr.e o1' his departure. ne reported his belief 
that the ftilure of the Foreign Office to reply to Theodore's 
letter had been lardely responsible for all that had occurred 
and spoke highly of Rassam's abilities and character. 2 He 
advised the Foreicn Secretary to comply '1ith the request of 
l . ] 1 . 0 . 1 , Stanton, F . O. 5/22/66, quoted, :rrarston, op .cit., 
p .312. 
2 . " P . P . 11 , p . 469, FJ_ad-Clarendon, incl. in 610. 
123. 
Theodore for artisans and machinery, and depreca±ed the use 
of force as he feared it v.,rould endanger the lives of the 
captives . 
Before Clarendon could ~ive consideration to these 
facts and suggestions the liberal government of Russell fell 
and the conservatives led by Derby came to power. The new 
Foreign Secretary , 3tanley , had a long talk with ~lad , and 
received :from Co . IVIerwether a memorandum on Ethiopian affairs 
in which he argued that th .~ best course o:f action would be to 
satisfy the king by showinc a liberal d isposition . He suggested 
that the Queen shouJ_d 1>1ri te a polite letter to Theodore asking 
him to send the much d i scussed embassy to ~n~land so that they 
coul , see the pro.r..ressive civilization of England and discover 
for themselves -che advantae;es o£ a fri1.)ndly as uoc io.-cion with 
B •t . l rl aln . 
These arguments fell on the willing ears of Lord 
Stanley who wa~; opT)osed to any form of military action , and 
believed that no re~sonable means should be neglected for 
ob~aining the release of the captives . So he ordered that 
the artizans and the articles ordered by the kin~ should be 
sent at the public expense . 2 ~erwether himself recruited 
seven worklpen who vere to accompany ::?lad to ~thiopia . l[essrs . 
Eacton & Co . de sic-ned o. t•Hel ve horse 11ower steam en ~ine to 
l . "l . :.0 .", o . 493, lVIerewetner ' s memorandum, Au_·ust l6, 66, 
. l c-38 lnc..._ . '- . 
2 . up: P . n, p . 496 , IVlurray-The Secretary o.f 'J~he ·.Crea .... ury, Aug . 
l8' 66 . 
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meet with the requirements of The odor(: for '.rhom r!erv!ether 
bou':ht a num.b"·r o:f ;::Cesel1.ts. ~'he cost a::..· all these i terns 
exceeded £39001 , an insi,:rnificant trifle com·1ared to the 
probable cost o! a militar: cE~pairn in ~thiopia . 
i~eanVIhi le rumours vrere aJ.'loat that :Bigypt V!Ol!ld 
attack 3thiopia , and ~lad who feared its porbable effect on 
the British captive s request,ed the Foreizn Secretary to take 
immediatA steps to check Egypt . 2 On the advise of' t~le 
Forei_n Office , Col. Stanton o~ Alexandria, took the mat~er 
U? with the Viceroy of Egypt uho assured hi~ ""Chat he had 
not the sli ·.htest intention of attacking Lthiopia . 3 Flad 
also req_uested the 5r i tish 10VArnmr:r't to endeavour to 
rer-tore the convent at Jerusaleu to Ethiopian monks as he 
thou~1t such a move would convince Theodore of Britain ' s 
friendshi:r> . Thou ·L no serious thou ht was ·iven to this 
su;,.estion, the :Jritish Govern:nent went as far as they could 
to satis.fy Theodore meet in:; provocation '<!i th restrain~ and 
demonstratin,. a genuine de eire to avoic. -the use of .2..orce . 
They had as ever used .Jcheir inf'lu-:=nce to restrain ~gypt ' s 
agp;ressive intentions in ~thiopia , and were obviousl~! anxious 
to make amends for previous eri·ors of ommission and commission 
towards the of .ended monarch . On September l , Flad in~ormed 
l . "1? . P . 11 , p . 522 , lVIer\·!ether-~he F . 0 . 
2 . "P . P .", :p . 476 , Flad-Stanley , incl . 613 . 
3 . "P . P . 11 , p . 482 , Stanton- Stanley , July 23 , 66 . 
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Theodore of the complete success o£ his mission, and also of 
-che Queen ' s friendly disposition towards him . .!!'lad hoped to 
return to Ethiopia with artisans ru~d mac~inery by the end of 
October . 1 
In Ethiopia, :mean\·rhL_e , everythinc: seemed to be 
going well . Theou.ore allowed Rassac and his party to move 
about freely . Dentention no longer meant fetters . The king 
as if in compensation for hie former rude behaviour showered 
many presents on the captives including saddles inlaid with 
gold , a special si n of his favour . He even planned to create 
nei•7 Orders o£ -·1eri t, and to confer higher distinctions on 
Rassam , Blanck and Prideaux . On May 24, the Queen ' s birthday, 
he ordered a 21 7Un salute and a feast as a token of his 
respect for her . He took Rass~ and his £riencis on hunting 
expeditions and spoke frequently of his friendship towards 
En'",land . 2 Had this phase continued a little longer it is 
probable that the Ethiopian affair could still have ended 
gracefully . But the inconsistent •:-theodore not knowin~ what 
was happening in Enr.:land , for Flad ' s letter l1ad not yet reached 
hi2, accepted rumours about Britain ' s treachery to\vards him 
and suddenly turned com~letely about and assumed an attitude 
of hoetility towards the ca_tives . 
l . lfJ? . P . n, p . 503 , Flad-Theodore, 1 Sentember 1866, incl . 
2 . "P . P . ", p . 484 , Rassam-Clarendon , 1;,1ay 27, 1866 . A 
detailed account of Theodore ' s c~nduct towards the British 
mise ion can be found in Blanc ' s "Narrati_ve" and Rassam ' s 
nNarrative o.f the B,....i tish Mission". 
On June 25 , he asked Rassam and his party to face 
a political trial durin~_: which he brought many charges against 
them . He burst out v.rith uncontrollable rage on the supposed 
dupliclty of Britain , and announced that he had received 
secret intelligence regarding the comp1icity of Britain with 
Turkey, and accused her o£ building a Railway for the convey-
ance of troops to Ethiopia. He revived his old complaint 
that Jerusalem \las his inheritance , but that En'lland had been 
supportine Turkish sovereignty over thct place . Later he 
placed Rasfam and his party under strict detention , 1 and 
though Rassam vra3 able to ge t occassional messages to Theodore , 
he v1as unabl e to i mlJre ss upon him the consequences to v.rhich 
he was expos in:· himself by his rude behaviour . 2 A few days 
later Rassam and his party were conveyed to the Fort of 
f·Jagdala \·Jhere they ·were to spend lont.s days of· hope and anguish 
until their rescue came at the hands of Kapier • . 
News of Rassar.:.1 ' s imprisonment reached the li,ore ign 
Oi'fice to\.ards the end of Au';ust 1866. This shat terct the 
confidence of ~erwether and Flad in t·.e professed friendship 
of ~heoaore . Flad conveyed his opinion to the Foreign Office 
that no good would result by Britain ' s compliance with 
Theodore ' s request and advised them to take stronger measures 
against him . 3 T1erwether \'lho stron.;ly su:pr:-orted this opinion 
l . 11 ? . P . ', -p . 503 , Ras( am-r1erwethe:r, July 26, 66 . 
2 . Markham, on . cit .·, pp . 111- 113 . 
3 . nP . P . ", p . 508, ]1acl- Herewe-r;her , 19 Se-otember 1866 . 
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submitted a ne1.. :n ;morandum to the :?orei _n Office explaining 
the need to :t'ollo\, a more vi::!. ... ile policy to.-.rards Theodore. 
~-e considered the imprisonm~nt as a gross outr:t~e a11d insult 
to the British Govern..rnent and maintained that "such a barbarous 
con'luctn should not be tolc>rated. He advised the "lri tish 
Government to derr:and fron Theo-:-..ore the immediate release of' 
the captives and urged that, this demand failinz in its purpose, 
an expedition should be sent to accomJ~ish the rescue. He 
arcued that the ~reater part of Ethiopia was in rebellion 
a~ainst the kin_ and that ~here could bo no doubt but that 
the local rulers and the people of ~thiopia woul~ cooperate 
with the British once it was made c~ear that the expedition 
would not continue in 3thiopia after liberatine the ca~tives 
and that the British GoverTh.--nent had no ulterior aims . 1 The 
cabinet hov.rever rejected I·~erwether 's plan as they still clung 
to the hope of avoidin6 the necessity of sendino a military 
expedition and resolved to persevere in their original con-
ciliatory measures . 2 
Mer~\vether vias much disappointed with this decision 
as he had reached the conclusion that only the use of force 
would bring the desired results . However it was decided to 
send Flad back with a polite but firm letter from the Queen 
I. "P . P .", pp . 509-ll, Merwether ' s memorandum on Ethiopia, 
Sept . 25 , 66 . 
2 . "P . P . ", p . 5l4 , .L·erewether-I~urray l October 1866 . 
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which pointed to the contradiction between Theodore's pro-
fessions of friendship anci his actions, and which indicted 
him for imprisoninr..: ambassadors uhose persons were held to 
be sacred by all nations "asL>uming to be civilized.n The 
let~er went on to ask Theodore to give effect to his promises 
by releasin-: the CD. )tives, after which the British Government 
would send him the articles and artisans . 1 
Flad was instructed to tell Theodore that he had 
destroyed the British Government ' s confidence by imprisoning 
the British mission; that Britain had no wish to encourage 
Egypt ag&inst Ethiopia; but that in return for Britisb good 
will ~thiopia had to Live substantial proof of her friendship 
towards Britain , ana the release of the captives would be such 
2 proof . Thus a hint of threat was also conveyed. But the 
whole correspondence maces it clear that the British g overn-
ment wa~ extremely reluctant to send a military expedition 
against Ethiopia , and that they 1·.rishss till the end to escape 
from that country , peacefully, and vJi th their prestige intact . 
li'lad , on arriving at l\:assawa , sent the Queen ' s 
letter to Theodore v.rho was not influenced by it in the least . 
On the contrary, he sent Rassam a draft of' his reply which 
very firmly declared that although he had "loved England 
exceedinglyn and s incerely desired i'or her f,riendship, he had 
l . "P.P.", pp .514-l5, Queen-Theodore, October 4 , 66 . 
2 . "P . P . n , p.,516 , Instructions to l7lad , October 8, 66 . 
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heard of her complicity with the Tur!<:s and had changed l1is 
attitude . 1 But this letter was never sent and soon we find 
him again changing his tactics and writin~ an imploring note 
to Rassan:.. declaring that the moment the workmen arrived in 
his country that he would send him away, and that he was 
prepared to fall at the feet of the Queen for this 1~avour . 2 
I.Jlean\vhile Flad arrived at Debra Tabor and during 
his interviev~ with the king implored him to release the cap-
tives and even politely pointed out that if he were to anta-
gonize England he would have a war on his hands not only '.vi th 
that country but also with .?ranee and Egypt . Theodore remained 
undisturbed by this as he had some hovl reached the conclusion 
that he could get nothinG exceut by the coercion of En .... ; land 
uhose natural sympat"1ies he believed to be vri th his enemies . 
Ho told Flad thPt since ~n ~land had refused him her friend -
ship , he was \·Iillint.· to :fi ~:ht her . 
It is indeed very ~ifficult to underGtand Theodore 
whose intransigence and lack of foresi::_;ht aDpear to defy 
1..mderstan0 in:-; . It was a tragedy that the British Government 
had created an impreszian in hi~ mind th;lt they would yield 
only to pressu.::-e and f"orce of circum.::tance ~ . In 1866, ·che 
internal c ond ition of Ethiopia was anythin~ but happy . 
l . nP . J: . ", p . Theou.ore-Ras am, Jan . 67 . 
2 . n p . p . fl' p . 570' Theodore-Has'3C:UTI' Jan . 8' 67. 
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Re bellion was the order of the da: . Theo~ore ' s long and 
protracted vlars ag2.inst -che I'1ohamrnedan Gallas had le.ft him 
exhausted , and had corroded hin authority . Wagsum Gobaze ·v.ras 
becoming stron er in western ~thiopia , and ~enelek , since his 
escape from Theodore's prison, was grov.,rinP.: po\verful in Shoa . 
The re~el chief Kassa was practically independent in Tigre . 
Theoc.;.ore ' s sovereignty vras more nominal than real , his 
authority beinc limited ·to the central parts o£ the empire . 
Iiis army had been reduced to a mere rabble an~ his merciless 
behaviour to·.·1ards prisoners , his predatory expeditions inclu-
ding the sack of Gondar , and his attitude towards the clericals 
h a d alienated the sym-pathies of hie subjects . Under these 
circ1-unstances Theo.:...ore probably felt that he needed a diplo -
matic victory over the mi-=>;hty Enr.·lish to prove to his people 
his strength . As Rassam pointed out his very .figure frightened 
rebels , and this timGly victory would add to his reputation . 
f\'lor e importantly he needed mechanics and artisans to build 
tis armaments so that he could assert his power over the 
rebels and thus consolidate his position . At ·the same time 
he did not p o ssess or pursue any policy as Europeans under-
stood it . Probably Cameron was correct in observing that 
"as to policy he knew ·no"!:::hin""' , his maxim was to defy every -
body depend i ng on t.ne Holy Trinity whose instrument he 
bel i eved himsel:f to be ;r . Thus blinded by an irrational 
belief in his ultimate victory , and an errane ous understanding 
of British policies and attitudes , Theodore turned deaf ear 
to the British suggestions and continued to keep Rassam 
~_nd his party in fetters tnus leaving Br~tain no alterna-
tive but the use of force to accompli8h her objective . 
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CHAPTER VIII 
With the failure of Flad's mission the Ethiopian 
question asfumed a serious character. I'hough two more 
ineffective efforts were made to procure the release of the 
captives1 there was no doubt regardin~ the only means avail-
able to achieve this objective . Every one familiar 1.·.rith the 
Ethiopian situation - the captives at l~1agdala , Col. Nerwether 
at Aden , and the leading illf3illbers OI both the rrory e.nd the Whig 
parties - came to conclude that further peaceful approaches 
would not brin~ the esired results , and that Theodore would 
not release the captives unless forced to do so . 
As early as May 1864 , the question of Cameron ' s 
imprisonment had been discussed by Parliament , and on I~ay 23 , 
Chelmsford moved for the placing or the Ethiopian papers in 
Parliament . On June 30 , 1865 , a debate took place in the 
Commons on the Government ' s Et hiopian polic;y vrhen they came 
under sever criticism for their negligence in replying to 
Theodore . Russell and Layard tried to defend themselves by 
making Came:ron a scapegoat . 
Hearn'!hile t;he British officials at Ca iiD'o and Aden 
were getting im,atient of the Jovernment ' s pacific policy . 
Tired of wai tin;~ v1i th the workers and artisans at I·1assawa in 
l . In 186 7 the Khedive of Eg:y-pt and the patriarch o.f Jerusalem 
made separate a~peals to Theodore to release the ca~tives; 
obviously these had no e££ect on Theodore . 
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anticipation of Theodore ' s reply , ~erwether warned the Foreign 
Secretary of the effects of further in ults from ~heo~ore on 
3ri tish prestige, and v.rged hi~1 to ado_ t a 1--:'::..rm and bold 
atvitude towards the king . 1 Col . Sta~ton, at Alexandria, 
supported this vie\·.r . 2 Even the pacific Lta,nley had slowly 
reached the concl ·sion that ueaceful relations was not the 
object of Theodore and 11rote a stron.__ly 1.:orded letter VTarning 
him that if he C:id not release the captives within three 
months friendly relations \Tith Ethiopia would cease , and force 
would be employed ac;ainst him . 3 On the same day, transmitting 
this news to 1·1erv1ether , Stanle~,- 1.v-rote that he was in consul -
tation with the In·ia Of~ice about the probable military 
expedition ac-ainst 1rheor1ore , although he himself' was much in 
.favour of' a peaceiul solu·iJion oi' the question . To many in 
the India Of'i'ice Stanley ' s pacific moves ,..,ere a disappoint-
ment, and Sir . Stafford No.r:thcote i;JTote .:Tohn Lawrence that nthe 
inclination of the council her is to abstain from action of 
a military character •••• and I think it probable that this 
will be the ul tima.te decision of the Government ..•• it is 
very little -co ou:c credit . n4 
It is probable that many in En land were in agree -
ment with the vievi o£ Si::- Stafi·ord . Even amidst all the 
1 . ":.? . P . rr , p . 514 , Lerwether-rJ.Iurra:7 , October l, 66 . 
2 . u~. -.; " 
• ....1- • ' 
3 . n . P . n , 
p . 547, 
p . 610 , 
Stan ton;- Stanley· , 
Stanley-Theodore, 
Feb . 1 , 67 . 
-.~.pril 16, 67 . 
4 . Northcote-~a-vrrence, l•_o.y lC , 67 , Quoted by Andre~i Lang, 
Life & Let~ers of Sir 0ta£ford Northcote ( 2 vols ., London; 
1890 Vol . l , p . 3Q8 . 
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excitement about the Re£orm Act , the Newspapers k e pt alive 
the Ethiopian isr ue and the Pall .. "lall .. Gazette v1i th i -cs 
stronq conservative leanings never stop~ed writin~ about the 
....... 
need for a more vigorous Ethiopian policy and warned the 
government "of the stigma on our pov1er o:f having been unable 
to cope with the resolute chief o£ Abyssinia [ and also pointed 
out that) the effect would not be lost on ::Ggypt, or along the 
shores of' the Red sea [ and indee cU it mieht have its influence 
on India ."1 
The Forei,n Secretary had been under constant 
parliamentary pressure to take stron~er measures, and on ~1ay 
14, 1867 in the Com..rnons :t·x . \ ylds asKed him to explain whether 
further measures had be n taken to release the captives . 2 On 
June 21 , Stratf'ord Radc 1_it'.fe raised the same q_uestion in the 
Lords and argued that theEthiopian ~uestion involved national 
honour , and warned the -;overrun"-:nt against further indignities 
at the hands of Theodore . 3 On July 19 Lord Cochrane took the 
matter up in the Lords and ·v1ondered whether there was any hope 
of the liberation of the captives . 4 On 26 July , Henry Seymour 
told the commons that great interest in the captives had been 
excited throughout gland and that it was the ~eneral opinion 
l. '' P . P .. ", p . 632 , quoted by Beke in his letter of 13 June , 67 
to Stanley . 
2. Hansard , 3rd series , Vol .CXC , p .. 524 . 
3 . Hansard , 3rd series , Vol . CLXYJVII, ~ . 239 .. 
4 . Hansard , 3rd series, Vol .CLXXXVIII , p .l723 .. 
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that the country was disgraced in allowing them to remain so 
long in captivity and t hat a show of force would be necessary 
to restore prestige . 1 Henry Rawlinson warned a gainst a miser-
able example of moral cov1ardice and military weak-ness 2 and 
argued that prestig e in politics •t.ras like crndit in .finance ; 
that it had enabled Great Britain with very smal l means to do 
great thin~s . As a matter of fact t h e whole British position 
in the East dep ended on it. It was the foundation of the 
Empire and a talisman v.rhich had helped Great Britain to do 
great things and every step must be tak en to preserve it 
intact . 3 Henry Layard supported this view and wondered whether 
the honour ana the credit of Great Britain did not render a 
military expedition against Ethiopia absolutely necessary . 4 
As the parliamentary pressure for stronzer measures 
was moun tin~_· the woef'ul tale of' the ca ptives was making it 
very difficult for the Government to persevere in their peace-
.ful policy towards Theodore . Both Cameron and Dr . Blanck urote 
the Foreign Ofi'ice that nothinrr but an army could secure their 
release from Theodore ' s fetters . Ras La m vho had been held in 
high esteeiL. by the Government sent a secret mes r a g e to I-!erwether 
reading , "Action for us is life and delay death . " Ler\lether 
l . Hansard , 3rd series, Vol . CLXXXXIX, p . 237 . 
2 . Ibid . , p . 242 . 
3 . Ibid . 
4 . HB.J.l.sard , 3rd series, Vol . C f1XXXIX , p . 242 . 
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who had sent the artisans bac:,;: to En ··land in view of TheoCi.ore ' s 
haughty silence considered th~t since Theodore had i~nored 
the aovernment ' s ultimatum they -rP.re bound to take military 
mec:-,surer· acainst him, anu ureea Stanley to make :;>reparations 
-. 
for \•Jar . ·- Thus the mis"jionarif~S, t1-J.e ca'Ttives, the of.ficials 
and the leaders of both political parties had come to conclude 
that they had been \.ronged . ·rhey <::..lso held that prestige was 
the foundation o:f the empire and ·vlhatever the loss of life 
involved , and \lhatever the ~xpenses, that no one should ever 
be allov,r]d to offend it Vfi th impunity . In vi~w of these 
feel in s and circumstances, and in view of the exl)iry. of the 
three months ultimat~~ served to ;~heorore , the ~rltish govern-
ment decided to send an exJeditionary force to ~thiopia to 
2 
release the captj_ves and to r e!Sto r e honour . On September 9 , 
1867 Stanley in.Zormcd Theodore o.f this decision and warned 
him that he alone \.rould be he1.d responsible for all the 
conseq_uences . 3 
I:n r ·o,Tc11ber 1867 when the Government approached 
parliament for money to undertake the military expedition , 
the Ethiopian question was once again debated . Queen Victoria 
informed parliament th2~t she had. ordered tr1e expedition to 
relf~ase the captives from unjust imprisonment and to vindi-
-- -----------
l . up . P . " , p . 6 53 , Nere·wether- Stanley , June 18 , 67 . 
2 . nP . P .", p . 653 , Sta.nley-Herewether , June 15,. 67 . 
3 . "P . P . " , Vol . XLIII , n . 186 , Stanley- I>ierewether , Au~ust 18 , 67 . 
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cate the honour of the Lord Stanley thou~ht that 
Brit~in ' s prestige tould have suffered throuehout the world 
had the government allowed Her Ilia· esty' s cro•,vn and dignity 
to be offended by a semi-barbarous potentate . 2 He weilt on 
to say that "we rest our _position there on 1.·1hat is vaguely 
called prestige -·le cannot accept an insult f'rom an 
uncivilized -.ower and merely say we are sorry for it" . 3 He 
pondered how Britain, irrespective of material consideration, 
had always foug~t to safeguard her prestir:e and asked the 
commons rhetorically 'l.'lhat was the orig in of the Bhootan war 
and answered that it was precisely the same, the detention 
of , and the insult to, the British envoy . Even Gladstone4 , 
Disraeli and the Earl of Ellenborough felt that justice was 
on the side of Britain, and war vrith Theodore had become a 
necessity in order to maintain British prestige untarnished . 
But prestize was not a mere emqtive word . As 
Lord Stanley told parliament the J:Sritish government had 
decided to send an expedition to ... ~~th iopia under a strong sense 
o.f imperial necessity . For it was arc;ued that ·the Ethiopian 
affair would certainly have repercussions on the Indian 
people . And if Britain left the captives at Magdala to their 
1 . Hansard, Vol . CXC, p . 3, Queen's address, Yov . l7, 67 . 
2 . Ibid . , p . 35 , Lord Derby , Nov . l9, 67 . 
3 . Hansard, Vol . CXC, p . 212, Stanley in the Commons, 26 Nov . 67 . 
4 . Hansard, 3rd servies, CXC, p . 296 . 
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fate, the Indians \vould consider it as a sign of weal<:ness of 
:Sri tain and would not be slo\·.r to challenge the British govern-
ment in India. Layard went a step frrrther and told the 
Commons that it ·vras an imperial question and not limited to 
~ ~ . l l 
.tndla a one . Henry Rawlinson joined the choruses and argued 
that British prestige had to be restored £or greater needs . 
The Secretary of State for India, Sir Stafford Jorthcote, went 
on to the extent of G.eclaring in the Commons, that n if. it 
were not for India it would be a matter of grave consideration 
whether the expedition vias necessary at all . n 2 Later , writing 
to the Viceroy of' India, Northcote wondered "~tlhether Indian 
envoys to M:uscat and Zanzibar would have .found it to their 
advantage to have it commonly reported that Enr~land did not 
trouble herself to rescue her servants . 11 3 ~he Secretary of 
State for India was particularly anxious that the recognised 
conduct as to the inviolability of diplomatic personnel be 
upheld even at the cost of blood and treasure . 4 Cranborne 
sup-;orted this view . 
At the same time both the Whigs and the Tories 
were unswerving in -cheir opposition to any annexation o:f 
territories in Ethiopia, despite the fact that proposals to 
this effect were not lacking . Walley, an M. P . objected to 
l . Hansard, Vol . CXC, p .. 27~- . 
2 . Ibid . , p . 374 . 
3 .. l':orthcote-Lawrence, quoted by Lang, op . cit . p . 311. 
4 . Hansard, Vol.CXC, p . 37l . 
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any prior com.mi tmcnt excJ_uding the occupation of any Ethiopian 
terri tory . 1 Dr . Kra~- f, a misA ions.ry, su~t3ested that the 
British GovorJlffient should UJt overlo~k the op~ortunity of 
securin ~ a stronr.· '~O' ition j_n the Red sea rer~ion, alon ~ the 
avnue to India . 2 Soue in India \·rere only too enthusiastic -t;o 
occupy parts of ~.:.:thiopia . But these cuggestions fell on the 
deaf ears of -che .,::ovGrnrnent . T:'le ~arl of' _)erby stated in 
pr rliament that "euggestion i'or occupyin;; Abys; inia .for 
sanitorial and other purposes-God knows what - have been made 
to Her M.ajesty 's cov<..;rnment . 'But it has never crossed our 
minds to go one ctep further than to obtai n the release of 
the prisoners . n3 Earl Russell, the leader o:t• the oppoci tion 
expressed satisfaction at the assurance of the Government that 
no terri toria]_ acquisitions would be made . 4 Layard was happy 
at the ~uee:n' s "distincttt assurance to the saoe eff'ect . 5 
Gladstone hoped that as soon as the object of the expedition 
was accomplished Britain woulci Ji thdrav.r from .Dthiopia and never 
again mix herself with the affairs of t~at or similar countries. 
Disraeli assured the commons that Britain was r.oing to war not 
to obtain territory, not to secure co~ercial advanta~es, but 
l . Hansard , Vol . CXC, p . 97 . 
2. "P.P.", p . 5l3 , Krapf-Stanley, Oct . l, 66 . 
3 . Hansard, Vol . CXC, p . 44, 
4 . Ibid ., p . l7 . 
5. Ibid ., p . 277 . 
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for high moral causes, and moral causes alone . 1 
The Forei:;n Secretary told the Commons that "the 
sooner we are again out of the country CBthiopii) an the less 
we have to do v.~i th it in the futur·e the better . ~.e can do 
well \'Ti thou·t Abyssinians , and -t;he Abyssinians must learn to 
do without us , 112 In fact the position taken by the govern-
ment in public was completely in accord with their private 
instru.ctions to Na~lier, nthat he \.ras not sent to overthro·w 
one ruler and set up another, to extend British territory or 
increase British influence . 113 
Thus it is clear that the British government had 
no desire to acquire any territory in Ethiopia or to establish 
any influence . She had \·rai ted patient"ly in the hope that 
Theonore 1-"Tou.ld release the captives; but this had not happened . 
But slowly 1 .hen the British realized that their prestige had 
been at stake they reacted strongly. It was prestige and 
prestige alone , \~ich in the end led to Napier ' s expedition 
to IVIagdala . 
Parliament ':las almost unanimous on thiQ issue and 
the two political narties acted with perfect understanding 
under the circumstances . Earl Russell the leader of the o~po-
sit ion f'el t "that parliament \-.ras bound to extend every 
consideration and forbearance to the government 11 • 4 
l . Hansard , VolCXC, p . l90 . 
2 . Ib i d ., p . 217 . 
3 . F . O. l / 21 , F . O. S . S . for India - Napier 10/9/1867 . 
4 . ~sard, Vol . CXC , p . 590 . 
lltl 
CHAPrER IX 
It is not the object of this research to go into the 
various details of Napier's expedition to Ethiopia. Once the 
decision was made to liberate the captives by force, the 
responsibility of organising the whole expedition was transferred 
to the India Office. 
performed his duties. 
Sir. Stafford Northcote meticulously 
The government took no chance and 
enormous amounts of money - over nine million pounds - was spent 
on the expedition. As far as possible every contingency was 
foreseen and adequate provisions were made to meet the same. 
The Bombay government was instructed to make all the 
1 
necessary local arrangements for the departure of the expedit-
ionary force which, on the recommendation of Napier, had been 
fixed at 13, 000. The British diplomatic agents for the fiddle 
East and Spain were instructed to buy the needed package animals. 2 
Forty four elephants were sent from India to carry the heavy guns 
on the march. A ' railway complete with locomotives and some 
twenty miles of track was laid across the coastal line. At Zula, 
the landing place, large piers, light houses and warehouses were 
established. Two condensers to convert salt water into fresh 
water, and three ships with hospital facilities were sent.3 Then, 
l. For more details see, Holland & Hoizier, A Record of The 
Expedition to byssinia,2 vols. LONLON; 1870. 
2. P.Papers; 1867-68, Vol.XLIII, pp.57. Papers connected with 
The Abyssinian Expedition, Under ecretary of State for 
War - Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; 
August 27, 1867. 
3· P.P. 1 , Vol, XLIII, pp. 56, 
The Secretary of State for India - Governor of Bombay 
August 27, 1867. 
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with the help of the Imperial Mint at Vienna, 50,000, £aria Theresa 
dollars, which was the only acceptable currency in Ethiopia, was 
l 
obtained to pay for Ethiopian goods. 
Meanwhile, permission was obtained from the Khedive for 
the passage of the expedition through Egyptian territory. 2 Indeed, 
it took a little effort and tact to convince Khedive Ismail to 
restrain his excessive enthusiasm to co-operate with .Britain, 3 for 
any sign of collaboration with the Egyptions,who were the 
traditional enemies of Ethiopia,would have made British progress 
in Ethiopia very difficult. However, with grace, the Khedive 
acceded to the British request. ermission of the Ottoman and 
Persian governments ~ere procured to use the overland telegraph 
routes. 
The force's intelligence corps under Col. Merwethere 
contained many interesting personalities, among whom ·may be 
mentioned John Krapf, 'who was the first European to see the snows 
of Mt. Kenya1 , and the New York Herald's war correspondent, Henry 
Horton Stanley o:f later African :fame. A geographer, a zoologist 
and a representative of the British Museum, were among the members 
o:f the expedition. Observers were sent by the French, russian, 
Italian, Dutch, Austrian, and Spanish governments. 
l. 1 P •• 11 , vol, XLIII, pp.258 
The Under Se~retary to The Government of India -
The Deputy Governor of The Bank of England, October 3, 
1867. 
2. np.an, vol, XLIII, pp.85, 
Memorandum of the Under Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs, September 8, 1867. 
3· 11 P.P.", vol, XLIII, pp.335 
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs - The 
Acting Consul General of Alexandria, October 10, 1867. 
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Col. Merwether had t-aken great care to maintain close 
relations with the local chiefs through whose territory the 
l British army had to pass to Magdala • Even before the commence-
ment of the campaign King •J.enelek of Shoa had opened correspondence 
with Col. 11er\"ether at Aden, and the latter had arranged to have 
him sent certain presents and a friendly reply. But, even more 
important were the relations with Kassai of Tigre who had now 
asserted his independent position. He rendered invaluable 
assistance to the British army, by helping them to procure the 
needed supplies of food and fodder, and by preventing sporadic 
attacks on the caravan of supplies. These arrangements, effected 
by Merwether, played a very important role in the success of the 
expedition. 
In October, 1867, the first advance guard arrived at 
Z~a, and by the end of the year most of the force had arrived 
at that port. Vlith the arrival of ir Charles Napier at Zyla, 
in January 1868, commenced the long march of the army to Magdala. 
Meanwhile, Napier had issued an ultimatum to Theodore 
asking him to release the captives and avert the final catastrophe. 
He stated: 
Ny sovereign has no desire to deprive you of 
any part of your dominions, nor to subvert 
your authority, although it is obvious that 
such would in all probability be the result 
of hostilities. 3 
1. Holland and Hoizier, op.cit., pp.317. 
2. · 1P.P.u 1868, vol.XLIII, pp.28. Further Papers on The 
Abyssinian Expedition } emorandum by Sir Robert 
Napier, February 7, 1868. 
3· Napier 1 s ultimatum to Theodore, Holland and Hoizier,op.cit. 
pp. 352. 
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This note never reached Theodore for Rassam destroyed it 
suspecting that it would infuriate the King and thus endanger the 
lives of the captives. 1 
A proclamation was also issued to the people on the 
objectives of the expedition, and it was emphatically stated that 
there was no intention of occupying any portion of the Ethiopian 
territory, or of interfering with the government of the country. 
Rewards and punishments were held out for all depending on their 
co-operation or opposition to the British expedition. 2 
Conscious of the strength of the British force3 
Theodore did not make any attempt to check its progress; also he 
had no control over the coastal areas (which were under the 
effective authority of Kassai who was actively assisting the 
British) through which the British army was marching. Moreover, 
he seems to have had a blind faith that he would emerge as a 
stronger man destined to give Ethiopia a millenium of peace and 
prosperity. Till the end, he cared for no human assistance at 
all, as he believed in a current Ethiopian prophecy that an 
European king would meet an Ethiopian sovereign, and afterwards a 
king would reign in Ethiopia greater than any before him. Theodore· 
was thus hopeful 11 that a king ·would come to treat with a kingn 4 • 
l. Blanck, OP.cit., pp.380. 
2. Napier• s proclamation to the people of Ethiopia, January 18, 
1868. 
trP.P.u, vol.XLIII, pp.34, Further Papers on the Abyssinian 
Expedition. 
3. Blanck, op.cit.pp.35l. 
4. Blanck, op.cit.pp.l97. 
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All the same, he was not prepared to surrender, even if everything 
went bad for him. At that time, his army of 10,000, was no more 
than a rabble and he, naturally, decided to defend himself, what 
was until then the impregnable fort of Magdala, where his 
possessions had been ~reserved and the captives had been held. 
In March, 1868, Theodore reached Magdala along with his monster 
cannon, ns_ebastapooln. He ordered the removal of fetters from the 
captives and behaved in a friendly manner towards them. He told 
Rassam that he had lost all Ethiopia, but that he would wait there 
so that God's will might be done. 1 
As Theodore had known, his army was not a match for the 
disciplined and well-equipped British force. On the 10 April, 
in the first action Theodore's army was beaten. Theodore asked 
Rassam to reconcile him with the British commander; whereupon, 
Napier commended Theo~ore for his bravery, and told him that his 
army had fallen before a superior force ru~d assured him of 
honourable treatment, if he were to release the prisoners and 
submit himself to the Queen. 2 After this, Theodore released the 
captives and sent a thousand cows to Napier as a sign of friendship. 
But, Napier could not allow Theodore to continue to rule Ethiopia 
since he had instructions to take him a prisoner to Bombay, and 
hence demanded his surrender. Theodore would not even consider 
such a proposal, and the hostilities were renewed. A small action 
took place on April 13, when the fort of Magdala fell into the hands 
l. Ibid. 
2. uP.P.u, vol. XLIII, pp.734, Napier-Theodore, April 1868. 
of the British; Theodore committed suicide, and the British 
a rmy found only his dead body. 
1 6 
The British commander arranged a decent burial for 
Theodore, bombarded the fort and left it n a blackened rock as 
a warning to all who injure the subjects of Her fajesty the 
Queen of Englandta .l He did not assume any responsibility for 
creating an administrative fabric for Ethiopia, and soon started 
on his return march. By June the army reached the coast, and 
on the lO June Napier left for England. Britain's prestige 
had been restored! 
1. "P.P." 1867-68, vol. LXIII,(3955/5) p.13, Further Papers 
Connected with The Abvssinian Expedition. 
Napier-Menelek, 28 April 1868. 
147 
CHAPrER X 
The conduct of Robert Napier towards the chiefs of 
Ethiopia bears eloquent te~timony to the disinterestedness of 
the British Government in seeking any influence in Ethiopia, and 
to their reluctance to interfere in the domestic politics of 
that country. At the time of the British intervention in 
1867-68, there were three important chiefs in Ethiopia all of 
whom were interested in seeking British assistance in promoting 
their own plans. In the north was Kassai who was struggling to 
consolidate his position in Tigre; in the west was wakshoom 
Gobaze who was in command of an army of 30,000, and was awaiting 
the time when he could proclaim his sovereignty over Ethiopia; 
in the south was Menelek of Shoa, who since his escape from 
Theodore's fetters at Magdala, had grown strong and was not devoid 
of imperial ambitions. Each of these chiefs welcomed the 
British intervention, since each was interested in the fall of 
Theodore. Though they were anxious to see the end of the 
tyrannical rule of Theodore they had not dared to attack the 
despot, for even in his declining days Theodore's very name 
created mortal terror in their hearts. 1 But all these chiefs 
were one in thinking that after overthrowing Theodore the British 
should withdraw from Ethiopia as soon as possible. 
Not only inclination but circumstances also favoured 
a British policy of friendship towards these chiefs as their 
l. 'P.P.ll, l867-68 vol, XLIII pp.28, Further Papers on 
Abvssinian Expedition. Napier's Nemorandu.m 
February 7, l868. 
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co-operation was absolutely necessary for a quick and successful 
conclusion of the campaign. But the British government was 
determined not to get mixed up with the wishes and aspirations 
of these provincial rulers; within this frame work, Napier 
tried to follow a policy of nonintervention in the domestic 
affairs of Ethiopia, maintenance of a balance of power among the 
local chiefs, and repudiation of any responsibility for the 
administration of the country after the fall of Theodore. 
Of the three Ethiopian chiefs, Menelek of Shoa was in 
contact with the British Resident at Aden, even before the 
beginning of the expedition, and had declared his genuine desire 
for Britain's friendship. 1 
Kassai of Tigre also had sent a messenger to Merwether 
expressing his faith in the declared objectives of Britain in 
invading Ethiopia and desiring true friendship with Britain. 2 
Kassai equally saw the importance of forging closer ties with the 
invading army with a view to boosting his own prestige and if 
possible to getting their assistance in consolidating his 
authority over Tigre; more so in checking his only great rival 
Gobaze. But when he wrote a friendly letter to Merwether and 
Napier calling himself' ttthe head of the chiefs of' Ethiopiatt, 3 he 
received a courteous but noncommital reply. In his memorandum 
1. uP.P.n, 1867-68, vol. XLIII, pp.38, Papers Connected with the 
Abvssinian Expedition, Stanley-Menelek, August 19,1867. 
2. t•P.P.L', vol. XLIII, pp.564, Merwether-Napier, December 19,1867. 
3. uP.P.'', vo1. XLIII, pp. 569, Napier• s :Memorandum. 
on the subject, Napier, referring to the pretensions of Kassa 
wrote of the need for vigilance in nintercourse with the 
Abyssinian chiefs and to avoid being involved in the internal 
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d~sputes of Abyssinia11 • 1 On 23 February 1868, a meeting took 
place between Kassai and Napier at which the former asked that 
the British army should undertake to guarantee his dominions 
against any invasion by his rival Wagshoom Gobaze. This, 
Rober~Napier unhesitatingly refused, on the ground that England 
would not interfere in the domestic ~airs of the country. 2 
However, Nerwether was quick to appreciate the importance o:f 
maintaining closer ties with Kassai through whose territory the 
army had to pass to Hagdala. 
\ agshoom Gobaze was not less anxious for British 
assistance against Kassai . He wrote to Napier explaining how 
he was obstructing their common enemy, Theodore. But the central 
theme of the letter was quite clear. He wrote Uif he (Kassai) 
tells you Tigre belongs to me from my father, you must not take 
it for the truth11 .3 Herewether replied that the commander in 
chief would have nothing to do with the internal affairs of 
Ethiopia, and he would treat all as friends, and no more. 4 
.After the fall of Magdala and the death of' Theodore 
Napier thought of' restoring some ba~ance in the country among the 
rival chiefs, though he was committed to the policy of noninter-
1. 11 P.P.u, vol. XLIII, pp. 569, Napier• s Hemorandum January 20 1868. 
Blanck, op.cit. pp.415. 
2. Napier's Memorandum, Ibid. 
3. 11 P.P.u, vol. XLIII, pp.613, Gobaze-Napier. 
4. 11 P.P.u, vol. XLIII', pp.6l4, :Merewether-Gobaze. 
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vention in their affairs. He planned to hand over the strong 
t b -P -P h" . •t l 1-, h I fort of Magdala o Go aze in proo.1. 0.1. 1s s1ncer1 y. t>J ags oom s 
deputy was sent for to receive the possession of the fort which 
he declined to accept. However, the commander presented him 
with 200 of Theodore's muskets. 2 Even then Gobaze, in spite of 
the desire of Napier, avoided meeting him as he felt that he had 
nothing more to expect from him. 
Without a knowledge of Theodore's fate and death, 
Menelek of Shoa in a friendly letter to Napier offered his help.3 
Napier communicated the happy news of Theodore's death and 
informed Menelek that the British army, having attained its 
objective, was on a return march. 4 
Almost in identical language Napier wrote to Kassai 
about the death of Theodore and desired to meet him on the eve 
of his departure. On 25 May, 1868, Kassai with his principal 
chiefs was in attendance to take leave of the general. Napier 
presented him with a battery of mountain guns and mortars, and 
muskets for one regiment.5 It was intended to help Kassai to 
defend himself against enemies, both from within and without. 6 
Though the Foreign Secretary had writiEn that the British 
l."P.P.u, vol,XLIII, pp.739, Napier-Gobaze, April 15, 1868. 
2. Markham, op.cit. pp.366. 
3· uP.P.u, val. XLIII, pp.739, Menelek-Napier. 
4. Napier-Menelek, April 28, 1868, Ibid. 
5. Markham, op.cit. pp.38l-82. 
6. ttP.P. 11 , vol. XLIII, pp.806, Napier - The S.S. of India, 
June 9, 1868 
government had no concern with what might happen to Ethiopia by 
the removal of Theodore, Napier did not take the instructions 
verbatim. Being genuinely interested in the welfare of the 
Ethiopians, he did try to exert moral influence on the chiefs 
with a view to stabilizing the internal political situation of 
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that country. Napier was of the opinion tha~ in the past, most 
of the Ethiopian difficulties had arisen as a re·sult of one man• s 
ambition to rule over all; in his belief this had led to internal 
dissensions, and in turn had invited external aggression also. 
Napier thought that the best hope for Ethiopia lay in the 
territorial status guo and the mutual co-operation of the great 
chiefs. So he persuaded both Kassai and Gobaze to leave in 
l peace and work for the progress of the country. 
Soon after the fall o:f Magdala a number of Ethiopian 
chiefs wished to transfer their allegiance to Britain. 2 Had 
Napier intended to establish British influence in Ethiopia 
opportunities were not lacking. But he ·not only refused to 
exploit the situation, but advised the chiefs to refrain from 
senseless politics and warfare.3 A little later, Haste Yohannes, 
one of the nominal emperors of Ethiopia wandered into the British 
camp, but the commander treated him with scant ceremony as he had 
no intention of meddling with the issue of the succession to the 
l. nP.P.", vol. XLIII, pp. 812, Napier-Gobaze, May 28, 1868. 
~ -
2. Markham, op.cit. pp.363. 
"P.P. 11 , vol. X:&III, pp.810, Napier - The Secretary of State 
for India, June 18, 1868. 
3· Ibid. 
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throne. 1 
The British government was equally firm on this issue. 
Bridgtower, an Englishman living in Italy, claimed descent from 
the Solomonoid line and requested the Foreign Secretary to 
2 
support his claim to the Ethiopian throne. The British 
Government replied that they had no intention of interfering with 
the succession to the throne of Ethiopia.3 Thus there was 
absolutely neither any intention nor effort on the part of the 
British Government to establish their influence in Ethiopia. 
Napier's letter to Sir Stafford Northcote brings out clearly the 
spirit of Britain in her dealings with Ethiopia . In a character~ 
istic Victorian spirit it reads: 
1. 
2. 
3· 
I think it may be said that the object of 
the expedition has been accomplished without 
the rights of the princes or the chiefs of 
the country having been interfered with by us: 
and that the prospect of Abyssinia enjoying 
tranquility is, at this day, fairer than it 
v1as at the date when our army landed on the 
coast.
4 
Markham, op.cit. pp.364. 
11 P.P.n, 1867-68, vol. XLIII, pp.l88, Bridgtower - Hammond, 
September 13, 1867. 
Ibid, pp.188, The Under Secretary for the Foreign Office -
Bridgtower , September 18, 1867. 
nP.P.u, 1867-68, vo1. (3955/VI), pp.54, Napier-
Northcote, June 18, l8o8. 
CHAPI'ER XI 
In 1848 Palmerston had talked optimistically 
of the advantages that might accrue to Britain and Ethiopia 
from closer friendly and commercial relations. In 1867 
Stanley had reached the conclusion that they could do 
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better without such ties. No doubt the intervening period 
being one of frustrated hopes, had brought about disillusionment 
to both powers. Devoid of unity of purpose, and failing 
to understand each other, they could have hardly fared 
better. ut, for us to understand what happened, we must 
necessarily undertake an analysis and appreciation of British 
and Ethiopian aims which were mostly irreconcileable and often 
ran counter to each other. 
One of the important British objectives in Ethiopia 
was the extension of trade. Consul Plowden had been highly 
optimistic about this as he believed that it vJould quadruple 
within a short time if the British government helped the 
Ethiopians to exploit the immense and undeveloped natural 
wealth of their country, and to protect their trade from the 
Turkish exactions at Massawa. He had also hoped that a long 
period of commercial intercourse would stimulate the Ethiopian 
economy, and that the resultant prosperity would create a 
further demand for manufactured goods. It is with this end 
in view that the British Government endeavoured to procure 
an independent sea port for Ethiopia. 
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Unfortunately, this policy did not find a congenial 
environment for execution in Ethiopia, because of the peculiar 
social and economic attitudes of the people. First of all 
the christian Ethiopians, who constituted a majority of the 
population, looked down upon the trader whose position was 
considered inferior to that of the soldier or the priest. 
Indeed, it was difficult to convince them that trade and commerce 
had an important contribution to make towards national progress, 
and that the trading class was as important as any other 
professional class. Such conservative attitudes did not help 
matters in the least. econdly, the Ethiopia.n econoiJ.y was very 
primitive and the need of the people for manufactured goods , as 
also their ability to pay for them, was very limited. For 
instance, Ethiopian productions were mostly agricultural and, 
except for coffee, they had not much with an export va~ue. 
Though northern Ethiopia was suitable for cotton production, 
the staple w~s neither extensively cultivated nor had its 
commercial importance been realized by the people. By the time 
Britain began to consider the possibility of promoting the 
cultivation and trade of this staple, her relations with 
Ethiopia had so much deteriorated, that it was no longer 
possible for her to pursue commercial objectives. 
To the Victorians, trade was not an end in itself; 
it was also a means to civilize underdeveloped people. But 
to the disappointment of the "civilizers 11 the thiopians 
remained unreceptive to the idea. There was not an _ ~thiopian 
of any consequence who was genuinely interested in im_r:,roving 
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himself or his country through British association, though this 
is not to suggest that they were ignorant of such possibilities. 
Some Ethiopian chiefs had a vague notion of the progress ·which 
Britain had made and frequently requested the British 
government to supply them with artisans and builders to cast 
cannons and build churches . They sought nritain's assistance 
in acquiring arms and ammunition . Partly because of 
negligence, but mostly because of ignorance they did not think 
of reforming their government, or their tax system, or of 
impoving the lot of their people by exploiting and developing 
their internal resources . Where they did, as in the case of 
Theodore, their approach to reform did not correspond with that 
of Britain. Also, the absence of similar outlook, the constant 
civil war, and the suspicion of Ethiopian's towards foreigners 
frustrated the British hopes of reforming Ethiopia. 
As to the stopping of the slave trade, though a 
fair measure of c;greement existed between the Ethiopian rulers 
and the British government, not much could be accomplished . 
Though Theodore prohibited the slave trade, because of his 
constant preoccupation, with wars and lack of resources, he 
could not suppress it . The 1'1Uslim merchants continued to 
sell christian Ethiopians into slavery at the Turkish ports of 
Jidda, Iv1assa.wa, and Suakin, and Britain could only protest 
against it to the Porte. As the Islamic law permitted the 
slave trade, and the Turkish officials were much in its favour, 
the Porte was in no serious frame of mind to take effective 
steps to suppress it to please the christian conscience of their 
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doubtful ally. In the 1860•s through Massawa and Suakin alone, 
each year, about 10,000 Ethiopians were exported to the Hiddle-
East and other places, and this was very distressing to the 
British Government. 
Moreimportantly Britain had entered Ethiopia to 
counteract French activity in the Red sea region, and to 
safeguard from possible French menace, the sea route to India. 
However, it did not take long for Britain to realize that her 
suspicions regarding French intentions lacked substance. In 
fact, from 1848 to 1860, there was hardly any French activity 
in E thiopia as Napolean III had been busy playing for higher 
stakes elsewhere. Thus, once the French fear was removed, 
Britain had no reason to be very active in Ethiopia. 
Whatever the reactions of Britain to this changed 
situation, as far as the Ethiopians were concerned the 
situation had changed. Great expectations had been raised in 
them by Britain' s friendly approaches. v.Jhile the British 
government considered the commercial treaty as a means to 
promote material ends, the Ethiopians thought of it as a means 
to procure British assistance against the Turks from whom they 
hoped to recover certain territories which had been a part of 
the historic Ethiopian empire. They hoped that Britain, as 
a christian power, would help them against their Muslim rivals. 
However, Britain, as a world power with global interests, 
did not always take into consideration religious sentiments 
in her political relations. During the nineteenth century 
British policy was to uphold the integrity of the Ottoman empire 
and this was necessary to check Russian expansion towards 
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Constantinople which commanded the traditional overland routes 
to India. She was equally keen. to maintain good relations 
with Egypt in view of the strategical importance o.f the 
Alexandria.-Suez overland route. Moreover, any weakening 
o.f British influence in Egypt and Turkey was likely to be 
.followed by an increase in French influence, and such a 
development was not to Britain's liking. Hence, Britain 
needed to be on .friendly terms with both powers. Understandably, 
Britain neither supported the Ethiopian ambitions against 
Turkey, nor prevailed upon the Turks to raise their arms embargo 
against Ethiopia. This policy led to a serious friction between 
Britain and Ethiopia, .for the Ethiopians considered as their 
enemies all those who were on friendly terms with Turkey. 
v hat ever the Ethiopian reaction, Britain did endeavour 
to preserve Ethiopian independence by thwarting the Turkish 
and Egyptian ambitions against her. This policy did not always 
make .for happy relations with Turkey who at first suspected and 
later detested Britain's relations with Ethiopia. Particularly 
the Turkish authorities at Massawa were determined in their 
opposition as they feared that Britain's intervention in 
Ethiopia would put an end to the slave trade which brought them 
such good profits. They were equally embittered by the view 
that Britain had no right to interfere in Ethiopia which they 
held to be a part of the Sultan's domain. In spite of these 
difficulties Britain persisted in maintaining friendly relations 
with all the three powers without sacrificing her political 
influence with one or the other, a difficult task indeed. 
Whatever the indiscretions of Consul Cameron, and the 
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excesses of Theodore, the basic contraditions in the British 
and Ethiopian policies and attitudes would have led to a clash 
between them sooner or later. But the more important question 
is whether it was necessary for Britain to send an expedition 
of 13,000 men to release the captives from Theodore's fetters? 
All available evidence suggests that Britain want to war with 
Ethiopia to restore her prestige, and thus to retrieve her 
position in the Red sea region and elsewhere, and, naturally, 
the lives of the captives mattered much to her. Certainly, 
there cannot be any doubt as to the objectives or results of 
the expedition. apier's expedition, which left the fortress 
of agdala a t blac~ened stone' , did heal the wounded pride of 
Britain. 
But why did Britain choose to withdraw from thiopia 
without seeking for herself commercial or territorial benefits 
there? Ever since the establishment of consular relations with 
Ethiopia the British Government had disclaimed any territorial 
ambitions in that country, and reiterated this assurance to 
Parliament on the eve of the departure of the expeditionary force 
from nombay. One reason for this would appear to be that the 
period of the partition of Africa had not set in; it was still 
in the future. o long as Britain was assured of informal 
influence, there wa.s no need for her to saddle herself with 
responsibility for administering backward territories. After 
Napier's successful expedition, Britain's.prestige in that region 
had gone up. The ~thiopian chiefs had come to admire not only 
the prowess of ritish arms and their superiority, but also the 
sincerity of her professions. As they were friendly and well 
disposed towards Britain there was no need for her to go to 
the trouble of ruling that country. 
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Moreover Napier's victory had been made possible by 
the co-operation of the Ethiopian chiefs who were not only 
anxious to see the fall of Theodore, but also determined to 
maintain the independence of their country. They had 
co-operated on the distinct assurance of Britain that she 
would withdraw from thiopia soon after the captives had been 
released. Any step contrary to the undertaking would have 
provoked the hostilities of the chiefs and exposed Britain to 
countless troubles. .lso, Britain, wished Ethiopia to be 
independent as the trouble of ruling such proud and recalcitrant 
people was not worth the returns. Even had Britain desired 
territory, as Lord Stanley told parliament, thiopia was not 
the place to look for it. 
More importantly, Britain \vas interested in the Red 
Sea coast of Ethiopia, and this was in Turkish hands. As long 
as a friendly Turkey could be trusted with the coast there was 
no need to occupy Ethiopia. \Ihenever the status Quo was 
threatened by a foreign power Britain was i@pelled to move into 
the area, and as a matter of fact British policy became active 
in Ethiopia only whenever the French showed signs of activity 
in that region. So long as France kept away from active 
interference Britain would do likewise. In 1867-68 there wa.s 
not much danger from France, and hence no need for Britain to 
saddle herself with the administration of Ethiopia. Moreover, 
a wave of anti-imperialism was sweeping Britain, and no more 
India's were desired on the African coast. 
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There is, therefore, no wonder that Britain withdrew 
from Ethiopia and that Disra.eli took the opportunity to assert 
the purity of purpose which had taken her to that country. 
Thus two decades of British relations with Ethiopia 
had not brought about any radical changes in the situation. 
Britain's commercial expectations had not been fulfilled; 
reforms had not been introduced in Ethiopia, and all hopes of 
modernization had been given up. The Victorians had been 
shocked by the way the two decades of' their relations with 
Ethiopia had ended. As Robinson and Gallagher observe, 
"the imperialism of Free trade among non .8uropean people were 
disappointing ••• no westernizing collaborators had been found. 
Their response had not been what the political economists 
had foretold; no waves of regeneration as Palmerston or 
Buxton had dreamed had rolled along the trade routes of 
tropical rurica.ul British experience in Ethiopia was no 
exception to this pattern. 
1. Robinson & Gallagher, Op.Cit, P.5-6. 
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Addendum 
In this supplement I would like to deal with those points which 
are either insufficiently emphasized in the preface or not at all raised 
there. As stated in the preface, this is a thesis on Anglo-Ethiopian relations 
from 1846 to 1868, and as the aim was to examine how Britain became 
interested in Ethiopia and why she failed to establish successful relations 
with her, the emphasis had to be political. ~~ile some aspects of British 
policy like commerce, the balance of power in the Red Sea region and 
Anglo-Turkish relations, which were found integral to the thesis are 
discussed in some detail, other aspects like British attitudes towards 
slavery and reform are omitted. 
One might wonder whether more should not have been said about British 
public and parliamentary opinion that helped bring about the 1867 
expedition and the part played in it by religious and commercial groups 
of the time; but it must be remembered that the religious and commercial 
groups which, as handmaids of modern imperialism, played such an effective 
role after the 1880's, had not yet acquired great importance in the 1860's 
and we do not have any evidence of their having a hand in bringing about 
the 1867 expedition. Likewise, in the 1860's the agencies shaping public 
opinion were relatively few, nevertheless, had I had an opportunity to 
conduct an extensive study of the newspapers and journals of the time I 
could have elaborated the chapter on public opinion, though it is doubtful 
if the conclusions presented in the thesis and based on careful study of 
parliamentary papers and debates would have been altered. 
2 
Now a few \lords about the authenticity of the source material: 
British parliamentary papers on Ethiopia 1846-68. At the outset t\vo 
questions offer themselves: how acceptable is this source, and would it 
be possible to compensate for the factors of bias? The veracity and 
historical value of these papers could be evaluated fairly by an analysis 
of the intention of the government presenting them and the circumstances 
in 1:vhich they were presented. In this instance, the conservative 
government of Derby, which presented the papers to parliament through 
1866-69, needed no justification to send an expeditionary force to 
Ethiopia as British public opinion was already demanding such a measure. 
The government had no need to suppress any vital information or distort it 
while presenting the previous twenty years correspondence on Ethiopia 
with which it had very little to do. Even the opposition in parliament 
was in agreement with the government. The papers seemed to me a dependable 
source, and wherever it was thought otherwise efforts were made to compare 
it with other sources. For instance, the papers do not reveal clearly one 
of the important reasons for establishing consular relations with Ethiopia: 
the fear of possible French preponderance in Ethiopia and the Red Sea 
region. Probably the government with an eye on good relations \·Jith the 
French Empire avoided spotlighting the correspondence on such a recent 
phase of Anglo-French rivalry in the region. A careful examination of 
other sources helped to restore the balance. But for the want of space many 
instances could be cited showing how the material was evaluated critically. 
I am hopeful this thesis would be borne out by the original correspondence 
of the Foreign Office. 
K.V.R. 
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